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ABSTRACT 
Automatic Detection of Safety and Security Vulnerabilities in Open 
Source Software 
Syrine Tlili, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2009 
Growing software quality requirements have raised the stakes on software safety and 
security. Building secure software focuses on techniques and methodologies of design 
and implementation in order to avoid exploitable vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, cod-
ing errors have become common with the inexorable growth tendency of software size 
and complexity. According to the US National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST), these coding errors lead to vulnerabilities that cost the US economy $60 
billion each year. Therefore, tracking security and safety errors is considered as a 
fundamental cornerstone to deliver software that are free from severe vulnerabilities. 
The main objective of this thesis is the elaboration of efficient, rigorous, and practical 
techniques for the safety and security evaluation of source code. To tackle safety er-
rors related to the misuse of type and memory operations, we present a novel type and 
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effect discipline that extends the standard C type system with safety annotations and 
static safety checks. We define an inter-procedural, flow-sensitive, and alias-sensitive 
inference algorithm that automatically propagates type annotations and applies safety 
checks to programs without programmers' interaction. Moreover, we present a dy-
namic semantics of our C core language that is compliant with the ANSI C standard. 
We prove the consistency of the static semantics with respect to the dynamic se-
mantics. We show the soundness of our static analysis in detecting our targeted set 
of safety errors. To tackle system-specific security properties, we present a security 
verification framework that combines static analysis and model-checking. We base 
our approach on the GCC compiler and its GIMPLE representation of source code 
to extract model-checkable abstractions of programs. For the verification process, we 
use an off-the-shelf pushdown system model-checker, and turn it into a fully-fledged 
security verification framework. We also allow programmers to define a wide range of 
security properties using an automata-based specification approach. To demonstrate 
the efficiency and the scalability of our approach, we conduct extensive experiments 
and case studies on large scale open-source software to verify their compliance with 
a representative set of the CERT standard secure coding rules. 
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After more than two decades of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) hegemony, the 
software market witnesses an inexorable migration towards Free and Open Source 
Software (FOSS). COTS software used to be considered more secure, stable and ma-
ture for corporations and organizations. However, the intrinsic limitations of COTS 
software such as closed source code, expensive upgrades, and a lock-in effect have 
emerged over time. Furthermore, FOSS has achieved a great level of maturity and 
growth that makes it ready to compete with COTS. FOSS is developed either by 
volunteers, academia, non-profit organizations, or by large firms who want to include 
commodity software to give a competitive advantage to their hardware products. To 
date, thousands of FOSS projects are carried out via Internet collaboration. Many 
of these FOSS products are widely available and are considered to be as mature and 
secure as their COTS equivalents, at a lower or no cost. FOSS is now perceived 
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as a viable long-term solution that deserves careful consideration because of the po-
tential for significant cost savings, improved reliability, and support advantages over 
proprietary software. 
The principle of open source software is that the user can freely use and modify the 
source code. This raises a controversial debate regarding the security consequences 
of this principle. Some security experts claim that open source software is more 
secure because of the concept of peer review or multiple eyeballs where anyone can 
potentially examine source code, identify security flaws, and propose security fixes. 
Other security specialists claim the reverse arguing that malevolent parties could 
also take advantage of the open source to identify software vulnerabilities with the 
intention to exploit them. The two standpoints are defendable, however an empirical 
comparison between FOSS and COTS [100] has shown that software defects and 
vulnerabilities are detected and fixed more rapidly in open-source projects. As such, 
it is necessary that security issues be addressed, in a scientific manner, for open source 
software that tends to increase in size and complexity. Consequently, the safety and 
security evaluation of source code is a very important step to build secure software. 
The purpose of this research is the elaboration of practical, rigorous, and efficient 
techniques for the security and safety evaluation of FOSS. 
2 
1.1 Motivations and Problem Statement 
Most of the existent open source software is written in the C [75] and C++ [76] pro-
gramming languages which are considered as the defacto languages for system pro-
gramming [90]. Such software includes operating systems (Linux [74], PreeBSD [59]), 
device drivers, and is complemented with Internet servers (Apache, Sendmail, Bind), 
databases (MySQL), etc. C/C++ fulfill performance, flexibility, strong support, and 
portability requirements [87]. However, security and safety features are either ab-
sent or badly supported in C/C++ programming. Lack of type safety and memory 
management left at programmers' discretion are the source of many critical security 
vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows, format string errors, and bad type conversions. 
We refer to memory errors and type errors in source code as low-level safety errors. 
Besides, the C/C++ libraries provide programmers with functions for privilege man-
agement, file management, network management, etc. These functions are designed 
with the care to provide flexibility and performance features at the cost of neglecting 
security concerns. A misuse of these functions can lead to privilege escalation, data 
leaks, and denial-of-service attacks. We refer to the coding rules that should prevent 
these kinds of errors as high-level security rules or security properties. 
1.1.1 Need for Automated Verification Tools 
Despite the availability of many books and documents that guide programmers writ-
ing safe and secure code [1,2,20,73,129], implementation errors that have severe 
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security consequences still exist in source code. This is because the C/C++ library 
functions are inherently unsafe/unsecure and should be used with precaution. Even 
skilled programmers tend to inadvertently commit errors that render their code vul-
nerable and potentially exploitable from a security standpoint. As the number of lines 
grows, manual checking of security violations becomes cumbersome and error-prone 
for programmers. Therefore, automated techniques for vulnerability detection are 
very helpful for programmers in diagnosing security and safety errors for the purpose 
of sanitizing their code. In the literature, there is a range of error detection approaches 
that can be mainly classified into dynamic analysis and static analysis [8,11,12,32,94]. 
Dynamic analysis monitors program execution to spot errors as they occur. Precision 
and accuracy are its key features. However, they come at the cost of a significant 
performance overhead induced by the runtime monitoring. Moreover, dynamic ap-
proaches suffer from incomplete path coverage as they consider one execution path 
at a time. The exploration of all execution paths requires the challenging definition 
of a large number of test cases. On the other hand, static analysis operates on source 
code without program execution to predict potential runtime errors. It offers the 
cost-saving advantage of the early detection of software errors. As opposed to the dy-
namic counterpart, static analysis can perform an exhaustive path coverage and does 
not introduce runtime overhead. In this thesis, "we consider the elaboration of static 
analysis techniques for the security and safety evaluation of software. Our research 
effort focuses, among other things, on the efficiency and the usability of the proposed 
techniques. 
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1.1.2 Heavy Annotation Burden on Programmers 
The evolution of static analysis in the arena of security and safety verification is re-
markable. It went from simplistic approaches based on syntactic pattern matching 
to more sophisticated semantic analysis of programs. The pioneers in this field are 
the Lint family of tools [54,80,84], that started by syntactically detecting unsafe 
constructs in source code. Then, they moved a step forward by taking advantage 
of coding comments to annotate programs with security and safety constraints in 
order to tackle more coding errors. ITS4 [126] and RATS [118] perform a lexical 
analysis that improves the Lint pattern matching by identifying the meaning of the 
parsed elements (variables, function arguments, function calls, etc.). Unfortunately, 
these tools generate a very high rate of spurious warnings. However, they have the 
merit of being the forerunner in using static analysis for security purposes. Other 
tools such as CQual [58] uses a type-based analysis to detect security violations 
in source code. CQual annotates standard C types with user-defined qualifiers. It 
mainly detects violations of secure information flow where data coming from an un-
trustworthy source is used in a trusted destination without being checked. Through 
their program annotation-based techniques, the aforementioned tools specify security 
properties that are intermingled with the source code. This tight relation between 
properties and source code allows these techniques to have a deep insight into program 
behaviours for the purpose of uncovering undesirable ones. Nevertheless, mixing the 
source code with the security properties limits the expressiveness and the diversity of 
security properties. The latter cannot be modularly denned and applied to different 
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programs. Besides, programmers are reluctant to use annotation-based techniques 
since the manual annotation process is effort and time consuming. Therefore, our 
goal is to define verification techniques that release programmers from this heavy 
annotation burden in order to increase and facilitate their usability during software 
development. 
1.1.3 Modular Security Property Specification 
The diversity of software system functionalities implies a diversity of their security re-
quirements. Therefore, programmers should have the ability to define and. customize 
their own system-specific security rules. MOPS [31] and MC [11] are ahead of other 
techniques in providing flexibility and customization features for specifying security 
properties. Both tools provide an automata-based language to define temporal se-
curity properties related to the sequencing of program actions. The specification of 
security properties is isolated from the targeted source code. Therefore, the specifi-
cation of a large range of security properties is worth the effort since these properties 
can be uniformly reused and applied to any software. These techniques utilize sophis-
ticated compiler representations such as control-flow graphs and call graphs allowing 
a semantic-based analysis. However, the availability of the aforementioned tools may 
be an issue. The latest version 0.9.2 of MOPS has been released in 2003. In addition, 
MC is now a commercial tool. 
A major difference between MC and MOPS that should be highlighted is that 
MOPS is based on model-checking, whereas MC is a static analysis tool. In fact, 
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new trends in software model-checking show great promise in detecting programming 
errors and exploring the correctness of software [18,28,35,35,37]. It is also efficient for 
the specification of a wide range of system-specific security properties. The model-
checking process is performed on a state transition system that captures program 
behaviours. The model-checker exhaustively searches the state space to verify the 
compliance of program behaviours with respect to the specified properties. The state 
explosion problem is the main issue of software model-checking [38]. The number 
of states grows exponentially with respect to the size of the analyzed program. This 
problem limits the applicability and the usability of model-checking for large software 
verification. Abstraction is a well-known and established technique to cope with the 
state explosion problem by safely reducing the size of the program model. Thus, 
the challenge is the generation of a concise and model-checkable abstraction of the 
analyzed program. We believe static analysis can be used for the generation of suitable 
and scalable program abstractions for model-checking approaches [42]. 
1.1.4 Efficient Synergy for Hybrid Approaches 
The notorious position of static analysis in the arena of safety and security verification 
of software is irrefutable. Nevertheless, the undecidability limitations of static analysis 
is also a fact [82], especially with imperative programming languages. For instance 
in C, pointer analysis such as aliasing is statically undecidable [106]. To remedy 
this issue, recent research trends move towards the definition of hybrid tools that 
establish a synergy between static and dynamic analyses to detect safety and security 
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violations [93]. Among these tools, we find CCured [94], SafeC [12], FailSafe [134], 
and RTC [72]. Generally, their main idea consists in using type inference to insert 
runtime checks in source code. The lightweight static analysis performed by these 
tools results in many runtime checks that induce a performance overhead that range 
from 30% to 150%. For instance, CCured performs a flow-insensitive type analysis 
that does not take into account pointer aliasing that is considered as crucial for the 
safety analysis of pointers. As a result, many superfluous runtime checks are inserted 
to overcome the limitations of CCured type analysis. Moreover, most of these tools 
only focus on spatial memory errors, i.e., out-of-bound accesses of pointers. Errors 
related to the bad sequencing of memory operations such as using freed pointers and 
double-free of pointers are not tackled. A more sophisticated type analysis is required 
for these tools to prune runtime checks on operations that are statically guaranteed 
to be safe. Besides, the type analysis should also consider temporal memory errors 
that may result in undesirable system crashes. 
1.1.5 Flexible Integration of Verification Techniques 
Despite the increasing trends of automated source code checking, verification tools 
are not regularly used throughout software development process. The main reason is 
that most of these tools are not integrated into development tools and environments. 
Programmers are often required to learn how to configure and use security and safety 
verifiers. The steep learning curves of some tools discourage programmers from using 
them. Therefore, we face the challenge of building automated and scalable techniques 
8 
that can be efficiently integrated into the software development process in order to 
uncover a wide range of software vulnerabilities. More specifically, we target the 
severe and insidious memory and type errors of the C language that we refer to as 
safety errors. Additionally, we intent to provide programmers with the appealing 
capability of specifying and verifying system-specific properties that we refer to as 
high-level security properties. 
1.2 Objectives 
The ultimate goal of this work is to elaborate efficient, rigourous, and practical tech-
niques for the automated detection of safety and security vulnerabilities in source 
code. More specifically, our objectives are as follows: 
• Elaborate a taxonomy of coding errors that create severe vulnerabilities in 
source code. 
• Conduct a comprehensive and comparative study of existing techniques for 
safety and security evaluation of source code. From this, we should identify 
the advantages and the shortcomings of these techniques. 
• Elaborate efficient and practical approaches based on static analysis and model-
checking techniques for the automatic detection of security and safety violations. 
• Design and implement a safety and security verification toolkit that incorporates 
these analyses. 
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• Demonstrate the efficiency and the usability of our techniques by conducting 
case studies on large scale software. 
1.3 Contributions 
To pursue our objectives and solve the aforementioned related problems, we elabo-
rate and develop techniques for the security and safety verification of software. For 
the verification of low-level safety properties related to type and memory errors, we 
present a type and effect analysis that extends the standard C type system with safety 
annotations. We enrich our type system with static safety checks to detect insidious 
safety errors. For the verification of system-specific security properties, we present an 
approach that combines static analysis and model-checking. The combination aims 
at automating the construction of model-checkable abstractions and at allowing pro-
grammers to customize their desired security properties. In the sequel, we provide 
more details of the aforementioned contributions. 
1.3.1 Type and Effect Discipline for C Safety 
In this thesis, we define a novel type and effect analysis for detecting memory and type 
safety CTrors in C source code. Our formalism is based on an imperative language that 
captures the essence of the C language. The related contributions are the following: 
• Extending the standard C type system with effect, region, and host annotations 
to collect safety information of the analyzed program. Effects capture memory 
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operations in the program such as memory allocation, memory deallocation, 
pointer dereferencing, and pointer arithmetic. Region annotations are used to 
abstract dynamically allocated memory locations and declared variable memory 
locations. Regions also account for aliasing information, in a sense that pointer 
expressions annotated with the same region are referring to the same mem-
ory location. Finally, host annotations are used to track the state (allocated, 
dangling, wild, etc.) and the type of memory regions. 
• Denning flow-sensitive type annotations for program expressions that are al-
lowed to change at each program point. The flow-sensitivity endows our type 
analysis with capabilities to handle dynamic allocation and destructive updates 
of imperative languages. We also give an algorithm that uses region annotations 
to account for aliasing information and to propagate annotation updates of an 
expression to all its aliases. 
• Defining a set of static safety checks that rely on the defined annotations to 
detect unsafe pointer usages and unsafe type conversions. Our static checks are 
compliant with the ANSI C standard [75], however they are more restrictive in 
order to detect coding errors that may result in runtime errors. 
• Elaborating an annotation Inference algorithm that automatically propagates 
type annotations through an intraprocedural phase and an interprocedural phase. 
• Establishing the soundness proof of the inference algorithm to our type checking 
rules in order to use it as a decision procedure for detecting safety errors. 
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1.3.2 Static Detection of Runtime Errors 
The ANSI C standard under-specifies the semantics of certain operations to allow some 
flexibility and portability in implementations. The under-specified behaviours of the 
C language can be classified into three main categories: implementation-defined be-
haviours, unspecified behaviours, and undefined behaviours. Implementation-defined 
behaviours represent details of the system that are left at implementation discretion 
such as the representations of integers in memory. Unspecified behaviours character-
ize cases for which the standard has no restriction such as the evaluation order of 
function arguments. Undefined behaviours that are of our interest occur when a pro-
gram performs an operation that is semantically invalid and leads to system crashes. 
For instance, accessing uninitialized pointers, dereferencing null pointers, freeing un-
allocated pointers, etc. One intent of this work is to prove that our type and effect 
analysis is able to catch all the occurrences of its targeted type and memory errors. 
The related contributions are the following: 
• Defining a dynamic semantics for the imperative language of our type and ef-
fect analysis. Our semantics is given in a structural operational style and is 
compliant with the ANSI C standard [75]. We also define a set of rules that 
capture runtime errors caused by our targeted set of unsafe type and memory 
operations. 
• Establishing the consistency proof between the static semantics and the dynamic 
semantics. In other words, we prove that the values produced by evaluation of 
12 
expressions in the dynamic semantics are consistent with the types assigned to 
them statically. 
• Establishing the soundness proof of our static analysis for the detection of the 
targeted type and memory errors. This proof is based on the established con-
sistency relation between the dynamic analysis and the static analysis. 
• Defining an effect-based interface that is used to supplement our static analysis 
with a dynamic counterpart. We use the collected effects to extract dunno points 
that characterize program points and execution paths of memory operations 
that are statically undecidable. These dunno points serve the purpose of guid-
ing code instrumentation for dynamic analysis. 
1.3.3 Verification of Secure Coding Rules 
To target high-level security properties, we define a security verification environment 
that brings static analysis and model-checking into a synergy. The core idea is to uti-
lize static analysis to generate concise and scalable abstractions of programs. Besides, 
programmers benefit from property expressiveness of model-checking techniques. As 
a result, our approach can model-check large scale software against system-specific 
security properties. The related contributions are the following: 
• Defining a framework based on static analysis and model-checking for software 
security verification. The main components of the framework are the GCC 
compiler and the off-the-shelf model-checker Moped for pushdown systems [112]. 
13 
We base our approach on the GIMPLB language-independent representation of 
source code provided by the GCC compiler. The intent is to define a flexible 
approach that can be extended to all languages that GCC supports. 
• Elaborating a model generator algorithm that automatically serializes GIMPLE 
representation of programs into model-checkable program abstractions. The 
generated program abstractions prune program behaviours that are not relevant 
to the considered security properties. Besides, the model generator algorithm 
can be optionally flagged to compute data dependencies of program expressions 
to enhance the verification precision. 
• Realizing the proposed verification approach by implementing it and conducting 
case studies on large scale and widely used C software. For the experiments, 
we verified the compliance of 35 Linux packages to a set of the CERT secure 
coding rules [2] that can be modeled as finite state automata. 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 gives a representative set of 
common coding errors and the different analyses and techniques used to reveal their 
presence in source code. Chapter 3 surveys the most prominent tools based on static 
analysis for the verification of C programs. The chapter also presents a comparative 
study of the techniques used by these tools while presenting their advantages and 
their limitations. Chapter 4 is dedicated to our type and effect discipline for memory 
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and type safety of C programs. The soundness of our static analysis for detecting our 
targeted type and runtime errors is established in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 describes 
our security verification framework based on static analysis and model-checking. The 
validation of our tool is done through the experiments detailed in Chapter 7. We 
draw conclusions and discuss future work in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 2 
Survey of Security and Safety 
Analyses 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we survey coding errors and the different analyses used for their de-
tection in source code. We focus on the C programming language [75] considered as 
the defacto language for system programming [91]. The standard C library of func-
tions provide programmers with appealing capabilities over memory management, 
file management, privilege management, etc. These functions are designed with weak 
or inexistent security features. A secure usage of these functions is left to program-
mers' responsibility. Unfortunately, inadvertent programmers often commit coding 
errors that may cause security vulnerabilities. Automated verification techniques are 
required to assist programmers in detecting coding errors and building secure code. 
16 
The current survey chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.2, we examine a 
representative set of coding errors that lead to security vulnerabilities. Section 2.3 
presents the prominent analyses used to uncover these errors in source code: static 
analysis, dynamic analysis, and model-checking. A particular emphasis is put on 
static analysis as it is the cornerstone of this thesis. In Section 2.4, we compare static 
analysis with dynamic analysis and model-checking in order to establish their duality 
and their synergy. 
2.2 What Causes Safety/Security Vulnerabilities ? 
This section gives a representative hence non exhaustive list of programming errors 
that can lead to critical security flaws. We classify these errors into memory man-
agement errors, race condition errors, file management errors, string manipulation 
errors, and privilege management errors. 
2.2.1 Memory Management Vulnerabilities 
Memory management left at programmers discretion is an enormous source of safety 
and security problems for the C programming language. The programmer has com-
plete control over allocation and deallocation of dynamic memory spaces, the size 
and the content of the allocated memory as well.. To this end, the standard C library 
provides a set of functions for memory management. The inappropriate use of these 
functions may allow an unauthorized access to data in any memory location or to 
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consume all the memory locations and cause a denial of service. We present in the 
remainder of this section a list of common memory management errors. 
Use of Uninitialized Memory 
An uninitialized or wild pointer refers to a random memory location. The dereference 
of a wild pointer has an undefined behavior that can lead to system crashes and 
memory corruptions. When the random location of a wild pointer belongs to another 
process, the use of that pointer results in an unauthorized memory access. To prevent 
such undesirable behaviors, each declared pointer must be set to n u l l so as to refer 
to no memory location. The usage of a nul l pointer results in a segmentation fault, 
however it does not lead to unauthorized memory accesses. Listing 2.1 illustrates the 
bad usage of a wild pointer p. 
Listing 2.1: Use of uninitialized pointer error 
char * p ; 
c h a r *q = NULL; 
s t r c p y ( p , " H e l l o " ) ; 
s t r c p y ( q , " G o o d b y e " ) ; 
If the random location of p is not write protected and belongs to another process, 
the strcpy(p, "Hello") call will overwrite its content and corrupt the execution of that 
process. On the other hand, nu l l pointer q does not refer to any memory location. 
The call s t rcpy(q , "Goodbye") results in a segmentation fault. 
Use after Free 
Dynamically allocated memory that is not used anymore should be explicitly released 
by calling the f r eeO function. This good practice optimizes resource consumption 
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that helps increase the system performance. We refer to pointers to freed memory 
locations as dangling pointers. Their content may remain intact until the system 
decides to assign these locations to other processes. Thus, using a dangling pointer 
may lead to unauthorized memory access and system crashes. Listing 2.2 illustrates 
an unsafe usage of dangling pointer buff. 





















As detailed earlier, dynamic memory locations should be freed when no more used to 
speed up running processes. Inadvertent programmers often free multiple times the 
same memory location. The impact of these double-free errors is similar to the use of 
freed memory. If the freed location is assigned to another process, freeing again that 
location will corrupt the process execution. 


















*) malloc (BUFSIZ); 
Listing 2.3 shows an example of a double-free error. The aliasing between pointer 
p and pointer buff renders this kind of errors even harder to detect. There are 55 
19 
entries in the CVE database related to double free errors. In some cases, such as 
in MIT krb5 (CVE-2007-1216) and Mozilla Firefox (CVE-2009-0775), double free 
errors lead to malicious code execution on vulnerable systems. 
Free of Unallocated Memory 
The f ree( ) function must be exclusively called on a dynamic memory location derived 
from malloc, r ea l l oc , and cal loc functions. Pointers that are initialized with the 
address-of operator & refers to static memory locations on the stack. Freeing stack 
memory location is illegal and may lead to segmentation fault. Listing 2.4 shows 
examples of illegal free operations. 






















*) ma 11 oc (BUFS1Z); 
Moreover, free operations cannot be performed on pointers that do not point to 
the beginning of an allocated block. In C programming, pointer arithmetic operations 
are used to access different elements of an array. All elements of an array have the 
same type, the first element is placed at the beginning of the allocated memory, and 
the remaining elements are placed at incremented offsets from the first one. A pointer 
that refers to an element inside the array cannot be freed. In Listing 2.4, the illegal 
free operations of pointers q and p have undefined behaviors that may result in a 
segmentation fault. 
20 
Use of Unchecked Null Returns 
This error often happen when programmers do not check the return value of malloc 
functions before using it. When a malloc function fails, it returns a nu l l pointer. As 
explained earlier, using a nu l l pointer can result in a segmentation fault. Therefore, 
a programmer must always check the return value of all functions that yield newly 
allocated pointers. In the example of Listing 2.5, pointer p returned by malloc () is 
not checked before being used in function s t r c p y O . There are 187 entries in CVE 
related to the dereference of nul l pointers that lead to denial of service attacks. 













A memory leak occurs when a process fails to release its assigned memory before 
termination. Given that operating systems assign a limited amount of memory space 
to each process, memory leaks degrade performance and can cause a program to run 
out of memory. 
Listing 2.6: Memory leak error 
char *p; 
p = (char *) malloc(BUFSIZ); 













An example of memory leak is given in Listing 10. When condition c evaluates to 
true the function returns without freeing the location of pointer p. Many memory leak 
errors listed in the CVE database are found in Linux kernel such as CVE-2009-0031, 
CVE-2008-2375, and CVE-2008-2136. These memory leaks consume all the kernel 
assigned memory space and lead to system crashes. 
Buffer Overflows 
Buffer overflow errors arise from weak or non-existent bounds checking of input being 
stored in memory buffers [73,133]. Attacks that exploit these errors are considered as 
the worst security threats since they may provide attackers with a complete control 
over the target host. The absence of bounds checking allows attackers to overflow 
buffers with data that contains malicious code and overwrites the return address 
pointer that controls the process execution. The malicious data redirects the exe-
cution to the attacker code that will execute with the privileges of the vulnerable 
process. If the process is running with root privileges, the attacker will be granted 
full control over the victim host. 
Buffer overflow errors are present in legacy code that uses deprecated functions 
that are readily exploitable such as g e t s O , s t r c p y O , and s t r c a t O . In Listing 2.7, 
function g e t s ( ) reads from the standard input and stores inte-str without performing 
any bound checks. 
Listing 2.7: Unsafe use of deprecated functions 
int main () { 
char *str = 
gets (str); 
} 
(char *) malloc(BUFSIZ); 
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The standard C library provides safe replacement for these deprecated functions 
such as s t rncpyO, s t r n c a t O and fge t s ( ) . These functions accept a length value 
as a parameter which should be no larger than the size of the destination buffer. 
Nevertheless, a bad usage of these so-called safer functions can lead to buffer overflow 
errors as well. A common error in the use of the safer memory copying functions 
is related to wrong assumptions about the parameters. For example, s t rncpy(char 
* s l , const char *s2, s ize_ t n) copies n bytes from s2 to pointer s i . When the 
size n is not properly set, this can lead to buffer overflow even though a safer function 
is used as shown in Listing 2.8. 





strncpy(strl, str2 ,20); 
To prevent this kind of security threats, deprecated functions that suffer buffer 
overflow errors should never be used. Moreover, safer replacement of these functions 
should be used with precaution since they do not systematically eliminate buffer 
overflow risks. In the CVE database, there are not less that 4879 entries related to 
buffer overflow errors. Their harmful impact range from system crashes to remote 
code execution. 
2.2.2 String Manipulation Vulnerabilities 
String manipulation errors can lead to severe security breaches in programs. The 
C library of functions provides a set of string functions that should be used with 
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precaution since they suffer security pitfalls. We present in this section some coding 
errors related to string manipulations. 
Format String Errors 
Format string errors arise from the misuse of output formatting functions that take a 
variable number of arguments. The C standard library contains many of these func-
tions such as p r in t f ( ) , fpr in t fO, spr in t f ( ) , snprintf() , vprintf() , vsprintf (), 
and vsnprintf(). All these functions use a format string argument that enable pro-
grammers to specify how strings should be formatted for output. Since these func-
tions do not entail a specific number of arguments, the C compiler cannot check for the 
presence of the format string argument. Besides, format strings arguments very often 
come from a user input that may contain a value different from what programmers 
expected [73]. Listing 2.9 illustrates a trivial sample of format string errors. 




main(int argc, char* 




In this sample, p r i n t f () interprets the first "%" character in the user defined 
argument argv[l] as the format string. For instance, if the argument contains the 
"%d" characters, the pr intf () function will use it as a format string to display a 
decimal integer. The function fetches for this integer in its allocated memory space 
called the stack, and then prints it out. This is quite dangerous since it gives attackers 
the possibility to read information from various memory locations. These errors can 
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be even more dangerous, since they may be exploited to overwrite memory locations 
using the *%n" format string. Generally, attackers take advantage of format string 
errors to inject malicious code and execute it with the privilege of a vulnerable process. 
Assumption of Null-Termination 
For flexibility purposes, C programming does not entail any size limitation for strings. 
The C compiler depends on the presence of the null character "\0" to signal the 
end of strings. The idea is to keep on reading from or writing to a string until 
reaching the null character, thus there is no need to know in advance the length of a 
string. Nevertheless, if the string is not null-terminated, it can be accessed out of its 
boundaries and lead to buffer overflow. Unfortunately, many C string functions make 
the naive assumption that the last character in a string is the null character. This 
assumption allows for adjacent memory buffer overflows [113,125]. 
Listing 2.10: Invalid null-termination assumption 
int main () •{ 
char longStrC 3 = "This is a long string"; 
char shortstr [163; 
strncpy(shortStr, longStr , 16); 





In Listing 2.10, the so-called safe function strncpy () overwrites the null character 
that marks the end of string shor tSt r . The subsequent p r in t f () call has an unde-
fined behavior since there is no null character that stops it from displaying output. 
To prevent these insidious errors, strncpy call should immediately be followed by the 
statement sho r tS t r [15] = ' \ 0 ' to mark the end of the shor tS t r string. 
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2.2.3 Race Conditions 
As stated in [27], " A serialization flaw permits the asynchronous behavior of different 
system components to be exploited to cause a security violation'. For instance, we 
assume that a process A validates some conditions before performing a given set of 
operations. In the meanwhile, a second process B exploits a timing interval, after 
process A validates its conditions and before it performs the operations, to invalidate 
these conditions. Thus, process A will execute the set of operations with the invalid 
assumption that the conditions are still valid. The timing interval exploited by process 
B is created by a serialization flaw known as a race condition. They often occur 
in concurrent and asynchronous execution environments where multiple threads or 
processes access the same resources without taking care of the execution order. The 
Time-Of-Check-To-Time-Of-Use vulnerabilities (TOCTTOU) in file accesses [19] are 
a classical form of race conditions. Listing 13 illustrates an example of TOCTTOU 
flaw. 
Listing 2.11: TOCTTOU error 
if (access(pathname, W_0K) == 0) 
fd = open(pathname, 0_WONLY); 
Function access() checks the write permissions of file pathname. On success, 
function openO is granted the write access to the file. It is important to notice 
that the check operation and the access operation are not executed atomically. If 
the file referred by pathname changes between the access() and the openO calls, 
the executing process will access a file without checking its permissions. This is an 
example of TOCTTOU error in which the binding of a file name can be changed 
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and lead to a security flaw. In order to understand TOCTTOU binding flaws, it is 
important to notice the two different methods of naming objects in UNIX System [19]: 
• File path name: it specifies the path through the file system to reach the target 
object. The kernel enters each folder in the path starting from the root folder 
until it reaches the target file. This naming method requires the kernel to 
traverse at least one level of indirection before reaching the target file. 
• File descriptor: it is a unique per-process non-negative integer used for accessing 
open files. A file descriptor does not have any level of indirection, the kernel 
uses it to directly access the target file. 
The naming method based on file path name is vulnerable to TOCTTOU binding 
flaws because of its multiple level of indirection. The kernel has to follow a long path 
before reaching the target object, in the meanwhile another process can change the 
binding to another object. The file descriptor naming method gives a direct access to 
the target object, thus it is much more difficult to exploit a TOCTTOU flaw when 
system calls use file descriptors. 
2.2.4 File Management Vulnerabilities 
The standard C library provides functions for creation, deletion, and manipulation of 
files and directories. Improper usage of these functions can lead to different security 
flaws such as sensitive data leaks, data corruptions, and privilege escalations. We 
discuss a set of file management errors in the following paragraphs. 
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Improper File Permissions 
In Unix systems, we refer to file creation permissions as file creation mask. The latter 
is divided into three categories: permissions of the user that owns the file, permissions 
of users that belong to the owner group, and permissions of all other users. When a 
file is created it inherits the current process mask which may be inconvenient to the 
system designer. The function umask0 provided by the C standard library is used 
to explicitly set the desired access permissions of newly created files. Precaution is 
required when setting a file mask, when the mask is too loose unauthorized users may 
have access to the created files. While on the contrary, a too tight mask may deprive 
users of file accesses intended by the system designer. In the sample code of Listing 
2.12, file unsafe f i l e is created without setting a safe file umask. Unauthorized 
users may have access to unsafe f i l e . For file pathname, the file creation mask "077" 
prevents all users except the owner from read, write, and execution accesses. 
Listing 2.12: Unsafe umask setting 
int fd = fopen 
umask(077) 








In addition to setting adequate file masks, files should be created in secure folders 
that have restricted access privileges. A good practice is to create files under folders 
that are exclusively accessed by their owners and system administrators. 
Unsafe Temporary Files 
Temporary files are very often used by processes to store intermediate results or to 
speed up their computation. By default, many programs store their temporary files 
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in the /tmp directory with default access permissions. Programs can also use other 
directories for temporary files. In all cases, if the directory and file access permissions 
are incorrectly set, it is possible for the temporary file to be used as an attack vector 
for the system [129]. The temporary file can be accessed and sensitive data can be 
leaked. An attacker can also tamper with the content of the file and create denial 
of service attacks. Moreover, temporary files should be removed from the system 
when they are no longer used. The information they contain is very valuable for the 
creation of attack scenarios. Therefore, temporary encryption files, cookies, and other 
internet temporary files should be deleted on a regular basis for security purposes. 
2.2.5 Privilege Management Vulnerabilities 
The least privilege principle entails that a running process should have privileges and 
capabilities that allow it to access resources that are necessary for its execution [21,47]. 
All accesses that are not required to perform its tasks should not be granted. The 
C library provide functions for privilege management. As for all C functions, misuses 
of these functions can lead to critical security threats. We present some privilege 
management errors of C programming in the following paragraphs. 
Dropping Privileges 
Setuid programs execute with the privileges of their owner, so ordinary users can 
access files and devices even if they do not have the required permissions. For in-
stance, the /usr/bin/passwd program used to access the highly sensitive password file 
29 
/etc/passwd is owned by the privileged root user. Nevertheless, unprivileged users 
are granted root privileges for executing /usr/bin/passwd and changing their own 
password. Thus, it is mandatory to write secure setuid programs. A good security 
practice is to follow the principle of least privilege. In other words, a program should 
acquire the needed privileges to accomplish a task, then drop these privileges as soon 
as they are not needed anymore. Listing 2.13 illustrates a sample code where the 
acquired root privileges to execute /usr/bin/passwd are never dropped. 





"passwd", username, NULL); 
Generally, unsafe setuid programs owned by root are triggered by many attackers 
since they enable them to gain full control over a vulnerable system. 
Chrooted Jail 
As part of the least privilege principle, a process should be confined to a virtual file 
system that contains exclusively the files required for its computation. This good 
practice helps reducing the impact of an eventual attack that can gain control over 
a vulnerable process. The C library provides the chrootO function to confine a 
process into a virtual working directory and deny all accesses outside of it. As for 
all C functions, the usage of enroot '() should meet some requirements to obtain the 
expected security effect. 
Function enroot O executes with root privileges. It is obvious that the root privi-
leges should be dropped after the enroot () call as mentioned previously. Nevertheless, 
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inadvertent programmers omit to do so and the process remains with root privileges 
inside the chrooted jail. This inadvertence opens a breach inside the confined di-
rectory that can be exploited by attackers to acquire high privileges. Moreover, the 
chrootO call creates the virtual directory but does not redirect processes to it. An 
explicit call to chdirC'/") must be performed to confine processes into the chroot 
jail, otherwise the latter is ineffective. Listing 2.14 provides a trivial example of a 
bad chroot () function call. 
Listing 2.14: Ineffective chroot jail 
char path [] = "/usr/jail"; 
chroot(path); 
/*...*/ 
/* program exists without performing chdir ("/")*/ 
2.3 Vulnerability Detection Techniques 
The detection techniques outlined in this section are categorized into static analysis, 
dynamic analysis, and model-checking. Existing tools and projects in each of these 
categories are presented in Chapter 3. 
2.3.1 Static Analysis 
Static analysis operates at compile time for error detection in source code. It is 
founded on program analysis theory for the safe prediction of program runtime be-
haviors [95]. Static analysis has so far been used for program optimization such as 
dead code elimination, loop optimization, and inline expansion [7]. The last decades 
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witnessed an inexorable expansion of static analysis in the arena of software secu-
rity [13,14,16,40,52,61,116]. In this section, we give on overview of the main static 
analysis approaches for security and safety verification. 
Abs t rac t In te rpre ta t ion (AI) 
Abstract Interpretation (AI) is a formal theory for constructing sound approximations 
of the semantics of programs [40]. It maps a program and its operations to an ab-
stract domain and abstract semantic operations, respectively. The mapping is based 
on mathematical concepts and structures that provide fine tuning of the abstraction 
process. AI is mainly used for optimizing programs, verifying programs, and build-
ing static debugging tools. The underlying mathematical foundations guarantee the 
soundness of Al-based analysis. Nevertheless, the precision of the analysis is condi-
tioned by the nature of the abstraction: (1) the abstraction might match exactly the 
actual behavior of the program, (2) the approximation might include extra behaviors 
as well as the actual behavior of the program, (3) the approximation might discard 
some important information about the actual behavior of the program. Efficient pro-
gram abstraction techniques increase the analysis accuracy and precision. However, 
they also increase the analysis complexity and may render it unscalable with large 
software. In fact, Al-based analysis faces a trade-off between the efficiency of program 
approximation and the precision of the analysis. 
Since the mathematics involved can be cumbersome and expensive to apply, there 
are few tool implementations supporting AI theory. PolySpace [104] and Abslnt [4] 
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are two commercial Al-based static analyzers that statically detect runtime errors. 
There are also academic tools such as Blast [68] and Saturn [8] that use predicate 
abstraction [15,37], which is a special form of abstract interpretation in which the 
abstract domain is constructed using a given set of predicates. 
Type Systems 
High-level languages use type systems in order to associate types with variables and 
expressions and to make the program more readable [26,101]. Types facilitate the 
understanding of the program structure and the interpretation of the data it uses. A 
type system consists of a set of typing rules and a set of type inference rules. The first 
set of rules defines types and associates them to language objects and expressions. 
Type inference rules deduce the type of an untyped expression in a given program. 
To prevent runtime errors, type systems are augmented with type constraints that 
enforce preconditions on inference rules [120]. If all type constraints of a program 
are solved, the program is well-typed and is free of runtime errors. This feature is 
summarized by Milner's famous slogan "well-typed programs cannot go wrong' [92]. 
The mechanism of type constraint generation and solving is now used for the 
specification and the verification of security and safety constraints on programs, re-
spectively [69,79,131]. The main approach consists of extending the type system with 
type qualifiers or annotations that hold security information. Then, security rules are 
expressed as constraints on these annotations [58]. For instance, the type-based tool 
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CQual [79] decorates standard C types with the qualifiers user and kernel to distin-
guish user space data from kernel space data, respectively. These qualifiers facilitate 
the specification of a security constraint stating that an untrustworthy user data 
cannot be used in function call where kernel data is expected. 
Type systems provide an elegant algebraic representation of an analysis in terms 
of compositionality and formality that facilitates the specification of typing rules 
and constraints. They provide an extensible analysis that can be easily integrated 
into the compilation process rendering the analysis fast and scalable. Despite their 
efficiency for detecting low-level property violations, type systems are not suitable for 
the verification of high-level security properties related to program functionalities. 
Flow Analysis 
Flow analysis is mainly categorized into control-flow analysis and data-flow analysis 
that are extensively applied for static program analysis [60]. 
Control-flow analysis computes a safe approximation of the order in which in-
structions of a program are executed. The control-flow graph is the most common 
representation used to model the flow relationships among program instructions [95]. 
Each node in the graph, referred to as a basic block, represents a sequence of consecu-
tive instructions in which the flow of control enters at the beginning of the block and 
leaves at the end of it without any branching or jump instructions. Directed edges 
represent transfer of control between basic blocks. Each possible execution path of 
the program has a corresponding path from the entry to the exit node of the graph. 
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Control-flow analysis is mainly used in code optimization for detecting dead code, 
infinite loops, etc. In the domain of security analysis, control-flow is particularly 
appropriate for the verification of temporal security properties that dictate the exe-
cution order of security-relevant operations. For instance, a temporal property may 
state that A call to s t a t ( f ) must not be followed by a call to open(f). 
On the other hand, data-flow analysis is a collection of techniques that approxi-
mate the values of expressions along all possible execution paths of a program. Data-
flow analysis algorithms are based on control-flow graphs extended with information 
about variables and expressions at each node of the graphs. Analysing the flow of 
data is more precise and leads to better code optimization than control-flow analy-
sis. For example, data-flow analysis handles the problem of reaching definitions that 
determines for each use of a variable, the assignments that could have defined the 
value being read. Solving the reaching definitions problem is useful for detecting 
uses of undefined variables, performing constant propagation, and eliminating com-
mon subexpressions [95]. In addition, there are more sophisticated data-flow analyses 
such as points-to analysis [10,119] and alias analysis [25] that focus on data memory 
locations. Points-to analysis is a technique that finds out to which storage locations 
a pointer can point during its life time. Alias analysis is a specific case of points-to 
analysis that finds out which pointers in a program refer to the same memory loca-
tion. This information is significant for the detection of bad pointer usages in C/C++ 
programs. 
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To summarize, flow analysis has a proven efficiency in code optimization and cod-
ing error detection. The separation between the data and the control flow gives even 
more flexibility in using this approach in program analysis. However, this approach 
is still used in an ad-hoc way and has less theoretical results than some other formal 
techniques such as type-based analysis and model-checking. 
2.3.2 Model-Checking 
Model-checking is an automatic verification technique that has successful results for 
hardware verification [132]. Recently, many research groups work on model-checking 
for software verification and demonstrate it has very promising results [35,127]. There 
are two main approaches for software model-checking: temporal logic model-checking 
and behavioral model-checking. For these two approaches, the program is translated 
into a finite state model that can be given as input to a model-checker. The program 
model is an abstraction that can be computed using flow analysis, abstract interpre-
tation, or type system frameworks. In the case of temporal logic model-checking, the 
property to check is specified in temporal logic [36]. The property expression is also 
given as input to the model checker. Then, the model checker performs an exhaustive 
state exploration to check if the model of the program satisfies the property. On 
the other hand, the behavioral model-checking approach compares the model of the 
implemented program against a model of its specification [78]. The main challenge of 
software model-checking is to define a precise model of the program and to deal with 
state explosion [38]. 
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2.3.3 Dynamic Analysis 
Dynamic analysis verifies the security and safety properties of a program at run-
time [17]. In contrast to its static counterpart, dynamic analysis examines the actual 
behavior of programs without performing any approximations. Hence, the results 
derived from dynamic analysis are precise, though they only hold for the current ex-
ecution of the program and cannot be generalized to all possible program executions. 
Testing is the most common technique for dynamic analysis. The effectiveness of 
the testing process depends upon the test data over which the program is executed. 
There is no guarantee that the selected test data would exercise all program execution 
paths to uncover property violations. As such, representative test data generation is 
for dynamic analysis what safe program approximation is for static analysis. 
Dynamic analysis is done through code instrumentation to collect information on 
programs and to perform property checks as they run. Code instrumentation can 
either be performed on source code or on executable files. Both approaches have 
their advantages and their drawbacks. Instrumenting source code utilizes compilers 
to insert annotations at different locations of the program. This high-level source 
code instrumentation yields a program annotated with the needed runtime checks. 
On the other hand, when source code is not available, as for commercial software, 
the code instrumentation is performed on executable files [86]. We can find in the 
literature many tools based on dynamic analysis for security verification. Purify [66] 
is a well-established commercial tool for the detection of memory leaks, double-free 
errors, and out-of-bound accesses. Insure++ [99] is another commercial tool that 
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detects memory errors, type errors, and string manipulation errors. There are also 
academic tools for the dynamic detection of memory errors such as Valgrind [115] 
and DMalloc [128]. 
2.4 Comparative Study 
Given the wide range of available approaches for analysing source code, choosing 
the suitable one depends on a set of criteria that we use in the comparative study 
presented in this section. First, we compare static analysis with dynamic in terms of 
completeness, soundness, performance, and cost of the analysis. Then, we compare 
static analysis with model-checking in terms of property expressiveness, soundness, 
completeness, and scalability of the analysis. 
Before we embark on the comparative study, we need to clarify the meaning of 
soundness and completeness in the context of security and safety analysis. A program 
analysis is sound when it does not suffer false negatives, i.e, it does not miss any 
occurrence of the targeted errors. A program analysis is complete when it does not 
suffer false positives, i.e, all the detected errors are actual errors. 
2.4.1 Static Analysis vs. Dynamic Analysis 
Static analysis and dynamic analysis are the two main protagonists that compete for 
the safety and security verification of software. A comparative study of these two 
analyses is of great interest to reveal their duality and their potential synergy [93]. 
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• Soundness: Dynamic analysis operates on actual program executions exercised 
by test data. The dynamic path coverage is restrained by the quality of test 
data. Some execution paths triggered by unexpected input data may not be 
considered during dynamic analysis. All property violations along these unex-
plored execution paths remain undiscovered. On the other hand, static analysis 
does not rely on any input data and performs an exhaustive examination of 
all predicted execution paths of programs. Static analysis strives for soundness 
by adopting a conservative and pessimistic approach that assumes worst-case 
scenarios for error detection. 
• Completeness: By its conservative nature, static analysis is inherently impre-
cise and suffers from a high rate of false positives. Moreover, undecidability 
is a fact in static analysis that we face very often, especially with imperative 
programming language such as C, C++, and Java [82]. In other words, it is the-
oretically impossible to determine whether a given property holds for a program 
or not. For instance, pointer analysis such as aliasing is statically undecidable, 
it typically infers that two pointers may alias along an execution path [106]. 
On the other hand, completeness is the key feature of the dynamic counterpart. 
All errors reported during runtime are undoubtedly actual errors. 
• Performance and cost: Dynamic analysis typically injects instrumentation 
code into analyzed programs. The execution of the instrumented code induces 
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significant time and resource overheads. Most of dynamic tools exhibited over-
head between 30% to 150% compared to the execution of the unmodified pro-
grams [12,61,66]. As a consequence, instrumented programs can be used for 
testing and debugging purposes and are unsuitable in production environments 
with stringent timing and resource requirements. On the other hand, static 
analysis offers the cost-save advantage of early detection of software errors. A 
research study showed that static analysis tools can provide a 17% to 23% cost 
reduction for reported security errors [14]. 
From this comparison, we can deduce that static analysis and dynamic analysis 
are rather complementary than competitive. Combining static and dynamic analysis 
is a very appealing and promising approach that aim at enhancing the overall out-
come of both analyses [49]. The synergy shall define a fair balance between soundness 
and completeness of the analysis. Recent research trends focus on combining static 
analysis and dynamic analysis [6,12,61]. These hybrid analyses insert runtime checks 
at program points where static analysis is undecidable. As a consequence, the number 
of errors detected by the overall approach increases compared to an approach exclu-
sively based on static analysis. In addition, the number of runtime checks decreases 
compared to an approach exclusively based on dynamic analysis. Our type and effect 
analysis defined in Chapter 4 is designed with the capabilities to resort to dynamic 
analysis for the purpose of overcoming static undecidability. It uses an effect based 
approach defined in Chapter 5 to efficiently guide code instrumentation for runtime 
checking. 
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2.4.2 Static Analysis vs. Model-Checking 
In what follows, we outline a set of criteria for the comparison of model-checking and 
static analysis. From this comparative study, we also deduce a duality between these 
two approaches that is appealing for the security verification of software. 
• Property expressiveness: When using static security analysis, the properties 
to be checked should be embedded within the compiler itself. Otherwise, the 
latter is not able to detect errors when it does not know them. This required 
compiler awareness restricts the number and the customization of security and 
safety properties to check. Model-checking does not suffer this limitation; it 
allows programmers to define a wide range of system-specific properties to ver-
ify. The desired properties are expressed in temporal logic or as finite-state 
automata. Moreover, model-checking is more suitable for detecting high-level 
security properties than static analysis. The latter checks low-level properties 
that can be directly mapped to source code, whereas model-checking can ver-
ify properties that are implied by the code without being explicitly present in 
it [48]. 
• Soundness and completeness: Both static analysis and model-checking oper-
ate on program abstractions. Therefore, they both strive for soundness and can-
not achieve completeness due to their conservative nature. However, there is a 
main difference between these two approaches in program modeling. Static anal-
ysis uses the compiler intermediate representations as program models, whereas 
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model-checking operates on a finite-state model of a program serialized into the 
input language of the model-checker. The main challenge of model-checking is 
the extraction of a finite-state model from the source code of programs. The 
model should be precise enough in order not to over-estimate and not to under-
estimate program behaviors. In fact, the precision of the analysis relies on 
the expressiveness of program abstractions. The effort and the time required 
by programmers to build a model-checkable abstraction hampers the usability 
and scalability of software model-checking. Recent research trends in software 
model-checking use static analysis to automate the building of a finite-state 
model of programs [23,41]. Compiler intermediate representations of source 
code such as abstract syntax trees and control-flow graphs are structured in a 
way that facilitates the automation of their translation to a given model-checker 
input language. 
• Scalability: Given the finite-state model of a program, the model-checking pro-
cess performs an exhaustive search of the state space to ensure the conformance 
of the program behavior with the specified properties. State explosion problem 
is the main issue of software model-checking [38]. The number of states grows 
exponentially with respect to the size of the analyzed program. This problem 
limits the scalability and the usability of model-checking for large software ver-
ification. Abstraction is a well-known and and established technique to cope 
with the state explosion problem by safely reducing the size of the program state 
space. During the program model construction, abstraction consists in retaining 
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program behaviors that are relevant for the desired properties and discarding 
those behaviors that are irrelevant [71]. Besides, there are also techniques that 
target the representation of states in memory to allow for an efficient and opti-
mized exploration of a state space. For instance, explicit state model-checking 
technique stores states in hashtables and ensures that each state is explored at 
most once. Symbolic model-checking stores state in sophisticated and compact 
structures such as Binary-Decisions-Diagram (BDD) for the speed up of the 
exploration process [24]. 
The comparative study of static analysis and model-checking shows that these 
approaches can achieve better results when jointly performing the security and safety 
verification of software. We present in Chapter 6 a security verification environment 
that brings static analysis and model-checking into a synergy in order to leverage the 
advantages and overcome the shortcomings of both techniques. The core idea is to 
utilize static analysis for the automation of program abstraction processes. On the 
other hand, programmers have the ability to define a wide range of security properties 
using an automata-based specification approach. As a result, our approach can model-
check large scale software against system-specific security properties. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we presented the most common coding errors of C programs that 
may lead to severe safety and security vulnerabilities. We also outlined the different 
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detection techniques used to automatically uncover coding errors. We mainly focused 
on static analysis that is the cornerstone of the thesis. We compared static analysis 
with dynamic analysis, then we compared static analysis with model-checking. The 
objective of the comparative study is to establish the synergies and the dualities 
between these approaches. In the following chapter, we present a list of existing tools 
that are mainly based on static analysis and model-checking for error detection. 
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Chapter 3 
Survey of Security and Safety Tools 
This chapter presents a survey of the prominent static analysis tools for vulnerability 
detection. The objective of this survey is to identify the techniques used by existing 
tools and the different capabilities they provide. We establish a comparative study of 
these tools based on the main characteristics of their approaches and their targeted 
security and safety violations. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 presents well-established annotation-
based tools. Automata-based tools are detailed in Section 3.2. Pioneer tools that 
combine static and dynamic analyses are outlined in Section 3.3. The proposed clas-
sification focuses on the main characteristics that distinguish each approach of the 
presented tools. We establish a comparative study of these tools in Section 3.4. We 
draw conclusion of this chapter in Section 3.5. 
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3.1 Annotation-Based Techniques 
Program annotations serve the purpose of specifying behavioral invariants that the 
code must satisfy. There are two main kinds of program annotations: (1) State-
ment annotations that decorate elements such as condition statements, loop state-
ments, and switch statements. (2) Type annotations that decorate standard types 
of programming languages. Both annotations can be used to enrich the semantics of 
programs with additional information that is useful for the detection of safety and 
security violations. We present hereafter prominent annotation-based tools that use 
the aforementioned techniques for security and safety verification of C programs: we 
detail their approach and their targeted vulnerabilities. 
3.1.1 Lint Family 
Statement annotation techniques utilize program comments to specify behavioral con-
straints and verify the conformance of the program to these constraints. To facilitate 
the reading and the understanding of their programs, almost 30% of the source code of 
Linux, PreeBSD, and OpenSolaris are comments [98]. Form this observation, ascrib-
ing semantics for program comments shows to be an appealing approach to specify 
and verify security properties of source code. 
Lint is considered as a pioneer tool that uses statement annotations for static ver-
ification of programs [80]. It performs a simple flow-sensitive type-checking analysis 
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that detects a basic set of programming errors: unused declarations, type inconsisten-
cies, unreachable code, use before definition, infinite loops, ignored return values, and 
execution paths with no return. Annotations that Lint adds are also used to eliminate 
false positives issued from its conservative analysis. For instance, the /*NOTREACHED*/ 
annotation is used to stop flagging unreachable code starting from a specific program 
point. The /*FALLTHRU*/ annotations is used to stop complaining about the ab-
sence of break instruction after a case statement. An example of the usage of these 
annotations is given in Listing 3.1. 





















There are also annotations for functions with variable number of arguments such 
as p r in t f () functions and scanf () functions. These functions are used to display 
output and to read input, respectively. They take a format string argument that 
specifies the format in which a data stream should be displayed or read. The ab-
sence or the bad usage of format string arguments can lead to critical security flaws 
know as format string vulnerabilities discussed in Chapter 2. The Lint annotations 
/*PRINTFLIKEn*/ and /*SCANFLIKEn*/ indicate that the nth argument of functions 
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printf () and scanf () respectively should be considered as the format string argu-
ment. Most of the Lint error checks are now embedded into the GCC compiler 
rendering the use of Lint obsolete. Nevertheless, Lint served as a starting point and 
as a source of inspiration for many other static detection tools such as LCLint [53] 
and Splint [84] that we briefly describe hereafter. 
In addition to the Lint checks, the LCLint tool makes more sophisticated usage 
of program comments to define behavioral constraints on the analyzed code. For 
instance, LCLint adds the comment /*@modif i e s *a@*/ to disallow modification of 
variables other than a. The sample code of Listing 3.2 should flag a warning when 
checked with LCLint, since function f oo() modifies argument b without being allowed 
to do so. 
Listing 3.2: LCint statement annotations 
static void foo(int *a. 
< 
*a = l, *b=2; 
} 
int main O 
{ 




int *b> /*@modifies *a@*/ 
The Splint tool uses more expressive annotations that tackle more programming 
errors than LCLint. Splint defines the clause requires to enforce function precondi-
tions and the clause ensures to state function postconditions. The preconditions and 
the postconditions are added to C/C++ library functions to detect security violations 
such as buffer overflows. Listing 3.3 shows the annotated version of the C function 
s t r cpyO. The precondition states that the memory size of s i in lvalue position 
referred to by maxSet(sl) should be equal to or greater than the memory size of s2 
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in rvalue position referred to by maxRead(s2). The postcondition states that pointers 
s 1 and s2 should have the same size after the copy operation. Moreover, Splint sup-
ports user-defined annotations and the specification of syntactic constraints on their 
usage. 
Listing 3.3: Splint statement annotations 
char *strcpy (char *sl 
/*0requires maxSet(sl) 
/*@ensvres maxRead(sl) 
/\ result == sl@*/\ 




The Lint family tools are very popular as they are among the oldest tools for 
static verification of source code. Their lightweight analysis is able to detect common 
programming errors in C source code. Nevertheless, they produce many false positives 
and the manual annotation burden renders programmers reluctant to use these tools 
on large scale software. 
3.1.2 CQual 
Another commonly used program annotation technique augments standard types with 
qualifiers. The latter provide a natural and easy way for programmers to ensure 
strong invariants of programs. In fact, types ascribe semantics to programs that 
discipline their behaviors, e.g., arithmetic operations cannot be used on values of type 
strings. Thus, extending types with qualifiers augments even more the semantics of 
programs by expressing strong invariants. For instance, the const type qualifier of 
the C language declares an object to be constant and disallows any modification of 
its value. Type qualifiers can also be used to express security and safety invariants of 
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programs. The verification process of these invariants can easily be integrated with 
the type-checking process performed by compilers. 
CQual is a type inference and constraint solving tool that detects vulnerabilities 
in C programs [58]. It provides a type qualifier framework that allows programmers to 
annotate standard C types with user-defined type qualifiers. These annotations refine 
on standard types by endowing them with security information. CQual expresses 
security properties as a set of constraints on annotated types. CQual verification 
process consists in inferring security type annotations to program expressions and 
checking constraint satisfaction on these inferred annotations. For instance, CQual 
has been used to detect user/kernel pointer errors where untrustworthy user space 
pointers are dereferenced inside the kernel space without being checked. To prevent 
these errors, CQual defines a security constraint based on two type qualifiers: user 
for unsafe pointers that are under user control, and kernel for safe pointers that are 
under kernel control. The security constraint entails that a user pointer can never 
be used where a kernel pointer is expected. This constraint implies an ordering 
relationship on qualifiers stating that user is a subordinate to kernel , and written 
user < kernel . CQual extends ordering relationships on qualifiers to subtyping 
relationships on qualified types according to the following built-in inference rules: 
<?i < <?2 
<7i i n t < <72 i n t 
9i < <?2 
9 iP t r ( r ) < <?2ptr(r) 
In these rules, q\ and 72 stand for type qualifiers and p t r ( r ) represents a pointer to 
a given type r . 
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Listing 3.4 illustrates the usage of type annotations to detect unsafe usage of user 
pointers. The C function c o p y f r o m u s e r O copies data from user space to kernel 
space. Pointer from is annotated with qualifier $user, whereas the annotation $user 
* $kernel of pointer t o stands for a kernel pointer whose content is from user space. 
In the considered sample code, variable m and c belong to the kernel space. The call 
to c o p y f r o m u s e r O assigns a value copied from the untrustworthy user space to 
the kernel memory location of pointer &;m. As such, CQual considers pointer m as 
unsafe since its content is from user space. It flags an error when the field buf of 
variable m is assigned to the kernel variable c. 
Listing 3.4: CQual type annotations 
unsigned long 
struct msg m; 
char c; 
copy_froi.user 

















CQual carries out a flow-sensitive inference algorithm that generates and solves 
security constraints on these type qualifiers. If the inference algorithm ever fails 
the constraint solving, a security vulnerability is reported. CQual performs a sound 
analysis, but the conservative nature of its analysis may lead to false positives. Despite 
the soundness of CQual, the required manual annotation effort hampers programmers 
from porting their legacy code to annotated CQual code. Rigorous annotation effort 
measurements shows that an annotation overhead of one annotation per 50 lines of 
code comes at a cost of one programmer hour per thousand lines of code [56,65]. 
CQual has also been used to detect format string vulnerabilities [116] and to verify 
the authorization hook placement in the Linux Security Modules [131]. 
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3.2 Automata-Based Techniques 
Automata-based tools are mainly based on flow analysis of source code. Their ap-
proach is based on the fact that many security properties are related to the execution 
sequence of security relevant operations(e.g., X should always happen before Y, X 
should never happen after Y). Such temporal security properties can be expressed as 
finite state automata that specify which sequences of actions are allowed. This sec-
tion illustrates two prominent automata-based tools, namely MetaCompilation and 
MOPS. 
3.2.1 Meta-Compilation 
The MetaCompilation (MC) approach [11,65] takes advantage of the compilation 
process to check violations of security properties in source code. Each property is 
expressed as a negation rule that specifies sequences of program statements that must 
not be executed. Programmers use a high-level automata language called metal [29] to 
express rule-checkers for security properties. MC rule-checker automata are classified 
into two categories [65]: 
• variable-specific checkers that express properties related to a specific program 
variable such as 'a freed pointer cannot be dereferenced'. 
• global checkers that express properties related to the whole program such as 
"interrupts are disabled". 
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The nodes of variable-specific automata represent states of the tracked variables, 
whereas the nodes of global checker represent global states of programs. The transi-
tions between states are labeled with patterns that match C code statements involved 
in a security rule. For instance, the metal rule in Listing 3.5 detects bad usage of 
freed pointers in C code. 
Listing 3.5: Metal checker of bad usage of dangling pointers 
state decl any_pointer v; 
start: { kfree(v) } ==> v.freed 
v.freed: { *v } ==> v.stop 
{ errCusing %s after free*" 
1 { kfree(v) } ==> v.stop, 





The state s t a r t denotes the initial state of the checker. Pattern v matches any 
freed pointer in the program. For each of these pointers, an automaton instance is 
created to track its state and report errors in case of security violations. The pattern 
kfree(v) triggers a transition from the initial state s t a r t to the state v . f reed, 
where pattern v stands for a freed pointer. From the state v. freed, two transitions 
are possible: (1) The first transition matches a pointer dereference pattern v and 
flags a use-after-free error. (2) The second matches a pointer deallocation pattern 
kfree(v) and flags a double-free error. 
The MC approach operates in two phases, an intraprocedural phase and an inter-
procedural phase: 
• The first intraprocedural pass applies the metal checkers to each basic block of 
the program control-flow graph generated by the compiler. The traversal of the 
graph uses a Depth-First Search (DFS) algorithm that goes along an execution 
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path until it ends. When the traversal reaches the end of a path it backtracks 
to the last branch point then resumes the traversal. Hence, all the execution 
paths of programs are explored. 
• The second interprocedural pass handles function calls through a refine and 
restore approach of the checkers states. When a function call is followed, the 
objects that pass from the caller scope to the callee scope should retain their 
state. When the call returns, the objects states are restored in the caller scope. 
As the call site information is kept at each function call, this interprocedural 
analysis is context-sensitive. 
In order to reach high scalability, analysis summaries recording the states of metal 
checkers are kept for each analyzed function. Summaries are checked at each function 
call. If the recorded states of the checkers match their current states the call is not 
followed. The existing summaries are used to reproduce the effect of analyzing the 
function. 
The MC approach has discovered many bugs in the Linux and BSD kernels [11] 
and has also been developed into a commercial product [43]. However, the scalability 
and the usability of MC come at the price of its analysis soundness. Many security 
violations such as pointer errors can pass through the checkers without being detected. 
These insidious errors are even more difficult to track in the presence of pointer 
aliasing. In fact, MC performs a trivial alias that considers simple assignment of the 
form x=y with no dereference operators for pointers. MC analysis also produces many 
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Figure 1 Automaton for the detection of bad chrootO usages 
chrootO 
chdirfV) 
false positives alarms, therefore the credibility of the analysis results can be affected. 
In order to reduce false positives, MC uses trivial data-flow analysis techniques to 
prune non-executable paths. Ranking heuristics are also used to sort the analysis 
results so that the most important security violations are displayed first in the final 
report [65]. 
3.2.2 M O P S 
MOPS [32] is a model-checker that detects violations of temporal security proper-
ties in C programs. MOPS defines a temporal security property as a finite state 
automaton. Each transition in the automaton is labeled with a syntactic pattern 
that describes a program statement. During model-checking, a transition is taken if 
its label matches the current program statement. The final states of the automaton 
are reached when the sequence of the executed statements violates the property. For 
instance, the automaton shown in Figure 1 entails that the chrootO function call 
must be immediately followed by a call to chdir (" /")-
The chrootO function creates an isolated virtual root directory (chrooted jail). 
When immediately followed by the chd i r ( " / " ) function, the working directory is 
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confined to the chrooted jail. Otherwise, an attacker will still have access to files 
outside the chrooted jail [30]. 
MOPS analysis performs a pushdown model-checking algorithm to detect safety 
properties violations in programs [50]. MOPS model-checking algorithm operates in 
two steps: 
• First, MOPS parses the control-flow graph of the analyzed program to derive a 
push-down automaton of the analyzed program [33]. Push-down automata are 
efficient in capturing interprocedural behaviors of programs [114]. They allow 
to perform an interprocedural and context-sensitive analysis since it matches 
each function call and function return with their corresponding call sites. It 
pushes the call site onto the stack at each function call and retrieves the call 
site from the stack at each function return. 
• Second, MOPS model-checker determines whether the considered property au-
tomata reach a risky state by computing the language intersection of the prop-
erty automata and the program push-down automaton. Since an automaton 
represents the negation of a security property, the result of the intersection 
should be the empty set to claim that the source code satisfies the considered 
properties. __ 
MOPS has been used on the entire Red Hat Linux 9 distribution to detect file 
system race conditions, file descriptor vulnerabilities, and unsafe usages of temporary 
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files [31, 111]. MOPS model-checking is sound under the assumptions that the ana-
lyzed C program is a portable, single-threaded program that has no function pointers, 
signal handlers, and no runtime code generation. The pushdown-automaton model 
of the program enables MOPS to be context-sensitive by keeping track of the return 
address of each function call. On the other hand, MOPS is path-insensitive and may 
generate false positives related to infeasible paths. Moreover, MOPS is data-flow 
insensitive and does not handle aliasing neither parameter passing during program 
verification. For instance, we consider a TOCTTOU error that may occur when a call 
to s t a t O is followed by a call to open() on the same file name. Misled by aliasing 
pitfalls, MOPS cannot detect error traces such as s t a t (x ) ;y=x;open(y). Besides, 
without considering parameter passing, MOPS misses the s t a t O call followed by a 
subsequent call to open() in a different function scope as shown hereafter: 
foo() in t bar (char * f i le) 
{ { 
int f = s t a t ( f l ) ; open ( f i l e ) ; 
bar ( f l ) ; /* . . . * / 
/ * . . . * / } 
} 
We show in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 that our approach can handle variable 
aliasing and parameter passing for revealing insidious error traces. 
3.3 Hybrid Techniques 
Recent research trends utilize hybrid approaches that combine static and dynamic 
analyses for memory and type error detection [6,12.94]. The combination aims at 
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overcoming the lack of precision of static analysis by injecting runtime checks in the 
analyzed code. The gain in analysis precision of hybrid approaches is appealing. 
Nevertheless, these approaches still require an effective static analysis to reduce the 
number of runtime checks and their induced overhead. We discuss in this section 
CCured [61] and SafeC [12] considered as the pioneers of hybrid analysis tools. 
3.3.1 CCured 
CCured [61] is a hybrid tool that combines type analysis and runtime checking in 
order to ensure safety of C programs. It takes as input a C code and outputs an anno-
tated CCured program instrumented with runtime checks for memory and type safety. 
CCured type analysis decorates the standard C type system with pointer annotations 
that distinguish between typed pointers and untyped pointers. The former pointers 
refer to objects with known types, whereas the latter refer to objects for which we 
cannot count on their static type due to cast operations. The annotations also de-
fine the required runtime checks to guarantee safe execution of memory operations. 
CCured defines the following pointer annotations: 
• The SAFE annotation is used for pointers to typed objects. Arithmetic opera-
tions are not allowed for SAFE pointers, thus runtime bounds checking is not 
needed. The only required runtime check for SAFE pointers is the null-check 
before dereferencing. 
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• The SEQ annotation is used for pointers to typed objects. Arithmetic opera-
tions are allowed for SEQ pointers, thus bounds checking on these pointers is 
performed at runtime. 
• The DYNQ annotation is used for pointers to untyped objects. The bounds and 
type of DYNQ pointers must be dynamically checked before dereferencing. 
To support runtime bounds and type checking, CCured defines fat pointers that 
maintain information on their size and their type referred to as metadata. CCured 
modifies the code of memory allocation operations in order to initialize the metadata 
of a pointer when created. 
CCured performs a sound analysis in the presence of runtime checks. It efficiently 
captures all out-of-bounds accesses and null dereferences in C programs. Nevertheless, 
CCured runtime checks increase drastically the performance overhead. An instru-
mented program may be three times slower than the original [88]. The flow-insensitive 
analysis and the lack of aliasing information restrain CCured from reducing the num-
ber of runtime checks. Definitely, CCured cannot be used for performance-critical 
software such as operating systems and drivers. Moreover, temporal memory errors 
such as the dereference of freed pointers and the dereference of uninitialized pointers 
are not detected by CCured as illustrated in Listing 3.6. The sample code memo-
ryEr ro r s . c is checked with CCured, the option -alwaysStopOnError generates an 
executable that always stops on error. However, the invocation of memoryErrors. exe 
shows that CCured does not detect nor prevent memory errors such as accessing freed 
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memory and use of uninitialized values. 
Listing 3.6: Limitations of CCured safety analysis 
int main(H 
int * p; 
int x; 
p = fcx; 




*p = 5; 
•/.d\n",*p); 
printf ("Use after f ree : 7.d\n" ,*p) ; 
return 0; 
> 
$ ./ccured —alwaysStopbnError 
memoryErrors.c -o memoryErrors.exe 
$ ./memoryErrors.exe 
Uninit value of x:1628796619 
Uninit memory :0 
Use after free :5 
3.3.2 SafeC 
SafeC [12] is another hybrid tool that utilizes static type inference to detect errors 
in source code and to insert necessary runtime checks. The main ideas of CCured 
approach are used in SafeC as well. SafeC changes the representation of pointers in 
memory in order to collect and maintain safety information such as memory bounds. 
Additionally, it performs a source-to-source translation for the conversion of pointer 
representations and the insertion of runtime checks. The augmented representation 
of pointers of SafeC is different from the representation of CCured fat pointers. A 
SafeC pointer is referred to as a safe pointer and it has the following representation: 
• Field value refers to the address value referred to by the pointer. 
• Fields base and s i ze refer to the base address and the offset of the memory 
location, respectively. 
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• Field storageClass indicates the kind of the pointer memory region, it can be 
Heap, Local, or GLobal. 
• Field capab i l i t y assigns a unique identifier for dynamically allocated memory 
blocks. 
To populate the aforementioned fields, SafeC modifies the source code of memory 
management functions such as the standard malloc functions and the f ree func-
tion. It also captures pointer creation through the addressof & operator and pointer 
arithmetic operations. 
At each pointer dereference, SafeC inserts a runtime check that refers to the base 
and the s i ze pointer fields for the detection of out-of-bounds accesses. It also inserts 
a runtime check that uses the storageClass and the capab i l i ty fields to verify that 
the memory region has not been deallocated. SafeC maintains a capability store that 
associates a unique identifier to each created pointer. When the pointer is freed, its 
identifier is removed from the store capability, thus the dereference of freed pointers 
can be detected. Unlike CCured, SafeC does not resort to garbage collection for the 
handling of freed pointers. 
The static analysis of SafeC is under-exploited. It serves the purpose of inserting 
runtime checks and converting pointer representations. It is never used to discard 
runtime checks related to pointer operations that are statically guaranteed to be safe. 
At runtime, SafeC exhaustively checks the memory bounds and the memory state 
(freed or allocated) for each pointer dereference. This heavy runtime checking induces 
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a high performance overhead that ranges from 130% to 540 % according to the authors 
[12]. Moreover, the modification of the memory layout renders executables generated 
by SafeC incompatible with other executables generated by standard compiler such 
asGCC. 
3.4 Comparative Study 
Prom the study of existing verification tools, we distinguish a set of analysis char-
acteristics that have an effect on the soundness, precision, scalability, and usability 
of these tools. We present below a listing of these characteristics in terms of their 
advantages and shortcomings. We also present the trade-offs that arise when choosing 
to design a verification tool with these listed characteristics. 
3.4.1 Flow-Sensitive vs. Flow-Insensitive 
Flow-sensitive analysis takes into account the execution order of program statements. 
This kind of analysis is used by MOPS, MC, and BLAST for the verification of 
temporal properties that entail a secure execution order of program actions. CQual 
also uses a flow-sensitive inference of type qualifiers that allows to set new values for 
qualifiers at each program point. On the other hand, flow-insensitive analysis does 
not consider the sequencing of program statements. Therefore, the generated results 
are related to the whole program and cannot be restricted to a specific program 
point. Flow sensitivity endows the analysis with precise results but at the cost of less 
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scalability. On the other hand, flow-insensitive analysis scales to large programs but 
do not provide accurate results. Trade-off between precision and scalability is a key 
factor in the choice between flow-sensitive analysis and flow-insensitive analysis. 
Pointer analysis raises the dilemma of flow-sensitive or flow-insensitive analysis 
[70]. In order to efficiently detect memory errors, it is useful to perform a pointer 
analysis to know the location referred to by a pointer and the set of aliased pointers 
to that same location. A flow-insensitive pointer analysis is scalable but less precise 
[10,119]. It can state that a given pointer p and pointer q may refer to the same 
location on some program paths. On the contrary, flow-sensitive approach is more 
precise and can derive more precise result such as pointer p and pointer q may refer 
to the same location at a specific program point. Nevertheless, this precision comes 
with the cost of less scalability [34,130]. 
For instance, CCured performs a lightweight flow-insensitive pointer analysis that 
is not precise. To remedy the lack of precision, CCured annotates with runtime checks 
all pointer operations that cannot be statically proved memory safe. Nevertheless, 
the performance overhead introduced by the runtime checks is unacceptable and may 
reach 150%. Other approaches similar to CCured, such as SafeC [12], Cyclone [63], 
and Vault [55] have the same performance issue due to a heavy code instrumentation. 
This performance issue leaves us enough room to define a memory and error detection 
approach with a better balance between precision and effectiveness. 
Yet, flow-sensitive analysis follows the control flow along the different execution 
paths in programs. Nevertheless, all traversed execution paths are not always actual 
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feasible paths at runtime. In fact, static analysis tends to be conservative and perform 
an exhaustive exploration of program paths without pruning infeasible ones. So, they 
may generate false alarms related to these impracticable paths. In this context, path-
sensitivity is a desirable characteristic for increasing the precision of an analysis by 
discarding infeasible paths. Nevertheless, a path-sensitive approach inevitably induces 
sophisticated analyses that may affect its scalability to large software. 
3.4.2 Interprocedural vs. Intraprocedural Analysis 
Intraprocedural analysis considers a program function as a stand-alone entity. The 
results of an intraprocedural analysis do not take into account the flow of data and 
control at function calls, whereas interprocedural analysis does. During an inter-
procedural analysis, the information flows from the caller procedure to the callee 
procedure and vice-versa. Therefore, the results of interprocedural analysis depend 
on the caller-callee relation. 
MC and MOPS perform an interprocedural and flow-sensitive analysis of pro-
grams. Nevertheless, the interprocedural analysis of MOPS is not efficient since it 
does not consider parameter passing at function boundaries as shown previously in 
this section. When moving from a caller function to a callee function, MOPS does 
not match actual parameters with formal parameters of the callee function. This 
prevents it from detecting errors that involve different function calls. On the other 
hand, the MC approach takes into account parameter passing at function bound-
aries. The state of a variable in a caller scope is retained and transferred to the callee 
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scope. This renders the interprocedural analysis of MC more precise than MOPS. The 
aforementionned type analysis of CCured is interprocedural but flow-insensitive. The 
execution order of function statememts is not taken into account. The unsoundness 
and imprecision of CCured analysis are rectified by resorting to runtime checks that 
spot actual errors. A flow-sensitive analysis would help CCured reducing the number 
of runtime checks for performance enhancement. 
A summary-based approach is often used to optimize and speed up interproce-
dural analysis. The idea consists in analyzing a function based on specific context 
and to store the analysis result in a concise summary. When the function is called 
again, the current call context is compared to the context of the stored summary. 
If they compare equal, the function is not analyzed and the stored analysis result is 
used. The summaries help saving time and resource consumption by avoiding the 
repetition of a previously performed analysis. For instance, the previously discussed 
MC approach achieves scalability by computing a global summary for each analyzed 
function that combines fine-grained summaries of each basic block of the function 
control-flow graph. 
3.4.3 Internal Checking vs. External Checking 
In the review~of the security tools, we have seen two kinds of checking: internal check-
ing that uses annotations and external checking that has no annotations. Annotation-
based systems specify security properties that are highly coupled with the analyzed 
code. Annotations are directly added to the code in order to enrich it with security 
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knowledge required for detecting errors. From the tight mixture between security 
specification and the code, annotation-based systems are more capable of achieving 
soundness than external checking tools. The latter provide a modular approach for 
security specification. The analyzed code is kept unmodified. In general, security 
properties are modeled by automata independently from the source code. These au-
tomata are executed during compilation or during a specific code traversal to verify 
security properties. Hence, the modular nature of external checking systems reduces 
the complexity of defining and managing security properties. However, the sepa-
ration from the source code makes external checking more prone to false positives. 
For achieving soundness, we would state that annotated-based systems are better 
candidates than external checking. Nevertheless, annotated-based systems present 
some shortcomings that must be taken into account when designing a static checker: 
(1) Programmers usually do not focus on security requirements and are reluctant to 
specify security annotations while implementing. (2) The effort of manually adding 
annotations to legacy code is sometimes very hard, especially for large programs [89]. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we presented a representative set of error detection tools mainly based 
on static analysis. We classified these tools into three categories that give an insight 
on their modus operandi: annotation-based techniques, automata-based techniques, 
and hybrid techniques. We discussed the advantages and the limitations of these 
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tools in detecting their targeted coding errors. From this thorough survey of error 
detection tools, we were able to judiciously choose the techniques and approaches 
that enable us to accomplish our objectives previously discussed in Chapter 1. We 
give in the following paragraphs a global overview of the coming chapters in which we 
detail our proposed methodologies for the automated security and safety verification 
of source code. 
We target low-level coding errors related to unsafe memory operations and type 
conversions. The tool survey demonstrates that type-based analysis is the most suit-
able approach to tackle memory and types errors in C programming. As mentioned 
in Chapter 2, these errors are implied by the permissiveness and the flexibility of the 
standard C type system. Decorating the standard type system with safety annotations 
provides a mean to enrich the semantics of memory management and type conversions 
for the purpose of detecting unsafe program operations. We present in Chapter 4 our 
type and effect discipline for memory and type safety. The main advantage of our 
approach compared to the existing tools is the automated type annotation process 
of program expressions. Programmers are relieved from this cumbersome and heavy 
burden. The flow-sensitivity and alias-sensitivity features of our analysis renders it 
more precise than the type analysis of CCured and SafeC. 
For high-level security properties related to privilege management, file manage-
ment, and other system-specific properties, we advocate the usage of model-checking 
techniques. In the comparative study of Chapter 2, we argue that model-checking is 
the best candidate when it comes to property specification. It allows the definition 
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of customized properties tailored to specific system requirements and secure coding 
rules. Our security verification framework presented in Chapter 6 combines static 
analysis and model-checking to verify large scale C software against a set of system-
specific and user-defined security rules. As opposed to MOPS, our approach computes 
and captures data dependencies to detect insidious errors that involve aliasing and 
parameter passing. Moreover, our tool provides the appealing feature of GCC multi-
language support that facilitates its extension to all languages that GCC compiles 
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Chapter 4 
Type and Effect Discipline for C 
Safety 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents our type and effect analysis for memory and type error detection 
in C code. The core idea is to decorate the standard C type system with annotations 
that hold, safety relevant information. We also extend the standard type system with 
static checks that use the aforementioned annotations to detect safety violations. The 
flow-sensitive nature of our approach allows type annotations to change at each pro-
gram statement in order to deal with the destructive updates of the imperative C 
language, such as dynamic allocation and deallocation of memory. Furthermore, we 
address the pitfalls of aliasing and indirect assignments by endowing our analysis with 
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flow-sensitive alias information. As such, annotation updates of a program expres-
sion are propagated to all its aliases. This chapter also details our inference algorithm 
that propagates type annotations to program expressions without programmers' in-
tervention. The inference algorithm operates in two phases. The intraprocedural 
phase propagates type annotations and verifies memory and type operations of each 
function. The interprocedural phase instantiates the annotated polymorphic types of 
declared functions according to their actual argument types. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents our imperative language 
that captures the essence of the C language. It also outlines the safety annotations 
that we decorate the standard C type system with. Our defined static checks that 
utilize the annotations for error detection are detailed in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 
describes the typing rules for program declarations, program expressions, and program 
statements. Section 4.5 presents our algorithms for handling direct assignments and 
indirect assignments through aliasing. Section 4.6 is dedicated to our annotation 
inference algorithm. We conclude this chapter in Section 4.7. 
4.2 Safety Type Annotations 
In this section, we present the imperative C core that we use to illustrate our type 
system. We outline the annotation extensions we made to the standard C type system 
to ensure memory and type safety. 
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4.2.1 An Imperative Language 
The imperative language defined in Table 1 captures the essence of the C language 
[75]. A program ir contains variable declarations Sv and function declarations 5fn, 
followed by program statements 5. Without loss of generality, a function id has 
only one argument variable x and a body sy. Program expressions comprise 1-values 
that refer to memory locations and r-values that refer to the content of memory 
locations. L-values encompass variables x, 1-value dereferences *lv, and structure 
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fields lv.(p. R-values include integer scalars n, r-value dereferences *r„, the address 
of an 1-value hlv, cast operations («)e, pointer arithmetics e © e' where © stands 
for arithmetic operators, and memory allocations malloc(e). Statements s include 
memory deallocation free(lv), assignments lv = e, function calls called : lv = id(e), 
return statements return e, and control flow constructs (sequencing, conditionals, 
and loops). Notice that we mark each call to function id with a label callu. 
4.2.2 Type Annotations 
We present in Table 2 the type algebra of our aforementioned imperative language. In 
fact, our type system propagates lightweight region, effect, and host annotations that 
are relevant for safety analysis of C programs. They are inserted at the outermost 
constructor of types in order to facilitate the inference algorithm defined in Section 4.6. 
We present in the following paragraphs the static domains of our safety annotations. 
• The domain of regions abstracts dynamic memory locations allocated on the 
heap and variables' memory locations assigned on the stack. The symbols p, 
p' represent values drawn from this domain, a fresh symbol is derived at each 
memory allocation. The symbol g stands for a region variable with a currently 
unknown value. The memory location of a given variable x is given the symbolic 
identifier rx where x corresponds to the unique identifier of the declared variable. 
Note that we use alpha-renaming to prevent collisions [81]. The notation p.o 
denotes an offset within a region p of a structure type. We assume that the 
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first field is at offset 0 of the hosting location. The remaining fields are located 
at different offsets from the first field. As we define a flow-sensitive analysis, 
a pointer may refer to different regions depending on the followed branches. 
Hence, we use the notation p U p' to represent the set of disjoint regions a 
pointer may refer to at a given program point. 
• The domain of declared types defines a representative subset of the C language 
types. It includes the empty type void, the integer type int, the pointer type 
ref(K), the structure type struct{(tpi, Ki)}i=i..n, and the function type K—>«;'. 
• The domain of inferred types decorates the declared types with effect, region, 
and host annotations. A pointer type is annotated with the memory location 
p that it refers to. Pointer types and integer types are also annotated with 
pointer host annotations and integer host annotations, respectively. These host 
annotations capture relevant safety information related to pointer values and 
integer values: allocated pointer, freed pointer, uninitialized pointer, uninitial-
ized integer, etc. Host annotations also indicate the type of values stored in 
the memory region of a pointers and integer variables. For converted integer 
and pointer types, host annotations are used to track their source type. For a 
pointer type ref AK)^, a cast operation is captured when the host annotation 
77 indicates a type that is different from its declared type K. For an integer 
type m£M, the annotation p, distinguishes between an integer derived from a 
converted pointer and a genuine not converted integer. More details on type 
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conversion are given later in this section. The term struct{(ipi,Ti,Oi)}i=i n is 
the type of a structure of n elements. Each field ipt is decorated with an offset 
Oi from the first field at offset 0 as indicated in the ANSI C standard [75]. The 
function type T-^T' is annotated with a latent effect a that is generated when 
the corresponding function expression is evaluated. The conditional type con-
struct if(r, T') denotes the type of a branching statement. Type r is inferred on 
the true branch, whereas type r' is inferred on the false branch. The declared 
types and the inferred types are related by the mean of two operators that are 
defined in Table 3: The operator " ~ " initially decorates declared types with 
host annotations set to [wild] and fresh region variables g for declared and yet 
initialized pointers. On the other hand, the operator " ~ " suppresses the anno-
tations of inferred types and recovers their original declared types. Notice that 
the types in an if(r, r ') construct are derived from one initial declared type. So, 
clearing an if(r, T') construct from its annotations is equivalent to clearing the 
annotations of one of its enclosed types: i/(r, T') = f = f 
• The domain of effects captures memory operations and type conversions that 
are encountered at each program statement [46,96]. We use 0 to denote the 
absence of effects, and <^  to denote an effect variable. Each effect records the 
program point £ where it is produced. The terms alloc(p,£) and dealloc(p,£) 
respectively denote memory allocation and memory deallocation. The effect 
stack(p,£) is generated when a pointer is initialized to a stack memory location 
p. The effect read(p, r, £) represents the dereference of a pointer to region p. 
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Table 3 From declared types to inferred types and vice versa 
void 
int[wiid] 
refe(K)[uriid] where g fresh 
struct{(vi,ki,Oi)}i..n 






The effect assign(p, r, I) represents the assignment of a value of type r to region 
p. The effect arith(p,£) captures pointer arithmetic operations on region p. 
Moreover, we define effects that capture control flow constructs of programs. 
The term o\ a' denotes the sequencing of a and a'. The effect if (a, a') refers to a 
branching statement where the effects a and o' are respectively produced at the 
true branch and the false branch. Hence, the collected effects a provide a tree-
based model of the analyzed program that captures safety relevant operations. 
The static safety checks defined in Section 4.3 refer to the generated effect model 
in order to verify temporal properties related to the bad sequencing of memory 












4.2.3 Host Annotation for Type Conversions 
The flexibility of the C language allows arbitrary type conversions for pointer and 
integer types without performing any safety checks. These explicit type casts are 
misleading since programmers may do wrong assumptions on the actual type of a 
memory location. To tackle insidious type casting errors, we refer to the host anno-
tations of pointer and integer types to derive their actual types. As defined in Table 
4.2, a pointer host annotation can be of the following values: (1) the value [malloc] 
indicates an allocated pointer, (2) the value [dangling] indicates a freed pointer, (3) 
the element [wild] indicates an uninitialized pointer or uninitialized integer, (4) the 
element [an'f/i] indicates pointer arithmetics, (5) the element [feint,,] represents a 
pointer to an integer value, and (6) the element [festnxc<{_}] stands for a region that 
stores a structure value. Notice that integer host annotations can refer to an integer 
type [femi] or to a pointer type [fere//,(«;)r,], since conversion between integer and 
pointer types is allowed. The empty set denotes the absence of host annotations and 
the symbol 7 stands for a host annotation variable. 
In Algorithm 1, we define two auxiliary functions that use host annotations in 
order to deal with type conversions: 
• Function castType(r, K) derives an annotated type r ' by converting r to and 
inferred type based on K. AS defined later in Section 4.3, we enrich our type 
system with static checks to uncover unsafe type conversions. For the latter, 
we assume that the cast operations result in the initial source type. 
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Algorithm 1 Utility functions to deal with type conversions. 
Function castType(r, K) = case (r, K) of 
(refp(K%, int) => *n*[&re/p(K%] 
(int[Urefp(K%},ref(K")) =» refP{K")V 
(refp{void)\maUoc],ref{K")) => re/p («")[&&»] 
(«/,(«/),,, re/^)) => »*/>")„ 
(if(Tr,r"),K) => 2/(castType(r',K;))castType(T", K)) 
else => r 
end 
Function strTypeOf(r) = case T of 
if{T~',T") => i/(strTypeOf(r'),strTypeOf(r")) 
re/p(K)[&r'] => T' 
else => void 
end 
• Function strTypeOf (r) yields the type of the value stored in the region of pointer 
type T. 
We illustrate the use of these functions through the sample code of Listing 4.1. 











typedef struct { int x,y,c; 
typedef struct { int x,y; } 
Pnt pt, *p; 
CPnt *cp; 
mainO { 
p = &pt; 
cp = (CPnt*) p; 




Initially, we infer the following types for the declared variables: 
pt H-> Pnt where Pnt = {(x,int[wiid\,0i),(y,int[wan,02)}-
P *-* refe(Pnt)[vriid] 
cp H-> refe,{CPnt)iwU] 
All host annotations are set to wild for uninitialized values, and region annotations 
stand for unknown values. At line (7), our analysis infers for pointer p the type 
TP = refr t{Pnt)Vp where r)p = \k.Pnt\. It indicates that pointer p refers to region rpt 
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of variable pt that holds a value of type Pnt. At line (8), pointer p is cast from type 
TP to type ref(CPnt). Notice that the destination type of the conversion is defined by 
the programmer, thus does not have any annotation. The cast operation yields type 
Tcp = castType(Tp, ref(CPnt)) = refr t{CPnt)np. We assume that cast operations do 
not change the content of memory locations, hence the host annotation of pointer 
cp remains rjp = [SzPnt]. It indicates that pointer cp, initially declared to refer to a 
CPnt value, is actually referring to a value of type Pnt. With the precision of the 
host annotation, our analysis cannot be misled on the actual type referred to by a 
given pointer. Hence, we can detect that the dereference of field c at line (9) is unsafe 
since cp is not referring to a CPnt structure. Section 4.3 illustrates our safety checks 
based on host annotations for detecting type conversion errors. 
4.3 Static Safety Checks 
This section outlines the static safety checks performed by our type system to detect 
and prevent a set of memory and type errors that are listed in Annex J of the ANSI 
C standard [75]. All safety-related operations are guarded by a corresponding static 
check. From the conservative nature of our analysis, operations that pass the checks 
never cause a runtime error during program execution. Those who fail may violate 
memory or type safety during program execution. 
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Table 4 Static safety check for detecting unsafe dereference 
drfChk(r) = (f = re/(«)) A (K / void) 
A(hostOf (r) ^ {[u>z'M], [dangling], [arith]}) 
drfChk(z/(r,r')) = drfChk(r)A drfChk(r') 
4.3.1 Safe Pointer Dereference 
The memory check drf Chk(r) defined in Table 4 verifies that pointer of type r can be 
safely dereferenced. It fails in the following cases: 
• Dereference of void pointers: the C language disallows dereferencing void point-
ers since their size and their type are unknown. 
• Dereference of uninitialized pointers: an uninitialized pointer with a [wild] an-
notation refers to an arbitrary location that can cause harmful effects when 
accessed. 
• Dereference of dangling pointers: a dangling pointer annotated with [dangling] 
keeps referring to a memory location that has already been freed. By derefer-
encing a dangling pointer, the original program may access memory locations 
that do not belong anymore to its address space, leading to undefined program 
behaviors. 
• Dereference of arithmetic pointers: these pointers may be problematic as they 
may refer to out-of-bounds locations. Since we do not perform bounds checking 
during our type analysis, we disallow dereferencing arithmetic pointers. 
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Table 5 Static safety check for detecting unsafe deallocation 
freeChk(r, a) = (f = ref(K,)) A ( K ^ void) 
A(hostOf(r) = [&T']) A (stack(pj) £ a) 
f reeChk(2/(r, r ' ) , a) = f reeChk(r, a) A f reeChk(r', a) 
Notice that our static type analysis can be combined with a dynamic analysis 
in order to perform dynamic bound checking as presented in our work [123]. More-
over, our lightweight type annotations can be extended to carry bounds information 
generated by existing static bounds checking techniques [85,105,110]. 
4.3.2 Safe Pointer Deallocation 
The static check freeChk(r, a) detailed in Table 5 verifies that a pointer of type r 
can be safely deallocated given the collected effects a of the program. It fails in the 
following cases: 
• Deallocation of uninitialized pointers: these [wild] annotated pointers do not 
have any assigned address, and thus any attempt to free such pointers can 
cause undefined behaviors. 
• Deallocation of dangling pointers: freeing one more time a [dangling] pointer 
may corrupt the system memory and lead to system crashes. 
• Deallocation of not dynamically allocated pointers: these pointers refer to 
stack memory locations that have not been dynamically allocated with mal-
loc functions, and thus cannot be dynamically freed. Notice that a pointer type 
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Table 6 Static safety check for detecting unsafe assignments 
asgnClik(T, int^) — [r\ ^ [ttntfd]) A (int = r ) 
asgnChk(r, re/p(/c)7,) = (if = [&T]) A (re/(«) = f) 
asgnChk(r, if(r', r")) = asgnChk(r, T') A asgnChk(-r, r") 
re/p(/c)[&Tj indicates that region p holds a value of type r . However, it does 
not indicate that region p is dynamically allocated. For that reason, we need 
to ensure that effect stack(p,£) is not present in the collected effects of the 
program. 
• Deallocation of arithmetic pointers: these [arith] pointers may refer to out-of-
bound locations, our conservative analysis disallows deallocating such pointers. 
4.3.3 Safe Pointer Assignment 
The memory check asgnChk(-r, r ') defined in Table 6 verifies that an 1-value of type 
r can safely be assigned a right-hand-side value of type r' . It fails in the following 
cases: 
• Assigning uninitialized right-hand-side value: the host annotation for integer 
values should be different from [un7rf]. For pointer values, the host annotation 
should be equal to [&T] indicating an initialized pointer to a value of type r . 
• Assigning mismatched declared types: the types of the right-hand-side and the 
left-hand-side operators must explicitly match. As such, we avoid problematic 
implicit cast operations that often mislead programmers. 
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Table 7 Static safety checks for type cast operations 
castChk(r, n) = case (r, n) of 
(Z/ (T ' ,T") ,K) => castChk(T',Ac) A castChk(T",/t) 
{ref^n'^Tj^int) => sizeof (ref(K')) < sizeof (int) 
(zni[&T/j, re/(/t')) => (f' = re/(/t")) A castChk(r', ref(ti')) 
(refp(K'%ref(K')) =» «" « K' 
{refp(K')v, ref(void)) =» irue 
(re/p(voJd)[ma(/oc], re/(At')) => frue . 
else =» /ake 
end 
fldChk(r,<^) = <p € f ldList(r) 
f ldChk(i/(r, T ') , </?) = f ldChk(r, <p) A f ldChk(r', <p) 
fldList(s<rwcf{(^i,Ti,oi)})i=1..n = [y>i,..., ¥?„] 
fldList(r)T7£S(ruct{} = 0 
4.3.4 Safe Type Cast 
Explicit type casts are misleading since they make pointers refer to types that are 
different from their declared type. These insidious type conversions are a common 
source of system crashes. We use an approach to deal with type casts that is based 
on data memory layout and physical subtyping as defined in [117]. In Table 7, we 
define the static check castChk(r, K) that takes as input the source type r and the 
destination un-annotated type K of a cast operation. Notice that the destination type 
of a cast operation is defined by programmers and does not have any annotation. The 
following paragraphs outline the type cast operations considered in our analysis. 
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Cast between pointers 
Type conversions from a pointer type T = ref
 P{K)V to an un-annotated pointer type 
re/(«') are allowed provided that K and K' are in a physical subtyping relationship 
(K ^ K' or K' =^  K) as defined in [117]. The physical subtyping takes into account the 
layouts of objects in memory. A type K is considered as a physical subtype of type K', 
denoted (K =^ «'), if memory layout of K is a prefix of K' memory layout. We use the 
notation K m K' to express that K' is a subtype of K or vice versa. Since our approach 
does not change data representation, r and K = T have the same memory layout. 
Cast from void pointers 
As stated in the ANSI C standard [75], any pointer can be cast to a void pointer. 
A freshly allocated void pointer ref
 p(void)[mauoc] can always be cast to any pointer 
type ref(K). The conversion derives the type re/p(K)[&£] as defined by the function 
castTypeO in Algorithm 1. The converted pointer refp(K)^^ can be cast to any 
pointer type ref(K?) provided that At « K'. 
Cast between pointers and integers 
Cast between pointers and integers is allowed provided that an integer type is large 
enough to hold a pointer value. However, we entail that only integers derived from 
pointers can be cast back to pointer type. An integer of type int\&rej (^ j indicates 
an integer derived from pointer type r = refp(K)v. This integer can be converted to 
pointer type ref{n) or to any pointer type re/(«') where K' RS K. 
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Safe Field Dereference 
The static check f ldChk(T, y?) verifies that a field </? can be safely accessed through 
a pointer type r. Due to cast operations, a pointer to a structure type K can be 
actually referring to a structure type K' where According to the definition 
given in [117], a structure type K is a physical subtype of structure type K'', denoted 
as K =<; K', if the following conditions are met: (1) all the fields of K' are present 
in K, and (2) the offset of each field in K' is the same in n. Hence, the physical 
subtyping relation establishes a hierarchy for structure types. As such, a pointer of 
type r = re/p(«;)[&T/] can only access the common fields between the declared type K 
and type r' stored in its region p. 
4.4 Typing Rules 
This section outlines our typing rules that are inspired from the type system for im-
perative languages presented in [109]. We define a type environment £ that maps 
each declared variable to an annotated type. Our type analysis infers initial anno-
tations for declared variables that can later be updated at each program statement 
to capture imperative destructive updates. For declared functions, we do not enforce 
any restrictions on the annotations of their argument types and return type. Thus, 
declared functions are assigned annotation polymorphic types in environment 6. 
Our analysis performs an intraprocedural pass and an interprocedural pass. The 
intraprocedural pass defines a flow-sensitive analysis that evaluates each function 
85 
body and applies the static safety checks defined in Section 4.3. The interprocedural 
pass instantiates the polymorphic types of callee functions by generating unification 
constraints at each call site [108]. The unification constraints are defined to unify 
pairs of region variables, host variables, program point variables, and effect variables 
at functions' boundaries. At each function call, our interprocedural analysis entails 
that the inferred function type should be equal to the declared function type, modulo 
type annotations. To facilitate the understanding of our typing rules, we define the 
following auxiliary functions: 
• Function regionOf (r) returns the region annotations of pointer type T. 
• Function addressOf (e, £) returns the memory location of an 1-value e. For a 
given pointer e of type r , we have regionOf (T) = addressOf (*e,£). 
• Function f ldType(r, <^>) returns the type of field ip in structure type r. 
The algorithms of these aforementioned functions are detailed in Appendix I. Through 
this chapter, we will write £ \ £' to denote the overwriting of £ by £', i.e., the domain 
of £ f £' is Dom(£) U Dom(£')> and we have (£ ] £'){x) = £'{x) if x € Dom(£') and 
£{x) otherwise. 
4.4.1 Typing Rules for Program Declarations 
Table 8 illustrates the typing rules for programs, variable declarations, function decla-
rations, and call sites. The sequent £,£ h (5, s) indicates that the program containing 
86 
Table 8 Typing rules for programs, declarations, and call sites 
£,£Y-8:£' .£',l\-s:r,S",a (Program) 
£,£\-(8,s) p r o g r a m ; 
£,£hnil:£ (Nil-decl) 
£,£\-S:£' K = T 
£,£)- KX\5 : £' Wx*-* T] 
K2 id{K\x) = Sjd.C 5fn T\-^->T2 = f resh(annot(Ki—>K2)) 
T\ >T2 = K\ >K2 V\..n = f v f a - ^ T z ) 
£,£\- id : Vui..n.ri-5->r2 
K2 id{K\x) = s,d C <fy„ £",^  h id : Vvi..n.ri—>T2 
T i - ^ r 2 = f resh(Ti-^->T2) £ f [x >-> T], £ h si(z : T', £', a 
fl = ZY(rj, T ) U Ufa, T') U fc' ^ a] 




declarations £ and statements s is well-typed. We augment the initially empty en-
vironment £ from program declarations in 6. The deduction £, £ h S : £ ' evaluates 
variable declarations and function declarations at program point £, then it yields a 
new environment £' t h a t is used to type-check program statements s. The judgment 
£',£\- s : T,£",a evaluates statement s, then yields a type r , an updated environment 
£", and a side-effect cr of memory operations and type conversions in s ta tement s. 
• The rule (Var-decl) maps a declared variable x of type K to the annotated type 
k in £. The operator " ~ " sets host annotations to [wild] and region annotat ions 
of pointers to unknown regions g as defined in Table 3. We assume tha t alpha-
conversion is used for renaming collision variables and avoid conflicts [81]. 
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• The rule (Func-decl) assigns the most general type for functions in environment 
£ using fresh annotation variables. We define type schemes of the form Vt>i..n.r 
where Vi can be region, effect, host, and program point annotation variables. 
The function f resh() takes the annotated type aimot(/c1—>K2) and replaces its 
annotation variables with fresh variables. Finally, we extend environment £ 
with a mapping from the declared function id to a polymorphic type where all 
free region, effect, host and program point variables in function type T\—>r?, 
are quantified. Function f v(r) derives the set of free variables of a given type 
r . Notice that the inferred function type should be equal to the declared type 
modulo type annotations. We note K-I id(K\x) = s,d C 8fn to indicate that there 
exist 6jn and 5'jn such that Sfn = 5jn; K,2 id(Kix) = s,,j; 5'jn 
• The rule (Call-site) instantiates the type of a function id given an argument 
type r . First, it generates fresh annotations for the callee function type. Then, 
it unifies the argument type r with the generic argument type T\ which should 
be equal modulo type annotations. The unification algorithm U is given in Al-
gorithm 4 of Section 4.6. Then, the (Call-site) rule evaluates the callee function 
statements su and yields the following: (1) a return type r ' that should be unifi-
able with the generic return type T2, (2) a new type environment £' that captures 
annotation updates at each statement, and (3) an effect a that records memory 
operations of the callee function. Thus, judgment 5, £ h calla : r — • T ' , £' states 
that when function id is invoked at program point £ with argument type r , it 
should return a type r', generate an effect a, and derive a new environment £'. 
88 
4.4.2 Typing Rules for Expressions 
The sequent £,£ h e : r , a defines the typing rules for program expressions presented 
in Table 9. It s ta tes that under environment £ and at program point £, the evalu-
ation of expression e returns type r and effect a. Some of the expressions refer to 
critical memory and type operations. In order to ensure type and memory safety, the 
evaluation of these expressions is guarded by safety checks as detailed in Section 4.3. 
Table 9 Typing rules for program expressions 
£(x) = T (Var) 
£,£\-X:T,® 
£,£Y-n: int^int], 0 
£,£\- lv : r, a p = addressOf (lv, £) 
£,th Mv : refp(T)[&T],stack{p,e) (Ref) 
£,£\-e:T,a f ~ ref {J) drfChk(r) 
p = regionOf(r) T1 = s t rTypeof(T) 
£,£ h *e : T', {a; read{p, r\ £)) ^Ueret J 
£,£\- e: T, <r £•, £ \- e': int^, a' r = re/(_) 
p = regionOf (r) -r' = refp,(_)\arith] p'fresh 
£, £ r- e © e' : T', (CT; </; arith(p, £)) 
£,£\- e : T, o castChk(T, /t) r = castType(r, K) 
£,^I-K(e) :r', cr 
£,£\- e:r,a f = struct {_} f ldChk(r, <p) 
T ' = f ldType(r, </?) /? = addressOf {e.tp, £) 




£ , l > - e : intlkint],a pfresh (Malloc) 
£,£\~ malloc(e) : ref
 p{void\malioc], {a; alloc{p,£)) 
The rules (Var) and (Int) are standard rules that produce no effect. The host 
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annotation of a constant is set to [&in£] as it actually refers to an integer value. 
• The rule (Ref) derives a pointer to the region that hosts the 1-value lv. 
• The rule (Deref) dereferences a pointer expression e of type r and generates the 
effect read(p, r'', £), where T' — strTypeOf(r) is the actual type referred to by 
pointer e. Because of cast operations, type r ' may be different from the pointer 
declared type. The safety of the dereference operation is guarded by the static 
check drf Chk(r) detailed in Section 4.3. 
• The rule (Arith) evaluates pointer arithmetic and generates the effect arith(p, £), 
where p denotes the set of regions pointer e may refer to. We assume that a 
pointer arithmetic results in a fresh region p' with a host annotation set to 
[arith]. 
• The rule (Cast) performs type conversion from type T to type K'. Note that the 
destination type K! as specified by the programmer does not have annotations. 
In Algorithm 1, we define function castType(-r, K') that derives an annotated 
type r ' from the conversion from type T to type K' such that f' = AC'. In order 
to detect and prevent type cast errors, we define safety requirements in the static 
check castChk(r, K') that should be met at each cast operation as specified in 
Section 4.3. 
• The rule (Field) returns the type of field y> of a structure expression e of type 
r . The field access is guarded by the fldCrik(r, ip) safety check as defined in 
Section 4.3. 
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• The rule (Malloc) returns a void pointer to a fresh region location p with a 
host annotation set to [malloc]. The allocation generates the effect alloc(p,£). 
Notice that annotation [malloc] is exclusively assigned to void pointers derived 
from malloc functions. Once, the newly allocated pointer is cast to a given 
declared pointer type ref(n), the host annotation is set to [&:&]. It indicates a 
pointer to an uninitialized value of type K. 
4.4.3 Typing Rules for Statements 
Table 10 presents the typing rules for statements. The statement judgment is of the 
form £,£)- s : T,£',a stating that under environment £ and at program point £, the 
evaluation of statement s yields a type r , an environment £', and an effect a. 
The flow-sensitivity of our analysis allows us to cope with destructive updates of 
our imperative language by inferring new types for variables with new annotation 
instantiations at each program statement. As in [77], the flow-sensitivity is restricted 
to type annotations in order not to complicate the inference algorithm. Note that 
region annotations carry aliasing information in a sense that aliased pointers should 
have the same region annotations [121,122]. We utilize this aliasing information to 
propagate annotation updates of an 1-value to all its aliases that refer to the same 
updated region. We define in Section 4.5, function updEnv[£, s) that evaluates the 
argument statement s under environment £ and yields an updated environment £'. 
• The rule (Free) conservatively deallocates all memory locations in p of pointer lv 
and generates the effect dealloc(p, £). The deallocation is guarded by the static 
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Table 10 Typing rules for program statements 
£, £ h lv : T, a r — re/(_) f reeClik(T) CT) 
p = regionOf (r) £' = updEnv(£,/ree(J„), T) 
£, £ h free(lv) : voidy£\ (a; dealloc(p, £)) 
£,£\-lv:T,a £, £ h e : T', or' asgnChk(T, T') 
^ = addressOf (Z„, £) £' = updEnv(£, lv = e, r ' ) 
£, £ \- lv — e : T', £ , (a; a'; assign(p, r ' , £)) 
£,£VIV:T,O £,ty-callid:T,-Z->T",E' £,£\- e : r',a' 
p = addressof (lv, £) asgnChk(r, r") 
£" = updEnv(£', lv = id(e), T") 
£,£\-lv = id(e) : r", £", (a; cr'; <r"; assign{p, T", £)) 
£,£ h e : r, g 
£, •£ I-return e : r, £, cr 
£ , £ h s ' : / , £ > ' £',f\-s":T",£",a" 
£,£\-s'-s":T";£",(a';a") 
£, I h e : int^ a £,£' h s' : T', £', a ' £, I" h s" : T", £", a" 
£,£ hif e t h e n s' else s" : if{j'y'),£' /&£", {a; if (a1, a")) 
£, £ h e : m£M, CT £, £' h s : r', £', a' 
£, £ Kwhile e do s : t/(r', void), £' /A £, if ((a; a'), cr) 








' f ( i ) i f x £ D o m ( £ ' ) , 
£'(x) if x i Dom(£), 
if(£(x),£'(x)) otherwise. 
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check freeChk(r, a) as specified in Section 4.3- The function updEnvQ yields a 
new environment £' where host annotations of lv and of all its aliases are set to 
[dangling]. 
• The rule (Assign) assigns a value of type T' to an 1-value lv of type T. The 
assignment is guarded by the static check asgnChk(r, T ' ) . The function updEnv() 
updates the type annotations of all variables that are directly or indirectly 
involved in the assignment statement. The effect assign(p, r', £) is generated, 
where p is the set of possible regions of the updated 1-value. 
• The rule (Func-call) evaluates a function call given the instantiated type of its 
corresponding call-site label. The return value is assigned to an 1-value provided 
that the safety requirements of the check asgnChk() are met. 
• The rule (Func-return) evaluates the return statement of the current callee 
function and has no effect. 
• The rule (Seq) defines the sequencing of statements where the generated effect 
is the sequencing effect of s' and s". 
• The rule (Cond) evaluates a branching condition. We define the merge opera-
tor "fA' that assigns the type if(£'(x), £"(x)) to a variable x at the merge point 
of a branching condition. It indicates that variable x is of type £'{x) on the 
true branch and of type £"{x) on the false branch. We use a similar effect con-
struct if {a', a") to denote the effect generated at the merge point of a branching 
condition. 
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• The rule (Loop) evaluates a loop construct. The resulting environment is equal 
to £ A\ £'; it denotes that the environment remains unchanged if the loop is not 
entered. Otherwise, the environment £' refers to the type mappings generated 
when the loop is entered at least one time. 
4.5 Dealing wi th Aliasing 
To increase the precision of our type annotation inference, we consider alias informa-
tion that enables us to propagate annotation updates of an 1-value to all its aliases. 
Pointer alias analysis has been widely investigated in years [10,13, 25,34,62,70,83, 
119,130]. It is possible for us to integrate one of these analysis techniques as a plug-
in into our type system in order to get aliasing information. Nevertheless, since the 
region inference of our analysis carries flow-sensitive aliasing information, we advo-
cate to use it to account for pointer aliasing in programs. This section outlines our 
algorithms in Algorithm 2 that handle direct and indirect assignments and update 
the static environment E at each program point. All auxiliary functions used in these 
algorithms are denned in Appendix I. We give a brief description of these functions 
hereafter: (1) Function updHost(r, rf) sets all host annotations in type r to 77. (2) Func-
tion regHostOf (re/p(r)7)) returns the pair (p, rj) of region and host annotations of a 
pointer type. For conditional type »/(__) the function returns a set of pairs where each 
pair corresponds to one of the enclosed pointer types. (3) Function updRegHost(r, p, 77) 
sets to 7] the host annotation of pointer type r that refers to region p. (4) Function 
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typeOf(e,£) returns the inferred type of expression e under environment £ 
• Function updEnv(£, S,T) in Algorithm 2 updates the current environment £ 
according to the argument statement s and the argument type r . It invokes 
function directUpd(£, lv, r ) defined in the following paragraph. 
• Function directUpd(£; /„, r ) takes as arguments the current environment £, the 
1-value lv to be updated, and its new type r . After changing the annotations 
of the argument 1-value lv, function aliasUpd() updates the annotations of all 
aliases of lv. Notice that modifying the annotations of a structure field im-
plies updating the annotations of its enclosing structure type as well. Function 
updFld() handles the annotation update of aggregate types as defined in Ap-
pendix I. 
• Function aliasUpd(£, p, 77) takes as argument the current static environment, 
the updated memory location p, and the host annotation 77 to set to all aliased 
variables that refer to p. We illustrate in Figure 2 the different aliasing cases 
that we consider in our approach: 
— A variable x resides in the updated location p as illustrated in Sample (a) 
of Figure 2. The invocation aliasUpd(£, rx, rj) updates the host annotation 
of variable x in £. 
— A pointer p refers to the updated location p with one level of indirection 
(one dereference operator). The aliasing information is extracted from the 
region annotation of pointer p, as illustrated in Sample (b) of Figure 2. 
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Algorithm 2 Function updEnv() updates the static type environment at each pro-
gram statement 
Funct ion updEnv(£, s, r ) = 
begin 
case s of 
free(lv) => directUpd(£,£„,updHost(T, [dangling])) 
calla : lv = e ==>• directUpd(£, IV,T) 
lv = id(__) => directUpd(£, lv, T ) 
end 
r e t u r n £ 
end 
Func t ion directUpd(£. lv, T) — 
begin 
case /„ of 
x => £ f [x H-> r ] 
x.<p =>• £ | [x H-> updFld(£(.x),<^, T ) ] 
a l iasUpd(£, addressOf (x, ce), hostOf (£(#))) 
*l'v.tp => T ' = updFld(typeOf {*l'v, £),(p,r) 
al iasUpd(£, addressOf (*l'v, £),hostOf ( T ' ) ) 
end 
al iasUpd(£, addressOf (lv, £ ) , hostOf ( T ) ) 
r e t u r n £ 
end 
Func t ion aliasUpd(£, p, r/) = 
begin 
for all y e Dom(£) do 
if addressOf (y ,£) C p t h en £ f [y i-> updHost(£(y),»7)] 
else £ f [y H-» indirectUpd(£(y),p,7j)] 
e n d 
Func t ion indirectUpd(r , /9,7?) = 
beg in le t T ' = r in 
for all (p',7?') 6 regHostof ( r ' ) d o 
if p' C p t h e n r ' = updRegHost(r' ,p', rj) 
else 
if 7?' = [ & T " | t h e n T ' = indirectUpd(r",p,7?) 
end 
r e t u r n T ' 
end 
e n d 
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The invocation indirectUpd(£(p),p, [&mf]) updates the conditional type 
of pointer p. It sets the host annotation related to region p of pointer p to 
[&m£] since it has been indirectly updated through its aliased pointer q. 
— A pointer p refers to the updated location p with multiple levels of indi-
rection (more than one dereference operator). The aliasing information is 
extracted from the host annotation of pointer p, as shown in Sample (c) of 
Figure 2. The invocation indirectUpd(£(g), p\ \lkint}) All host annotations 
enclosing a pointer type that refers to />' are updated. 
4.6 Type Annotations Inference 
This section is dedicated to the algorithm for inferring region, effect, and host annota-
tions for program expressions. The inference algorithm proceeds by case analysis on 
the structure of expressions and statements. We divide the inference algorithm into 
three different categories: (1) annotation inference for program declarations and call-
sites, (2) annotation inference for program expressions, and (3) annotation inference 
for program statements. 
The inference algorithm for program declarations is presented in Algorithm 3. 
Variable declarations 6V and function declarations 6fn are considered separately. For 
the former, the algorithm takes as input a 3-tuple made of an initial static type 
environment £, a program point £, and program declarations 5V. It evaluates the 
declared variables and outputs a new static environment £' that maps variables to 
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Figure 2 Examples to illustrate annotation update of aliased variables 
Sample (a): Pointer p refers to the memory location of x. 
l :q = &x; 




q : re / r Jmi) I & 
Sample (b): After the branching, pointer p may alias variable x and pointer g. 
l : q = ( in t *) mal loc(sz) ; 
2 : i f (c) 
3: p = Six; 
4 :e l se 
5: p = q; 
















Sample (c): The host annotations of pointer q and p indicate that *q and p are aliased 
l : q = ( in t *) mal loc(sz) ; 
2:p = ( in t **) mal loc(sz) ; 
3:*q = p; 





— * • 
—> 








q: re/p(re/(mt))[&re/e( i„,)M,)] 
p:re/p,(m{)[&i„ t [^ |] 
q: re//,(re/(m«))|&I.e/p/(fnt)|tj„1_M]1] 
q:re/p(re/(mt))[&,*//)/(int)|i:,„l)] 
p:re/p ,(mt)[&ln( ] 
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Algorithm 3 Annotation inference algorithm for program declarations and call-sites 
Infer (£, I, 6V) -
case 5 of 
nil => 




T \ - L * T 2 •• 
V\..n = f1 
in 
VvL.n .Ti -^ 
end 
£ 
let £' = Infer(£, 
id) = 







Infer {£, £, 6fn, callid) -
let Vt>i..n.Ti-^ ->T2 =Infer (£, £, Sfn, id) 
(T',£', a) =Infer (£ f [x >-> T],1, sid) 
0 = U(TUT)UU(T2,T')UU(c;,a) 
in 
( r - ^ r ' . f ) 
end 
annotated types with fresh region variables and host annotation set to wild. For 
function declarations, the algorithm takes as input a type environment £, a program 
point £, function declarations 8jn, a function identifier id. It assigns for the declared 
function an annotation polymorphic type in £ with fresh annotation variables. For call 
sites, the algorithm instantiates the type of the callee function by defining unification 
constraints on type annotations. The unification algorithm U defined in Algorithm 4 
uses a syntactic unification procedure a la Robinson [108]. The proofs of soundness 
and completeness of U are standard and can be found in [39,108]. Notice that our 
analysis generates fresh annotation variables for the argument and the return types 
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of each function call. As such, each unification constraint generated at function 
boundaries is applied to fresh variables and does not override constraints related to 
the previous function calls. In algorithm 14, we use the notation (rj„) to denote the 
sequence of host annotations of a type r and (7„) to denote the sequence of fresh host 
annotation variables. In Appendix I, we define function HostSeqOf (T) that yields 
the host annotation sequence of the argument type T. Similarly, we write (pn) to 
denote the sequence of region annotations of a type r , and (gn) denotes a sequence 
of fresh region annotation variables. In Appendix I, we define function RegSeqOf (r) 
that yields the region annotation sequence of the argument type r . As such, we have 
zn
*[»7ri] = T, if f = int and HostSeqOf (r) = \rf\n. We also have ref<pn](i^)[r)n] = T, if 
f = ref(n) and HostSeqOf (T) = [r/n] and RegSeqOf (r) = [pn]. 
Algorithm 4 Syntactic unification procedure 
W(r,7-/) = case {T,T') of 
(intbn], int[r)n]) => 0 = \£=1 [7i i-» rtf 
( r e / [ e „ ] ( K ) [ 7 n ) > r e / [ p n ] ( K ) h n ] ) => 0 = U ? = l [ f t *~* Pi] U ? = l \li ^ Vi] 
(struct{{tpi,Ti, Oi)}, struct{{<pi, T[, Oi)}),-=i„n =$, 0 = \J* U(ru r-) 
(void, void) \ (bool, bool) => Id 
else =$• fail 
end 
The inference algorithm for program expressions is presented in Algorithm 5. It 
takes as input a 3-tuple made of a static environment £, a program point I, and an 
expression e. It evaluates the input expression and decorates its type with effect, 
region, and host annotations. When evaluating a safety-relevant expression such as 
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A l g o r i t h m 5 Annotation inference algorithm for program expressions 
Infer {£,£, x) = 
let r = £(x) in (T, 0) end 
Infer (£,£,n) = (mi [&inl ],0) 
Infer (£,£,klv) = 
let (r, < J ) = Infer {£,£,lv) 
p = addressOf (lv,£) 
in 
(refP(f)[Ur}, (CT; stack{p,£))) 
end 
Infer (£,£,{n)e) = 
let 
(r,cr)= Infer {£,£,e) 
in 
if (castChk(r, K.)) t h e n 
let T' = castType(r, K) 
in 
else 
fail: vmsafe cast 
end 
Infer (£, ^, *e) = 
let (T,CT) = Infer (£,£,e) 
in 
if (drf Chk(r)) then 
let f = ne/(_) 
r' = strTypeof (T) 
p = regionOf (T) 
in 
(r', ((T; read(p, T',1))) 
else 
f a i l : unsafe deref 
end 
Infer (£, £, e.tp) — 
let (T, CT) = Infer (£, £, e) 
T — struct {_} 
in 
if f ldChk(r, tp) then 
let T ' = f ldType(r, ip) 
p = addressOf {e.tp, £) 
in 
else 
fail: unsafe field access 
end 
Infer (£, £,e® e') = 
let (T,<T)= Infer (£,£,e) 
f = re/(_) 
p = regionOf(r) 
(intf^a') = Infer (£,£,e') 
p' fresh 
in 
(re/>(_)[orit/«], (^; CT'; arith(p, £))) 
end 
Infer (5, £, malloc(e)) = 
let (r, a)= Infer (£,*,e) 
f — m£M 
p fresh 





A l g o r i t h m 6 Annotation inference algorithm for program statements 
Infer (£,£,free(lv)) = 
let (T,cr) = Infer (£,£,lv) 
f = re/(_) 
in 
if (f reeChk(r, a)) t h e n 
let £' — updEnv(£,free(lv),r) 
p = regionOf (T) 
in 
(void, £', (a; dealloc(p, £))) 
else 
f a i l : unsafe free 
end 
Infer (£,£,lv = e) = 
let (r, a) = Infer (£, £, lv) 
(T',<T') =Infer(£J,e) 
in 
if (asgnChk(r, T ' ) ) t h e n 
let £' = updEnv(£, lv — e, r ' ) 
p = addressOf (lv, £) 
in 
(r', £', (cr; a'; assign{p, T', £))) 
else 
f a i l : unsafe ass ign 
end 
Infer (£, £, return e) = 




Infer (£,£,lv = id(e)) = 
let Ti—>T2 = Infer (£, ^, calla) 
(r, cr) = Infer (£, £, Zv) 
(T / , f f / )=Infer(5, / ,e) 
asgnChk(r, T2) 
p = addressOf {lv,£) 
£" = updEnv(£', lv = id(e),T2) 
in 
(r2, £", {a;a'; a"; assign(p, T2,£))) 
end 
Infer {£,£,s';s") = 
let ( T ' , £ > ' ) = I n f e r o s ' ) 
(T",£",a") = Infer {£',£', s") 
in 
(r", £ " » " ) ) 
end 
Infer {£,£, if e t h e n s' else s") = 
let (mf^, cr) = Infer (£,£, e) 
( r ' , £ V ) = Infer (£,£', s') 
(T" ,£" ,CT") = Infer {£,£",s") 
in 
( . / ( T W ^ r ' , ^ ; . / ^ ; / ) ) ) 
end 
Infer (£, £, while e do s) = 
let (iniM, a) = Infer (£, ,^ e) 
( T ' , £ V ) = Infer ( £ , 0 ) 
in 
{if {void, T ) , £ /A £', £/(CT; (<T; cr'))) 
end 
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pointer dereferencing, type casts, and structure field accesses, the algorithm applies 
the required safety checks defined in Section 4.3. When these checks fail, the inference 
algorithm fails as well. The inference algorithm for program statements is presented 
in Algorithm 6. It. takes as input a 3-tuple made of a static environment £, a program 
point £, and a statement s. The algorithm fails when the safety checks related to the 
considered statement fail. Otherwise, the algorithm terminates successfully producing 
a 3-tuple enclosing an annotated type r , a new static environment £, and an effect a. 
In order for the annotation inference algorithm to serve as a static detection system 
for memory and type errors, it must be sound with respect to the typing rules defined 
in Section 4.4. In other words, a typing judgment inferred by the type annotation 
inference algorithm must be deducible by the typing rules as stated by the Inference 
Algorithm Soundness 4.6.1. 
Theorem 4.6.1 (Inference Soundness) Given a type environment £, a program 
point £, variable declarations 5V, function declarations 6fn, a call site calla, an ex-
pression e, and a statement s, we have: 
• / / Infer (£, £, Sv) = £', then £,£\~6:£' 
• If Infer (£, £, 6fn, id) = Vvi..n.r, then £,£\- id : Vi»i..n.r 
• //Infer (£,£, calUd) = (r,£'), then £,£V- calla : T,£' 
• If Infer (£, £, e) = (r, a), then £, £ (- e : r, a 
• / / Infer {£, £, s) = (r, £', a), then £, £ \~ s : r, £', a 
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Proof of Inference Soundness Theorem 4.6.1 In Appendix II, we establish this 
desired error detection property by proving the Soundness Theorem. | 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we presented a type and effect discipline for detecting memory and 
type errors in C source code. Our type analysis propagates effect, region, and host 
annotations that carry safety knowledge regarding the analyzed program. We endow 
our type system with static safety checks that use the aforementioned annotations 
to uncover memory and type errors. Our safety analysis performs in an intrapro-
cedural phase and an interprocedural phase: (1) The intraprocedural phase infers 
type annotations taking into consideration control-flow and alias information, (2) 




Static Detection of Runtime Errors 
5.1 Introduction 
The objective of the current chapter is to ensure that our static safety analysis defined 
in the previous chapter is able to catch runtime errors caused by its targeted set of 
unsafe memory operations. To this end, we define an operational semantics of our 
imperative language defined in Section 4.2.1 that complies with the ANSI C standard. 
Besides, the semantics evaluates standard undefined behaviours to runtime errors. 
They encompass accessing uninitialized pointers, dereferencing null pointers, freeing 
unallocated pointers, etc. Notice that we focus on undefined behaviours that can 
statically be detected by our memory safety checks defined in Chapter 4. 
In this chapter, we show that the dynamic semantics computes expression val-
ues that are consistent with the types assigned to them statically. We establish the 
soundness of our type and effect analysis in detecting memory errors. Since we strive 
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for soundness, our analysis tends to generate false positives that affect its precision. 
As a mean to enhance the latter, our analysis provides an effect-based interface for ex-
porting dunno points that pinpoint the location and the program traces of suspicious 
operations that should be considered using dynamic analysis. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 presents our ANSI C compliant 
operational semantics. The static semantics and dynamic semantics are proved consis-
tent in Section 5.3. Based on the consistency results, Section 5.4 shows the soundness 
of our static analysis for memory error detection. Section 5.4 is dedicated to the effect-
based interface for guiding dynamic analysis. To demonstrate the feasibility and the 
efficiency of our safety evaluation approach, we present our implemented prototype 
and experimental results in Section 5.6. We conclude this chapter in Section 5.7. 
5.2 Dynamic Semantics 
The dynamic semantics of our imperative language is specified by the means of a 
big-step structural operational semantics [67,102,103] that complies with the ANSI 
C standard [75]. We list in Table 11 the computable values that are derived from 
the evaluation of program expressions by our dynamic semantics. We consider the 
command value uni t , the undefined value undef that represents the value of unini-
tialized variables, the integer value in t , memory locations loc, and memory blocks 
for a structure 1OC@(UJ)I
 n where each Vi corresponds to a member of the structure. 
According to the standard, members of a structure are stored in the order they are 
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declared in their corresponding structure type. We also consider function closures 
{id, x, Sid, E) in order to formally capture call-time environments. A closure is com-
posed of the function identifier id, the function argument x, the function statements 
s^, and an environment E where it is defined. In fact, an environment E maps vari-
able identifiers to memory locations containing the values of these variables. We also 
define a store C that maps memory locations of variables and dynamically allocated 
locations to values. A trace / represents the side-effects of memory management 
operations. 
Table 11 Computable values 
loc e Ref 
v e Value 
E G Env 
C e Store 






{id, x, sid, E) 
Id -* Ref 








The operational rules presented in Table 12 and Table 13 specify how to execute 
a program in our source language. The rules are defined by the following judgments: 
• C, E h e —> v, / , C' for expressions in r-value position. 
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• C, E \~iexpr e —* v,f, C for expressions in 1-value position. 
• C,E h s —> v, f,C for statement, evaluation. 
Given a store C and an environment E, each judgment associates a syntactic element 
to the result v of its execution, the trace / of the side-effects generated during the 
execution, as well as the updated memory state C. The execution of a statement 
implicitly transfers the control to the next program point. Notice that we distinguish 
between the execution of an expression in 1-value position and an expression in r-
value position. The former returns the memory location loc that holds the value of 
the expression, whereas the latter results in the value v of the expression. Through 
this chapter, we will write m t m! to denote the overwriting of any map m by m', 
i.e., the domain of m t m' is Dom(m) U Dom(m'), and we have (m f m')(x) = m'(x) 
if x 6 Dom(m') and m(x) otherwise. We will write mXl)l2i... to denote the map m 
excluding the associations of the form x, i—> _ . 
Our rules are inspired by existing operational semantics of the C programming 
language [9]. We discuss some of the program expression rules of Table 12 in the 
following paragraphs. The (Ref) rule evaluates the operand lv of & to its location 
loc, and derives a pointer to that location. The (Cast) rule is trivial and does 
not modify the value of the converted expression. The type destination K should 
be an integer type int or a pointer type re/(_) as entailed by the standard. The 
(Arith) rule evaluates pointer arithmetic in a pessimistic way stating that the result 
of the evaluation is undefined. In the absence of dynamic bounds checking, there is 
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Table 12 Operational semantics for expressions 
Expressions 
x 6 Dom(JS) 
C,Ehx-^C{E{x)),9,C 
C,E\-n-+ int,0,C 
C, E hjeip ly ~» loc, f, C 
C, E h &«„ -> loc, (/; sfacfc(loc)), C' 
C , g h e - t loc , / ,C 




C'(loc + of f set(^j)) = vt 
C,£ I-e.^->«,*,/,C7 
C,Eh e' -> loc , / ' ,C C'.gl- e" -> in t , /" ,C" 
C , £ h e ' e e" — undef, (/'; /"; arith(loc)),C" 
C,Ehe-+ in t , / ,C ' loc fresh f = / ; onoc(loc) 
C, £ h ma/foc(e) -> loc, / ' , C f [loc H-> undef] 
no guarantee that the resulting pointer will remain within its assigned boundaries. 
Moreover, the C standard [75] states that the dereference of out-of-bounds pointers 
generates undefined behaviours that we consider as runtime errors. By conservatively 
setting the value of pointer arithmetic to undef, we are able to capture any potential 
and undesirable out-of-bounds access. The (Malloc) rule returns a fresh location loc 
that contains an undefined value as stated by the C standard [75]. 
The operational rules for program statements are listed in Table 13. The (Free) 
rule deallocates the memory location of a pointer that is previously returned by a 










Table 13 Operational semantics for statements 
Statements 
C, ff h e -> loc, / , C' (stack(loc) j f) Dom(C') = Dom(C") 
C,E\- free{e) -» uni t , (/; dealloc{loc)),C"oc t [loc •-> undef] 
(undef ifC'(loc') = loc, 
^C'(loc') otherwise. 
(Free) 
C'(loc') = r 
Co, E \-lexpr e -» loc , / , C C,Ehe' -+v, f, C 
({v = i n t ) V (v C .Re/)) / " = / ; / ' ; assign(loc) 
Co, B H e = e' -» v, / " , C'loc t [loc — v] 
Co, E \~lexpr e —* l o c , / , C\ 
C\,EV calla —> {id,x,su,E'),0,C% 
C2,Ehe'^v',f',C3 
C3 f \E'(x) -> v'}, E' r- sid -> v", f", C 
C0,Ehe = id(e') -> v", (/; / ' ; / " ) , C'loc f [loc ~ V"] 
C, E h return e —» v,f,C 
CQ,EY-S-+VJ,C C,E\-S' - > t / , / ' , C ' 
C0,EhS-s'^v',(f;f'),C 
Co, £ I- e -+ v, / , C !<^0 
C,E\-s' -*v',f',C' 
Co, E I-if e then s' else s" -» t/, (/; / ' ) , C 
Co, £ I- e -> v, / , C w = 0 
C , E I - s " - W f",C" 
Co, E h if c then s' else s" — v", (/; / " ) , C" 
C0,E\-e-^v,f,C v^O 
C,Ebs; while (e) do s -> t/, / ' , C 
C0, £ h while (e) do s -» v', (/; / ' ) , C 
C , £ l - e - > t t , / , C ' i> = 0 










loc may be assigned to another process. Besides, all locations that refer to the freed 
location loc are mapped to an undefined value in the derived store C". The (Assign) 
rule evaluates the left-hand-side operand to its location loc and updates the store 
C with a mapping from loc to the value of the right-hand-side operand. The (call) 
rule evaluates the label call^ corresponding to the call to function id, and yields 
the function closure (id,x,si(i,E'). The location E'(x) of the formal argument x 
is assigned the value v' of the actual argument e in order to evaluate the function 
statements s,y. 
5.3 Consistency of Static and Dynamic Semantics 
In this section, we prove the consistency of our static and dynamic semantics. We 
use the proof method that is introduced by Talpin and Jouvelot in [121] to show 
that the static and the dynamic semantics are consistent with respect to a structural 
relation between values and types defined as the maximal fixed point of a monotonic 
property. The result of the consistency is then used to show that our defined static 
checks report occurrences of all targeted errors and do not suffer false negatives. 
We define below a store model S that relates a region p and a type r to their 
corresponding reference value loc. 
Definition 1 (Store Model) A store model S is a finite mapping from locations 
loc to pairs (p,r) of regions p and types r as follows: 
S G StoreModel — Ref —> Region x Type 
We say that S' extends S, denoted by S C S', if and only i/V loc G Dom(<S), we 
have S(loc)=S'(loc). 
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In what follows, we define the relations S (= / : a and C : «S (= v : T that we need 
to establish a link between the static and the dynamic semantics. 
Definition 2 (Effect Consistency) A dynamic trace of side-effects f G Trace is 
consistent with the effect a G Effect for the model <S £ StoreModel, noted S \= f : o, 
if and only if: 
Va//oc(loc) £ / ,S ( l oc ) = {p,r) A alloc{p,£) G cr 
V/ree(loc) G / , S ( l o c ) = (p,r) Afree{p,£) e a 
Vrearf(loc) 6 /,<S(loc) = (p,r) A read(p,T,£) € cr 
V assign(loc) € f,S(loc) = (p,r) A assign(p,r,£) £ a 
V arith(loc) € / , <S(loc) = (p, r ) A arith(p,£) G cr 
VsfacA;(loc) G / , »S(loc) = (p, r ) A stack(p,£) G a 
The definition relates a dynamic effect on a location loc to a static effect on a 
region p and a type r that correspond to loc through the store model <5. Note that 
we also have the following: 
• If S C S' and S \= f : a, then S'\= f :a. 
• If S |= / : a and 5 |= / ' : a' then S \= / ; / ' : o; a'. 
• If <S ( = / : cr then Vcr', we have S (= / : zy(cr, cr') and <S (= / : i/(cr', <r). 
We define typed stores as models for describing the relation between values and 
types. 
C : S G TypedStore = Store x StoreModel 
Given a typed store C : 5, the following definition establishes the link between values 
of expressions computed by the dynamic semantics to their types evaluated by the 
static counterpart. 
Definition 3 (Consistent Values and Types) Given a typed store C : S, the value 
v is consistent with the type r, noted C : S \= v : T, if and only if v and r verify one 
of the following properties: 
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C : S |= u n i t : unit 
C : S \= i n t : int[^int] 
C : S \= undef : r O f C {void, ref(void)} or hostOf (T) D {[w»7d], [dan<?h'n<?], [an'i/i]} ^ 0 
C : «S |= l o c : T O 5 ( l o c ) = (regionOf ( T ) , strTypeOf ( T ) ) 
and C :S\= C( loc) : strTypeOf ( r ) 
C : S \= l o c : J'ni[&r] O f = r e / (_ ) and C : 5 (= l o c : T 
C : 5 |= 1OC@(VJ)I. .„ : T O Vy>i e f l d L i s t ( r ) and loc,- = l o c + o f f se t (^ j ) , 
C(loci) = Vi and C : S \= C(loCi) : f ldType(r, ipt) 
C : S (= {id, x, sa,E) : r <& 3 £ such tha t C : S \= E : £ and S, I h co/Ja : r , £ ' 
The intuition behind this definition is that the static type of a given expression 
is a conservative estimation of its corresponding value derived from the dynamic 
semantics. In the dynamic semantics, the undef value stands for a program expression 
that has an uninitialized value. In the static counterpart, that same expression can 
either be assigned a void type, a void pointer type, a [wild] annotated type, a pointer 
type with [dangling] annotation, or a pointer type with [on'i/i] annotation. A program 
expression that is initialized to an integer value i n t should have an integer type 
int[kint] where the host annotation [&mi] indicates an initialized value. A loc value 
corresponds to a pointer type r such that its referred region regionOf ( r ) and type 
strTypeOf ( r ) are related to loc in the store model S. Moreover, the value C(loc) 
stored in loc corresponds to the type strTypeOf ( r ) referred to by pointer r . In our 
static semantics, we allow casting from pointer type to integer type provided that the 
latter is large enough to hold a pointer value. The host annotation of the derived 
integer type keeps track of its original pointer type. An integer type inf[&T] where 
f = re/(_) is actually a pointer type r in integer disguise. Therefore, a value loc is 
consistent with m£[&T], if and only if loc is consistent with its hidden pointer type r . 
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Table 14 Function T whose maximal fixed point defines the consistency relation 
f(Q) = {(C:S,v,r)\ 
ifv = unit then r = void 
ifv = int thenr = int[&int] 
ifv = undef t/ienhostOf (r) D {[ioiW], [dangling], [arith]} ^  0 or r G {void, ref(void)} 
ifv = loc then 3 p, r' such that p = regionOf (T) and r' = strTypeOf (r) 
and{C : S,C(v),r') G Q andS{loc) = {p,r') 
ifv = loc@(wj)i..n thenr = struct{(tpi,Ti,Oi)}i..n and VloCj = loc + offset(y?j), 
C(IOCJ) = vt and [Ji=hn{{C : 5 , ^ , ^ ) } 6 Q 
if v = {id, x, sa, E) then 3 £ such that C : S \= E : £ and £,£\- callu : r, £'} 
We note C : S f= E : £, if and only if Dom(jE') = Dom(£) and for every x G 
Dom(£), we have C : S \= C{E{x)) : £{x). If C : S \= E : £ then for every 
x G Dom(E), we have S(E(x)) = (addressOf(x),£(x)). We have also the following: 
• if C : S \= v : r then C : S \= v: if far1) and C : S \= v: if{r', r ) . 
• If C : S \= E : £ then C : S \= E :£/&£' and C : S \= E :£' /A £ 
As discussed in [121,124], this structural property between values and types does 
not uniquely define a consistency relation and must be regarded as a fixed point 
equation on the domain 1Z = TypedStore x Value x Type of the relation. In Table 5.3, 
we define function T, on the domain Vfin(7Z) —> Vfin{lZ), whose fixed points are the 
relations on 1Z that verify the property defined above. To ensure the existence of the 
greatest fixed point gfp{J-), function T must be monotonic. 
Lemma 5.3.1 (Monotonicity of T) IfQQ Q' then F{Q) C ?(&). 
Proof of Monotonicity Lemma 5.3.1 Let Q and Q' be two subsets of 1Z such 
that Q C Q'. We assume that q G T{Q) and prove that q G J-'iQ')- Let q be 
(C:S,v,r): 
(i) if v G {unit, in t .undef} then q G ^ (Q ' ) by definition. 
(ii) if v = loc, there exist p and r ' such that ((p = regionOf (r) and r ' = strTypeOf (r)) 
or (T = mi[&itfp(_)i*T'jl)) a n d 5 ( v ) = (/9'T') a n d (C : < 5 ' C ( v ) ' r 0 G 2- S i n c e 
Q C Q', we have q G J^(Q') 
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(iii) if v = loc@(vi)i..n, then T = struct{(<Pi,Ti,Oi)}i..n and for locj = loc + 
offset((pi), we have C(loCi) = Vi and \Ji=i n(C : S,C(l°ci),Ti) 6 Q- Since 
Q C Q', we have g <E T{Q!) 
(iv) Finally, if v = (id, x, si(j, E) then there exists a type environment £ such that 
C : S t= £ : €, so that g <E ^(Q')- | 
Among the fixed points of T, we choose the greatest fixed point gfp(J-) as our 
consistency relation [121,124]; gfp(T) is defined by: 
S / ^ ) = U { Q C K | Q C f ( Q ) } 
A set Q such that QQ T(Q) is called T-consistent. The relation between values 
and types is thus defined by: 
C:S\=V:T^(C: S,V,T) G gfp(T) 
In order to use induction in the consistency proof, we need to check that the 
relation between a type and a value, whenever correct for some typed store C : <S, is 
preserved when the store is properly expanded. We note: 
C :SCC' :S' OS CS' andCC C', and for all v and T, C : S \= v : r => C : S' (= v : r 
Lemma 5.3.2 (Side Effects) Assume C : 5 (= w : r . If S(loc) = (p,r), then 
C : S Q Cioc f {loc •-* v} : <Saoc t {loc i—» (p, r ) } . Otherwise, for every region p, 
C : S C C f {loc H-> u} : 5 f {loc •-> (p , r )} . 
Proof of Side Effects Lemma 5.3.2 The proof is done by induction on the struc-
tures of typing and values. Let C — Cloc f [loc i—> v] -and S'loc = «Sloc f [loc i—> (p, r)] . 
We have to prove that C : S Q C : S', i.e., C : S' \= v : r given that C : S \= v : r , 
C C C', and «S C 5 ' . Considering the typed store C : S and Q C K such that 
Q = {(C :S',V,T)\C:S\=V:T}, we show that Q is ^-consistent, i.e., Q C .F(Q). 
Let g = (C : «S', u, r) e Q: 
(i) if v € {unit , in t ,undef} then g € ^F(Q) 
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(ii) if v = loc', by the definition of C : S j= v : T, there exist p' and r ' such 
that ((p' = regionOf(r) and r ' = strTypeOf (r)) or (r = ln^&re/p,(_)|&T,,])) and 
S(v) = (P',T') and C : «S f= C{v) : r ' . Since C C C and 5 C S'" then S » = 
(p', r ' ) and C : 5 |= C » : r', so that (C : 5 ' , C'{v), T') G Q and q G J^(Q) 
(iii) if v = loc@(uj)i..n, by definition of C : S \= v : T, we haver = struct {(<p%,Ti, o,)}. 
Let loCj = loc + off set(<^j), we have C(loCi) = Vi and C : S \= Vi : T .^ Since 
C C C and 5 C 5 ' then C : 5 |= C'(loCi) : TU and U,=i..„(C : ^ ' ( l o c , ) , - ^ ) G 
Q and g G JF(Q) 
(iv) Finally, if v = (id, x, Sjd, E) then there exists a type environment £ such that 
C:S\=E:£. This means that C : S \= C(E{x)) : £{x) for every x G Dom(E). 
Thus, we have (C : 5',C(£;(a:)),£:(x)) G Q, so that q <E F{Q). | 
Lemma 5.3.2 covers the cases of creation of new references and of assigning a 
value to an existing reference. In both cases, we make sure that the store expansion 
preserves the consistency relation. Note that if C : S \= v : r and C : S \= E : £ then 
Cf[loc t—> T] : S][p i—> (loc, r)] f= E : directUpd(£, IV,T) where addressOf (/„,£*) = p. 
As defined in Chapter 4, function directUpd(£, lv, T) derives an updated environment 
£' where the host annotations of all variables that directly or indirectly refer to p are 
set to [&r]. 
We also need to check that the relation between a type T and a value v, whenever 
correct for some typed store C : S, is preserved when the type is cast to another type 
T' such that r ' = castType(r, K) for all declared type n. In the dynamic semantics, 
we only consider type conversions applied on scalar types (integers and pointers). 
Lemma 5.3.3 (Type Conversion) Given a typed store C : S and a value v that is 
consistent with type T, then C : S |= v : r => C : S (= v : castType(r, K) for all K. 
Proof of Type Conversion Lemma 5.3.3 The proof of this lemma is done by 
covering all cases of function cast Type (r, K). 
• Let v = loc, r = re/p(/t% and « = int. We have castType(r, int) = int[&Ty 
Since C : S f= v : r and f = re/, we have from the \= relation C : S \= v : 
castType(r, int). 
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• Let v = loc, r = ref
 p(void)\mauoc] and K — re/(/t'). We have castType(r, re/(«;')) = 
T' with T' — re/p(«')[&K'J and strTypeOf (r) = strTypeOf (r') and regionOf (r) = 
regionOf (T ' ) . From the |= relation, we conclude that C : S |= v : r => C : S j= 
v : castType(r, re/(«;')). 
• Let v = loc, r = refp{K,')n and K = re/(/c"). We have castType(r, ref(n")) = r' 
with r ' = refp(K")v and strTypeOf (r) = strTypeOf (r') and regionOf (r) = 
regionOf (r '). From the [= relation, we conclude that C : S (= v : r =» C : S \= 
v : castType(r, re/(«;")). 
• Let v = loc, r = m£[&rey ^^ and «; = re/(«"). We have castType(r, ref(n")) — 
refp(K")v. Since C : S \= v : r, we have C : S \= v : refp(K")n and C : S \= v : 
castType(r, ref(n")) 
• Let v = int , r = m£[&intj. For all K, we have castType(r, «) = T and we conclude 
that C :<S |= t ; :T=>C:«SJ= i ; : castType(r, K). 
• Let v = undef, then r is either of the form int[wUd}, rejp{_)[dangling}, refp(_)[wiid], 
ref
 p(__)[arith], r e / p ( wi'd)[mafioc], or void For all K, we have castType(r, K) = r and 
we conclude that C : S f= v : r => C : S \= v : castType(r, K). | 
Lemma 5.3.3 covers the cases of type conversions. In our dynamic semantics, we 
assume that a value v remains the same when converted to another type. Similarly, 
the region and the host annotations of a pointer type are kept the same when con-
verted to another pointer type. In other words, the region of a pointer type and its 
actual referred type are unchanged. As such, we can always establish a link between 
a computable value and a type whether converted or not. The conversion between 
integer and pointer types are already covered in Definition 3 of the consistency rela-
tion. 
Now that we have defined the different relations between the static semantics and 
the dynamic semantics, we can state the consistency Theorem 5.3.4 
Theorem 5.3.4 (Consistency of dynamic and s tat ic semantics) Let E be an 
environment and £ its type. Let C : S be a typed store such that C : S \= E : £ 
117 
(i) Provided that £,£ \- e : r, a and C,E \- e —* v,f,C', there exists a store model 
S' such that C.SQC'-.S' with: 
S'\= f :a andC :S' \=V:T 
(ii) Provided that £,£ h e : r, a and C,E r-jexpr e —* 1 ° C I / J C , there exists a store 
model S' such that C : <S CC ' : S' with: 
S' \= f : a and C : S' \= C'(loc) : r and <S'(loc) = (addressOf (e, £), r) 
(Hi) Provided that £, £ h s : r, £', a and C, E \- s —> v, f, C', there exists a store model 
S' such that C :SQC': S' with: 
& \= f : a and? : & \= v: T andC : & \= E : 8' 
Proof of Consistency Theorem 5.3.4 The proof is done by structural induction 
on expressions: 
• Case of (Var): By hypothesis, we have: 
C:S \=E:E and C,E h x-+C(E(x)),V>,C and £,£ h x : T,0 
We must have x G Dom(£) and x € Dom(£J). From C : S (= E : £ and by 
taking S' = S, we conclude: 
S \= 0 : 0 and C : S \= C{E{x)) : £{x) 
• Case of (Int): By hypothesis, we have: 
C : S \= E : £ and C,E\- n —» in t , 0, C and £, £ h n : znt[&,-nt], 0 
By taking 5 ' = <S, we conclude: 
S (= 0 : 0 and C : <S .[= i n t : z'n£[&,-n£] 
• Case of (Malloc): By hypothesis, we have: 
C : S (= E : £ and C, E h malloc{e) - • loc, (/; aHoc(loc)),C f [loc •-* undef] 
and £, £ h malloc(e) : refp{void)\mauoc\, (o; alloc(p,£)) 
By definition of the dynamic and the static semantics, this requires that: 
C,Eh e —> int , / , C and £, £ h e : mi[^int], a 
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By induction on e, there exists a store model <Si such that C : S C C' : Si 
verifying: 
Si h / : a and C : «Sa \= i n t : mi[&int] 
By Definition 2 of Effect Consistency, we have {loc )-> (p, void)} \= alloc(loc) : 
alloc(p,£) and C : <Si f= undef : void. Since loc ^ Dom(<S'), we define S' = 
5 i f [loc »-> (p, void)]; we have: 
CiSiQC] [loc H^ undef] : S' 
By transitivity of C, we conclude that: 
<S' |= / ; aHoc(loc) : a; alloc(p,£) and 
C f {loc >-> undef} : S' \= loc : re/p(wicO[maHoc] 
• Case of (Deref): By hypothesis, we have: 
C : S \= E : £ and C, E h *e -* C'(loc), (/; reo<f(loc)), C 
and £, £ h *e : r, (<x; read(p, r, £)) 
By definition of the static semantics and dynamic semantics, this requires that: 
C,E \~ e —> loc, / , C' and 5, £ h e : r ' , a and f' = re/(_) and 
p = regionOf (r') and r = strTypeOf (T') and drfChk(T') 
By induction on e, there exists a store model S' such that C : S Q C : S' 
verifying: 
S' (= / : a and C : S' \= loc : r ' 
By definition, {loc i-> (p,r)} [= read(loc) : read(p,r,£). Since <S'(loc) = 
{p,r), we conclude: 
<S' |= / ; read(loc) : a; read(p, r, £) and C : S' [= C'(loc) : r 
• Case of (Ref): By hypothesis, we have: 
C : S \= E:S and C, E b ke -» loc, (/; stadfc(loc)),C and 
£, £ h &e : re/p(f )[&rj, (a; stack(p, £)) 
By definition of the semantics, this requires that: 
C, E blexpr e —> loc, f,C and £,£ h e : r, a and p = addressOf(e,£) 
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By induction on e, there exists a store model S' such that C : S C C' : S' 
verifying: 
S' \= f : a and C : S' (= C'(loc) : r and 5'(loc) = (P,T) 
By taking r ' = re/p(f)[&Tj and by definition of \=, we have: 
C' : S' \= loc : T' where p = regionOf (r') and r = strTypeOf (T') 
Thus, we conclude: 
S' \= / ; stack(loc) : a; stack(p,i) and C' : S' \= loc : Te/p(f)[&T] 
• Case of (Cas t ) : By hypothesis, we have: 
C:S\=E:S aadC,E\- («)e-> v , / , C and £, € h («:)e:r ' ,a 
By definition of the semantics, this requires that: 
C, E h e -T* v, / , C and £,£ h e : T, a 
and T' = castType(r, K) and castchk(r, «;) 
By induction on e, there exists a store model <S' such that C : 5 C C' : 5 ' 
verifying: 
5*1=7: a a n d C ' : 5 ' | = u : T 
By the Type Conversion Lemma 5.3.3, we conclude that: 
S'\= f : a and C : S' \= v: T' 
• Case of (Arith): By hypothesis, we have: 
C0 : S \= E : £ and C0, £ h e © e' -* undef, (/; onU( loc) ) ,C and 
£,£\- e®e' : re/ / /(_) [o r i (h], (a; an'tfi(p, ^)) 
By definition of the semantics, this requires that: 
C0, £ h e -» loc , / , C and C, E h e' -» v, / ' , C 
and 5 , l l - e : T , ( 7 and £,£ H e ' : mf^,<r' ' 
and f = re/(_) and p = regionOf (r) and p' fresh 
By induction on e there exists a store model S\ such that Co : S C C : S\ 
verifying: 
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C : Si\= loc : r and S\\= f : a 
We define T' = strTypeOf(r), by definition, we have {loc i—> (p, T ' ) } \= arith(loc) : 
arith(p,£). Since [loc i—• (p,r')] C Si, we have: 
Si j= arith(loc) : arith(p,£) 
By induction on e', there exists store model S' such that C : Si C. C' : S' 
verifying: 
S'\=f':a' 
By Definition 3 of Consistent Values and Types, we have: C : S' \= undef : 
'"e///(_)[aritfc] 
By transitivity of jZ, we have Co • S Q C : S', and we conclude: 
S' f= / ; / ' ; ani/i(loc) : a; a'; arith(p,£) and C : S' \= undef : ref
 p, (_) [or«h] 
• Case of (Field): By hypothesis, we have: 
C : S (= £ : £ and C, £ 1- e.w - • Vj, / , C 
and £,^ h e.</3j : Tj,cr 
By definition of the semantics, this requires that: 
C,E\- e-^> loc@(vi)i=i..n, / , C and C(loc + off set(y?;)) = Vi 
and £, £ h e : T, CT and f = siraci{_} and TJ = f ldType(-r, < )^ and f ldChk(r, <£>;) 
By induction on e there exists store model S' such that C : S C.C : S' verifying: 
S' |= / : a and C : 5 ' (= loc@(ui)i=1..„ : T 
We define loc; = loc + offset((fi), by definition we have: 
C : S' h C(locO : Ti 
Thus, we conclude: 
5 ' \= f :a and C : S' j= »,- : n 
• Case of (Free): By hypothesis, we have: 
C : S f= E : £ and C, £ h /ree(e) -> uni t , / ' , C"oc f [loc H^ undef] 
and £, £ h /ree(e) : void, £', (<r; dealloc(p, £)) 
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By definition of the operational semantics, this requires that: 
C,E\~ e —> loc, f,C and / ' = / ; dealloc(loc) 
C"hoc') = J u n d e f if C '( loc ') = l o c ' 
[C'(loc') otherwise. 
By definition of the static semantics, this requires that: 
£, I V e : r, a and f = re/(_) and p = regionOf (T) 
and £' = directUpd(£, lv, updHost(r, [dangling])) 
By induction one there exists store model Si such that C : S (= C : S\ verifying: 
<5i (= / : a a n d C : 5 i |= loc : T 
We define «S" with Dom(«S") = Dom(5i) such that: 
,„ f (p',updHost(r, [dangling])) if C'(loc') = loc and <Si(loc') = {P',T), 
S"(loc') = . 
[Si (loc) otherwise. 
By the Side Effects Lemma 5.3.2, we have: C : <Sj C C" : S" 
Since «S"(loc) = (p, strTypeOf (r)), by the Side Effects Lemma 5.3.2 we have: 
C" : S" C Cioc f [loc i-» undef] : S"oc f [loc i-> (p.t/ouf)]. By taking S' = 
<S"0C f [loc H-» (p, uoid)] we have: 
C : 5 C C"oc f [loc t-> undef] : S' and S' |= dea?/oc(loc) : dealloc(p, void) 
By transitivity of C, and by the Side Effects Lemma 5.3.2: 
C"oc t [loc i—*• undef ] : S' f= E : directUpd(£,Zw,updHost(r, [dangling])) 
We conclude: 
• S' \= f; dealloc(loc) : a; dealloc(p, i) and 
ci'oc t [loc •-* undef] : «S' |= un i t : void and C"oc t [loc i-> undef] : 5 ' f= £ : £ ' 
Case of (Free): By hypothesis, we have: 
C : S |= E : £ and C, E h /ree(e) -» uni t , f',C'loc f [loc H^ undef] 
and £,£ h free(e) : void, £', (a; dealloc(p, £)) 
By definition of the semantics, this requires that: 
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C, E h e - • loc, f,C' and / ' = / ; dealloc{loc) 
£, I \~ e : T, a and f = ref(_) and p = regionOf (r) 
and £' = directUpd(£, i„,updHost(T, [dangling])) 
By induction on e there exists store model Si such that C : S \= C' : Si verifying: 
Si \= f : a and C' : Si\= loc : r 
By definition, {loc i—» (p, void)} |= deaHoc(loc) : dealloc(p,£). Since loc 
G Dom(Si), we define «S' = >Si + [loc i—> (p, vofrf)] 
C : <Si C C'loc f [loc i-» undef] : «S' 
By transitivity of C, and by the Side Effects Lemma 5.3.2: 
C'loc f [loc H-> undef] : Sf \= E : directUpd(£, ^,updHost(r, [dangling])) 
We conclude: 
«S' |= / ; dealloc(loc) : a; dealloc(p, £) and 
C'loc f [loc i-» undef] : S' |= un i t : void and C'loc f [loc >-> undef] : S' \= E : £' 
• Case of (Assign): By hypothesis, we have: 
C:S\=E:£and 
C, E \- e = e' -» v\ (/; / ' ; assignee)), C'{oc f [loc -> t/] 
and £,£\- e = e': rf, £', (a; a'; assign(p, r', ^)) 
By definition of the semantics, this requires that: 
C, E hexpr e -» loc, / , C and C, B h e ' - » t/, / ' , C" 
and ^ f h e : T , ( T and £,l\~ e' : T', a' 
and p = addressOf (e, £) and £' = directUpd(£, £„, r ' ) 
By induction on e there exists store model »Si such that C : S \= C : S\ verifying: 
•Si |= / : a and C : Si f= C'(loc) : r and S i (loc) = (p,r) 
By induction on e' there exists store model S' such that C' : Si Q C" : S' 
verifying: 
S'[= f : o' and C" : S'\= v': T' 
By the Side Effects Lemma 5.3.2: 
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C" : S' C Clc f [loc -> i/] : S'loc t [loc -» (p, r')] 
We have £' = directUpd(£, IV,T'), by the Side Effects Lemma 5.3.2, we have: 
C c f [loc . - </] : S'loc t [loc - (p, r')] |= £ : 5 ' 
By taking <S" = S'loc f [loc i-> (p, r ')], we conclude that: 
<5" |= / ; / ' ; assign{loc) : a; a'; assign(p, r ' , £) 
and C ^ t [loc •-> v1} : S" \= v' : T' and C '^ t [loc .-> t/] : <S" |= £ : £ ' 
• Case of (Call): By hypothesis, we have: 
C:S\=E:£ 
and C, E h e = t'd(e') -» u", (/0; assi#n(loc)),Cioc f [loc •-> v"] 
and £, £ \- e = id(e') : T", £", (oo; assign(p, r", £)) 
By the definition of the (Call) rule, we have: 
a" 
£, £ h e : r, a and £, £ h e' : r ' , a' and £, ^ h ca/Ztrf : r '—>r", £ and 
do = a; ar; a" and p = addressOf (e, £) and £" = directUpd(£', e, r") 
By definition of the (Call) rule in the dynamic semantics, we have: 
C, E hiexpr e —» loc, / ,Ci 
and C\, E h ca//ld —» (id, x, sid,E'),®,C2 
and C2, S h e ' - » t / , / ' , C 3 
and C3 t [£'(*) -> t/], £ ' f- SM -> t/', /" , C 
and /o = / ; / ' ; / " 
By induction on e, there exists a store model S\ such that C : <S Q C\ : <Si 
verifying: 
S\ |= / : a and Ci : <Si \= Ci(loc) : r and <Si(loc) = {P,T) 
By induction on calli(i, there exists a store model S2 such that C\ : Si C C2 : S2 
verifying: 
C2 : S2 \= (id, x, sid, E') :T'^UT" and C2 : S2 (= £ : 5 ' 
By induction on e', there exists a store £3 such that C2 : S2 Q C% : S3 verifying: 
S3\= f : a' and C3 : S3 \= v' : T' 
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By the Side Effects Lemma 5.3.2, C3 : <S3 (= (id,x,sid,E') : T'-^T". By the 
definition of (=, we have C3 : «S3 |= E' : £. We define rx = addressOf (x, £), by 
the Side Effects Lemma 5.3.2, we have: 
C3 f [E'(x) ^ v'} : «S3 f [E'(x) -> (rx, r')] h & : £ ] [x , - r'] 
By induction hypothesis on Sjd, there exists a store 5 ' such that C3 : S 3 C C : S' 
which verifies the theorem. Thus, 
S' \= f" : a" and C : S' \= v" : r" 
From C2 • S2 \= E : £' and by transitivity of C, we have C' : S' \= E : £'. By 
the Side Effects Lemma 5.3.2, we have: 
C'loc t [loc - «"] : S'loc f [loc -> (p,r")l \= E :€' 
We define S" = S'loc i [loc ^ (p,r")]. By the Side Effects Lemma 5.3.2 C'loc f 
[loc •-» t/'] : 5 " =^ £ : directUpd(£',e,T"). Thus, we conclude that: 
•5" N f\ / ' ; / " ; ass^n(loc) : a; a': a"; assign(p, r", £) 
and C'loe f [loc •-> v"} : 5 " |= v" : r" and Cioc | [loc ^ «"] : S" |= £7 : £" 
• Case of (Re tu rn ) : By hypothesis, we have: 
C : S \= E : £ and C, E hreturn e —* v,f,C and £, £ hreturn e : T,£,a 
By definition of the semantics, we have: 
C,E \~ e —> v,f,C and £,£ r- e : r,CT 
By taking iS' = <S, we conclude: 
5 ^ = / : o - a n d C : 5 | = w : T a n d C : 5 | = £ ? : £ 
• Case of (Seq): By hypothesis, we have: 
C :S [= E : £ 
andCo , J B^- 5 ; S ' - > V ^ ( / ; / ' ) ,C , 
and £,£h s;s': T',£',(O; a') 
By the semantics, this requires: 
C0,E\- s^v,f,C and C . E h s ' : t/, / ' , C 
and <?, £ h s : r, £1, cr and £x,£\- s' : r', £', <J' 
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By induction on s, there exists a store *Si such that Co : S \= C : Si verifying: 
Si \= f : a and C : Si {= v' : r ' and C : Si \= E : £x 
By induction on s', there exists a store S' such that C : S\QC' : S' verifying: 
S' (= / ' : a' and C : S'\= v' : T' and C : S' \= E : £' 
Thus, we conclude: 
S' \= / ; / ' : a; a' and C : S' \= v' : r ' and C : S' \= E : £' 
• Case of (If-T): By hypothesis, we have: 
Co : S \= E : £ 
and C0, £ hif e then s' else s" -* «', (/; / ' ) , C 
and £, £ hif e then s' else s" : i/(r', r"), 5 ' A\ £", (a; if {a', a")) 
By the semantics, this requires: 
C 0 ,E h e -> v, / ,C and v ^ 0 and C , £ h s ' : t/, / ' , C 
and £, £ h e : int^ a and £, £ h s' : T', £', a' and f, £ h s" : r", £", a" 
By induction on e, there exists a store model <S] such that Co : S Q C : Si and 
C:Si\=f:a. 
By induction on s', there exists a store model 5 ' such that C : 5 j C C' : «S' 
5 ' (= / ' : a' and C : S' \= v' : r ' and C : <S' \= E : £' 
By definition, we have: 
C : S' h / ' : if {a', a") and C : S'^= E : £'/A £" 
Thus, we conclude: 
C' :S'\= / ; / ' : a; if{a',a") and C : S' \= v' : r' and C : S'\= E : £' fa £" 
• Case of (If-F): By hypothesis, we have: 
C0:S\=E:£ 
and C0, E hif e then s' else s" -> v", (/; / " ) , C" 
and £, I hif e then s' else s" : z/(r', r") , £' ^ S", (ex; if (a', a")) 
By the semantics, this requires: 
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C0,E\-e-* v,f,C and v = 0 and C , E h s" : v", f",C" 
and £, I he: tniM, a and £,£\-s? : r ' , £', cr' and £, * H s" : r", £", a" 
By induction on e, there exists a store model .Si such that Co : <S C C : «S] 
verifying Si (= / : a. 
By induction on s", there exists a store model S" such that C : Si C C" : S 
verifying: 
S" \= f" : a" and C" : 5 " |= v" : r " and C" : S" ^= E : £" 
By definition, we have: 
S" \= f" : if {a', a") and C" : S" \= E : £ ' /X\ £" 
Thus, we conclude: 
S" \= / ; / " : a; if {a', a") and C" : 5 " |= i/" : r" and C" : S" \= E : f' /A £" 
• Case of (While-T): By hypothesis, we have: 
Co : S \= E : £ and Co, E hwhile e do s —> v', / ' , C 
and £, £ hwhile e do s : «/(r', void), £' A\ £, ?/((cr; cr'), a) 
By the semantics, this requires: 
C0,E\-e-*v,f,C*ndv^OaadC,E\-s:v',f',C' 
and £, £ h e : m£M, cr and £, £ h s : r', 5', cr' 
By induction on e, there exists a store c?i such that Co • S Q C : Si and 
By induction on s, there exists a store model <S' such that C : Si Q C : S 
verifying: 
S' \= f : a' and C : S' \= v' : r ' and C : S' \= E : £' 
By definition, we have: 
S' \=f;f: cr; a' and S' \= f;f: if ({a; </), a) and C : S' \= E : £' /A £ 
Thus, we conclude: 
S' h / ; / ' : <f((a;cr'),cr) and C : S'\= v' : r ' and C : S' \= E : £' A\ 5 
• Case of (While-F): By hypothesis, we have: 
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C : S {= E : £ and C, E hwhile e do s -* uni t , / , C 
and £, ^ hwhile e do s : if(r', void),£' A\ £, z/((a; a'), cr) 
By the semantics, this requires: 
C,E\-e-*-v,f,C' and w = 0 
and £,£\- e : int^, a and £,£\~ s : r ' , £', a' 
By induction on e, there exists a store model <S' such that C : S C. C : S' 
verifying S' (= / : a. By transitivity of )=, Ave have C : S' \= E : £. By 
definition, we have: 
S'\= f: if {{a; a'), a) and C : S'\= E :£'ff\ £ 
Thus, we conclude: 
«S' |= / : if {{a; a'), a) and C : S' |= un i t : z/(r', void) and C : S' \= E : £' N\ £. 
I 
5.4 Soundness of Static Analysis 
We have shown in the previous section that our static semantics and dynamic se-
mantics are consistently related. In this section, we define the soundness property of 
our static analysis. Then, based on the consistency results of our static and dynamic 
semantics, we establish the soundness proof to demonstrate that our analysis does 
not suffer false negatives. To this end, we enrich the operational semantics with er-
ror rules that capture the undefined behaviours of memory operations. These unsafe 
behaviours result in dynamic errors that are predicted by our static checks as stated 
in our Soundness Theorem 5.4.1. Notice that our operational semantics does not 
consider modification to memory layouts during cast operations. Thus, it does not 
capture runtime errors related to type conversions. 
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Theorem 5.4.1 (Static Analysis Soundness) Let E be an environment and £ its 
type. Let C : S be a typed store such that C : S [= E : £. Let e be an expression such 
that £,l\- e : T,cr and C,E f- e —» v, f,C' o,nd C : S \= v : r and C : S (= / : a: 
• IfC, E h *e —> error then drfChk(TJ=false. 
• IfC,Eh- free(e) —• e r ro r i/ien f reeChk(V, a)=false. 
• IfC,E\~ e.ip —> error iften fldChk(V, <p)=false. 
Proof of Static Analysis Soundness 5.4.1 To establish the soundness proof, we 
define an error rule for each memory operation that has an undefined behaviour as 
stated by the ANSI C standard [75]. 
• Unsafe pointer dereference: In the dynamic semantics a pointer dereferenc-
ing error is captured by the following rule: 
C,E\-e-+v,f,C vj Ref 
C , £ h * e - > e r ro r 
In the static semantics, the (Deref) rule is as follows: 
£, £ r- e : r, a f = ref (J) drf Chk(r) 
p = regionOf (r) r' = strTypeOf (r) 
£, £ h *e : r', (a; read(p, T', £)) 
The dereference of pointer type r is guarded by the following static check: 
drfChk(r) = (f = rie/(«;))-A (K ^ void) 
A(hostOf(r) ^ {[wild], [dangling], [arith]}) 
We consider the possible values of expression e that lead to a runtime error: 
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— If v £ Ref and v = undef, we have C : S \= undef : r , thus type r is such 
that: 
(f 6 {void, ref (void)}) V ((hostOf (r) C {[ura7d], [dangling], [arith]})) 
Thus, we conclude that drfChk(r)=/aZse. 
— If v £ Ref and v ^ undef, we have C~: S J= v : r and this implies f not of 
the form ref(n). Thus, we conclude that drfChk(r)=/oke. 
• Unsafe pointer deallocation: In the dynamic semantics a pointer dealloca-
tion error is captured by the following rule: 
C, E \- e -» v,f, C ((v j Ref) V {stack(v) e / ) V (freejv) e / ) ) 
C,E \~ free(e) —» er ror 
In the static semantics, the (Free) rule is as follows: 
£, I h e : r, a f = re/( ) f reeChk(r, a) 
/> = regionOf (r) £' = updEnv(£,/ree(e), r ) 
E, £ h /ree(e) : void, £ , (a; dealloc(p, £)) 
The memory deallocation of pointer type r is guarded by the following static 
check: 
f reeChk(r, a) = (f = ref(n)) A (K ^ void) 
A(hostOf(r) = [&r']) A [stack(p,£) <£ a) 
By consistency hypothesis, we have C : S \= v : r and C : S \= f : a. We cover 
the three cases that result in a runtime error: 
— If v £ Ref and v = undef, by definition of the consistency relation C : S (= 
v : r , we have: 
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(T G {void, ref(void)}) V ((hostOf (r) C {[wtlii], [dangling), [arith]})) 
Thus, we conclude that f reeChk(r, a) = false. 
— If v £ Ref and v ^ undef, by definition of the consistency relation C : 
S \= v : T, we have f not of the form re/(«;). Thus, we conclude that 
f reeChk(r, a) = false. 
— If stack(v) € / , by consistency definition we have: 
S(v) = (p, strTypeOf(r)) and stack(p,£) € a 
Thus, we conclude that f reeChk(r, a) = false. 
• Unsafe field access: In the dynamic semantics a field access error is captured 
by the following rule: 
C,E\-e-+v,f,C' 
((v= loc@(^}i=i..n A C(loc + o f f s e t ^ ) ) ^ Vi)V (f not of the formloc@(})) 
C,E \~ e.ip —> e r r o r 
In the static semantics, the (Field) rule is as follows: 
£, i \- e : r, a f — struct {_} f lddik(r, ip) 
T' = fldType(T, if) p = addressOf (e.(p, £) 
£,l\- e.<p :T', a 
The field dereference operation e.<p is guarded by the following static check: 
fldChk(r, if) = ip € f ldList(r) 
— if v — loc@(u,-)j=i..n, by definition of the consistency relation C : S (= 
loc@(w,-);=1. „ : r , we have: 
131 
Vv?j G fldList(r) , C(loc + offset(<^)) = vt 
Since C(loc + of f set(</?)) ^ i;, then v? ^  f ldList(r) . 
Thus, we conclude that f ldChk(r, (p) = false 
— if v not of the form loc@(_), by definition of the consistency relation 
C : <S f= v : T, we have f not of the form struct{}. 
Thus, we conclude that f ldChk(r, ip) = false. | 
5.5 Guiding Code Instrumentation 
As for all static techniques, our conservative type analysis generates false positives 
and has undecidability issues. In this section, we show that our static approach can 
be supplemented with a dynamic counterpart to increase the overall precision. 
5.5.1 Static Analysis Limitations 
Our conservative type and effect analysis carries out an exhaustive coverage of pro-
grams' execution traces. Prom its path-insensitivity, it loses precision by assuming 
that all paths are feasible, thus it tends to generate false positives. Supplementing 
our static analysis with runtime checks presents the advantages of spotting feasible 
paths and eliminating false positives. Nevertheless, runtime checks induce perfor-
mance overhead on the analyzed program. As such, we should reduce resorting to 
runtime verification to a bare minimum. To this end, we classify the results of our 
static checks into three categories: 
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• A static check is successful for a given memory operation when all execution 
traces leading to that operation are safe. 
• A static check is unsuccessful for a given memory operation when all execution 
traces leading to that operation are unsafe. 
• A static check is undecidable for a given memory operation when at least one 
execution trace leading to that operation is unsafe. As this trace may be un-
feasible, we resort to dynamic analysis to spot the actual runtime error if any. 
From this classification of static checks, we deduce that dynamic analysis is used 
to handle statically undecidable program operations exclusively. We define an effect-
based approach to interface static analysis with a dynamic counterpart. The effects 
collected during the type analysis provide a tree-based model of a program that 
captures control-flow and alias information. We extract from this effect model what 
we call a dunno point that characterizes a statically undecidable operation as detailed 
in what follows. 
5.5.2 Stat ic Dunno Points 
In Table 5.5.2, we define a dunno point dunno as a three-tuple (chkTag, e,7r) where 
chkTag is a tag that describes the needed runtime check, e is the expression to check, 
and 7r represents a common signature of all execution traces that ends with the 
suspicious operation. 
' A program may have a large number of error traces, especially when it contains 
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Table 15 Dunno Points to guide code instrumentation 










(£, true) =» 7r 
(£, false) =>• 7r 
// G {alloc{p, £), dealloc(p, £), read(p, r, £), assign(p, r, £)} 
loops. Extracting all these error traces is cumbersome and useless since many of 
them are similar and lead to the same error. In order to reduce the number of 
reported traces, we define the domain pathSig , ranged over by n, that gives a concise 
characteristic of error traces. It identifies the specific branches and program points 
that define the bad sequencing of memory operations. To prevent our analysis from 
being trapped in an infinite loop, we set an arbitrary number of iterations for all loops 
in the analyzed program. 
The element (£, true) follows the true branch at the branching point £, whereas 
(I, false) follows the false branch. The notation (£,true) => (£',_) denotes all paths 
that reach program point £' through the true branch at location £. On the other 
hand, (£, false) =» (£',_) represents all paths that reach location £' through the false 
branch at program point £. The last element of a signature n is an effect element \x 
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dunnoPoint 3 dunno 
checkTag 3 chkTag 
pathSia B IT 
that corresponds to the vulnerable operation. Expanding a path signature TT yields 
all execution traces that lead to the same suspected error. 
In addition to the error traces, a dunno point indicates the needed runtime check 
by specifying a tag from the domain checkTag. As such, our analysis generates the 
following set of dunno points when facing undecidability: 
• (Wild, e, 7r =» read(_, £)); check if pointer e is null or uninitialized before deref-
erencing at program point £ for execution paths corresponding to signature n. 
• (Dangling, e, •K =*• read(_, £)): check if pointer e is dangling before dereferencing 
at program point £ for execution paths corresponding to signature IT. 
• (Bounds,e,ir => read(__,£)): check if pointer e is out-of-bounds before derefer-
encing at program point £ for execution paths corresponding to signature n. 
i 
• (DblFree, e, ir =4> dealloc(_, £)): check if pointer e is not dangling before freeing 
at program point £ for execution paths corresponding to signature -K. 
• (StackFree,e,n => dealloc( ,£)): check if pointer e refers to a dynamically 
allocated memory before freeing at program point £ for execution paths corre-
sponding to signature •K. 
• (InitRhs,e,TT => assign(_,£)}: check if the right-hand-side operand e of the 
assignment at program point £ is initialized for execution paths corresponding 
to signature ir. 
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(0, dunno U dunno') 
(!/2, dunno U dunno') 
(1/2, dunno') 
(V2, dunno') 
(i/2, dunno U dunno') 






• (FldStr, e.ip, it => read(_, £)): check if structure e has a field <p before access at 
program point £ for execution paths corresponding to signature 7r. 
5.5.3 Locating Instrumentation Points 
Now that we have defined dunno points, we revisit the output of our static checks in 
order to generate more expressive results as defined hereafter: 
• (1,0) when successful. 
• (0, dunno) when failed, the element dunno is used to extract the execution trace 
leading to an error. 
• (l/2, dunno) when facing undecidability, the element dunno is used to extract 
the execution traces that should be instrumented with runtime checks. 
As specified previously, static undecidability occurs when traces leading to the 
same operation on a given expression diverge on the safety of that operation. In 
other words, the expression in question has different types enclosed in a type construct 
*/(_, _ ) where some types pass the static check, while others fail. In Table 16, we 
define the operator © that combines the results of a static check applied on an «/(_, __) 
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A l g o r i t h m 7 Revised static checks for dunno point generation 
Function drf Chk(e, r, TT) = 
case r of 
tfiW,T") => drfChk(e, T', TT -> (^, true)) 0 drf Chk(e, T", IT -> (^, /aZse)) 
re/p(_)[dQnff(in9] =» (0, (Dangling, e, TT -> read(p, £))) 
^/P(_)[«rf(<fl => (0. (WW, e, TT ~* read(p, ^))) 
f ! / , ( J [ r t ] => (0, (Bounds, e, IT-> read(pj))) 
else =• (1,0) 
end 
Function freeChk(r,cr,7r) = 
case r of 
ifiir', T") => f reeChk(r, <r, £ -> 7r) © f reeChk(e, r ' , £ —> 7r) 
refp(_) [dangling] =*• (0, (DblFree, e, IT)) 
refp{_)[wud] . =» (0,(UnallocFree,e,7r)) 
refp(_)[arith] => (0, (Bounds,e,ir)) 
else => if (stack(p, _) e cr) then 




Function asgnChk(e, r, r ' , 7r) = 
case r ' of 
ife(Ti,T2) =» asgnChk(e,r, TI,^.—> 7r) © asgnChk(e, r,T2, £ ^ IT) 
refp{—)ri I in^»? ^ if C7? ^ {dangling, wild, arith}) then 




Function fldChk(e.yj,r,7r) = 
case r of 
ife(Ti>T2) => fldChk(e.(/p,TI,£-^ 7r) ©fldChk(e.</3,r2,^-» 7r) 







type. The combination returns a global result for the static check. For a given type 
r = ?/(r ' ,r"), if the check result for r' is (1,0) and (0,dunno) for r ' (or vice-versa), 
then the overall result for r is undecidable and equal to {x/z, dunno). Notice that 
an undecidable output prevails over all other outputs. The operator © performs the 
union of dunno points since each dunno point is related to a different execution trace 
signature. The algorithms of the static checks defined in the previous chapter are 
revised in Algorithm 7 in order to derive dunno points. Notice that we decorate the 
ife{—,—) type with a program point annotation £ that captures the location of the 
branching statement. The program point annotation is used to extract error traces 
for durino points. 
5.6 Extending GCC 
We have chosen to implement our safety verification approach as an extension of the 
GCC compiler. Our implementation is based on the GCC core distribution version 
4.2.0. We made this choice for the following reasons: 
• GCC is the defacto compiler of C programs, thus integrating our safety verifi-
cation within the GCC compiler increases its usability during software devel-
opment processes. Our safety verification is launched during the compilation 
process by simply setting its corresponding flag when invoking GCC. 
• Starting from version 4.0, the GCC compiler is based on the Tree-SSA frame-
work for the development of high-level code optimization techniques and static 
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analysis tools [97]. The Tree-SSA framework provides an easy access to control-
flow, data-flow, and type information, thus it facilitates the implementation 
of our static analysis. We also took advantage of the GIMPLE intermediate 
representation language provided by Tree-SSA. GIMPLE preserves source-level 
information about the code but simplifies complex constructs (e.g., loops are 
mapped to if and goto statements). 
To enable our static analysis, we pass the -f ipa-annot- inf erence command-line 
option to the extended GCC compiler. The normal compilation process of the com-
piler remains intact. When memory and type errors are detected, our type analysis 
pass generates warnings. We analyzed a set of real software such as openssh-5.Op 1, 
openss l -0 .9 .8 j , and a part of the Linux-2.6.26.6 filesystem in order to demon-
strate the scalability of our prototype. Table 17 gives the overhead on the compilation 
time imposed by our safety analysis. The measurements were made on a 1GHz In-
tel, 1GB Linux machine, using the GCC-4.2.1 compiler with -0 optimization level. 
During the experimentation, we activated some of our safety checks in order to de-
tect: free of dangling pointers, free of unallocated pointers, dereference of dangling 
pointers, and bad cast from integer to pointer. 
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We detected a bad cast operation from integer to pointer in the Linux kernel 
function vmspl ice_to_user ( ) ( f s / sp l ice .c ) . It actually corresponds to the well 
know vmsplice local root exploit (BID: 27704) that takes advantage of a pointer 
copied from the user space by the kernel function get_user. According to the Linux 
system call specifications, get_user is used to get an integer value from the user space 
[22]. In the vmsplice_to_user() function, the usage of get_user is not conform to 
its specification since it copies a pointer value from the user space instead of an integer 
value. Moreover, the address referred to by the user space pointer is never validated 
before being used. 
Listing 5.1: Vulnerable Linux Function vmspIice_to_user() 
error = get.user(base, &iov->iov_base); 
/*...*/ 
if (unlikely(Ibase)) { 
error « -EFAULT; 
break; 
} 
/ » • • • * ' / 
sd.u.userptr = base; 
/*...*/ 
size « __splice_xrom_pipe(pipe, Ssd, p ipe_to_user) ; 
Listing 5.2: GIMPLE Representation of vmsplice_to_userQ 
long unsigned int __val_guj 
/* ... */ 
void * base; 
/* ... */ 
D.25866 = fciov->iov_base; 
__asm__ __volatile__("call __get_user_4":"»a"__ret_gu ,"=d"__val_gu:"0" D.25866); 
base » (void *) __val_gu; 
D.25845 - ret.gu; 
error » D.25845; 
Listing 5.1 provides an extract of the vulnerable Linux code and a relevant snippet 
of its GIMPLE representation in Listing 5.2. The latter replaces the call to get_user 
with its inline assembly code where: get_user_4 is the invoked assembly function, 
ret_gu is the return value of the call, val_gu is the integer value copied from the 
user space, and D. 25866 is a temporary variable generated by GIMPLE corresponding 
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to the user space address to copy from. From the GIMPLE code, we can detect that 
the integer value __val_gu is cast to void pointer and assigned to the void pointer 
base. This cast operation fails our safety check castChk that entails that only integers 
previously derived from pointers can be cast back to pointer type. We are not aware 
of any static analysis tool that has discovered this error before being exploited. This 
experimentation demonstrates the scalability of our prototype and its potential in 
detecting real errors. 
5.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we defined an operational semantics of our imperative language that 
complies with the ANSI C standard. We enriched our operational semantics with 
error rules where undefined behaviours related to our targeted set of unsafe memory 
operations are evaluated to runtime errors. We proved the consistency between our 
static semantics and dynamic semantics. The consistency results were used to show 
that our static safety checks conservatively detect all occurrences of their targeted 
memory errors. Moreover, we defined an effect-based approach that allows our static 
analysis to be supplemented with a dynamic counterpart in order to overcome the 
inevitable static undecidability issues. We also prototyped our static analysis as an 
extension of the GCC compiler. The experimental results presented in this chapter 
demonstrates the scalability and the efficiency of our approach. 
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Chapter 6 
Automatic Security Verification 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we define our automated approach that combines static analysis and 
model-checking for the security verification of source code. As previously detailed in 
Chapter 2, software model-checking [15,32,68] is more efficient than static analysis in 
specifying and verifying system-specific security properties. Nevertheless, the state 
explosion problem is the main issue of software model-checking. The state space to 
explore grows exponentially with respect to the size of the analyzed program abstrac-
tions [38]. This problem limits the applicability and the usability of model-checking 
for large software verification. Abstraction is a well-known and established technique 
to cope with the state explosion problem. Thus, the model-checking challenge is the 
generation of a scalable and concise abstraction of programs. 
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The core idea of our approach is to utilize static analysis for the automatic gen-
eration and optimization of model-checkable program abstractions. As a result, our 
approach can model-check large software against customized system-specific security 
properties. Since we target open source software, we base our approach on GCC the 
defacto open source compiler to benefit from its language-independent and platform-
independent GIMPLE intermediate representation of source code. For the verifica-
tion process, we use the Moped model-checker for pushdown systems [107] that comes 
with a procedural input language called Remopla. As such, we automatically extract, 
from GIMPLE representations, program behaviours that are relevant to the consid-
ered security properties and serialize them into Remopla representations of Moped. 
In addition, we enrich program abstractions with a Remopla constructs that compute 
and capture data dependencies between program expressions. Hence, we are able to 
detect insidious errors that involve variable aliasing and function parameter passing. 
Security properties and program Remopla model are input to Moped in order to 
detect security violations and provide witness paths leading to them. 
The chapter is organized as follows: The software components and the overall 
architecture of our approach are outlined in Section 6.2. Specification of security 
properties as finite state automata is detailed in Section 6.3. The generation of 
program Remopla models is presented in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 is dedicated to 
our approach for handling data dependencies between program expressions. Our 
static analysis based technique for safe and concise abstraction of program models is 
presented in Section 6.6. We draw conclusion of this chapter in Section 6.7. 
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6.2 Approach Overview 
In this section, we outline an overview of our security verification environment. First, 
we give a short introduction of the software components that provide the basis for 
our approach. Then, we describe the architecture depicted in Figure 3 that integrates 
these components and the modus operandi of our approach. 
6.2.1 Tree-SSA Framework 
Our ultimate goal is to provide a security verification environment for open source 
software. To achieve our objective, the GCC compiler fulfills our requirement for the 
multi-language support. Since the last decades, the GCC compiler is considered as the 
defacto compiler for open source. Moreover, starting from version 4.0, the GCC main-
line includes the Tree-SSA framework for code optimization and static analysis [97]. 
It provides the language and platform independent GIMPLE tree representation of 
source code that facilitates the analysis of the compiler intermediate code. GIMPLE 
simplifies complex structures such as flattening loops into i f \ then\e lse and goto 
statements. It also converts expressions into a 3-address code of SSA form [44], using 
temporary variables to hold intermediate values. Working with GIMPLE represen-
tation allows our analysis to'be focused more on data modifications and control flow 
information instead of putting effort into analyzing complex language constructs. 
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6.2.2 Moped Model-Checker 
Moped is a model-checking tool for pushdown-systems based on the algorithms defined 
in [50]. The first version performs a combined linear temporal logic and reachability 
model-checking. Since 2005, version 2 of Moped comes with a new modeling language 
called Remopla, which is a C-like language and features explicit procedures [3]. The 
key feature of the new version is its implementation of abstraction refinement using 
Binary-Decision Diagrams (BDD) that enhances the performance of Moped [51]. For 
now, Moped version 2 only performs reachability analysis. 








bool , i n t , s t r u c t , enum, void 
s k i p , break, goto , r e t u r n 
i f , e l s e , f i 
do, od 
undef, t r u e , f a l s e , DEFAULT_INT_BITS 
de f ine , i n i t , module 
Listing 6.1: sample C code with Remopla Representation 
in t f ( i n t x) 
{ 
i f ( x < 5) 
X = x + 1; 
e l s e 
x = x - 1; 
return x; 
} 
void main () 
{ 
int i ; 
i = f ( i ) ; 
> 
(a) Sample C Code 
def ine DEFAULT.INT.BITS & 
i n i t main ; 
module f ( i n t x) 
{ 
i f 
: : x < 5 -> LI : x = x + 1; 
: e l s e -> L2: x = x - 1; 
f i ; 
return x; 
} 
module main () 
{ 
int i ; 
i - f ( i ) ; 
} 
(b) Remopla Code 
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Our software verification environment is based on the second version of Moped 
in order to benefit from the expressiveness of the Remopla language. A Remopla 
model of a given program consists of a set of module definitions characterizing the 
behaviour of the model. A Remopla module implements the concept of functions and 
procedures with a body that comprises a sequence of Remopla statements. Table 
18 summarizes the basic Remopla constructs. To build Remopla models of large 
C software, we automatically serialize GIMPLE representation into Remopla code. 
In Listing 6.1, we show a sample C code with its Remopla model. Each Remopla 
statement can be assigned a label that is used for reachability analysis. To verify 
whether a given label is reachable, Moped is invoked with the following command 
line: Jjmoped <Remopla_file_name> <label>. In the given Remopla sample, label LI 
is reached when x is less then 5, whereas label L2 is reached when x is greater then 
5. The DEFAULT_INT_BITS set to 5 indicates that the value of variable x can range 
from 0 to 25 - 1. 
6.2.3 Architecture 
Figure 3 depicts the architecture of our security verification environment. The security 
verification of programs is carried out through different phases including security 
property specification, program model extraction, and property model-checking. In 
the following paragraphs, we informally describe the input, the output, and the tasks 
of each of these phases. 
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Figure 3 Security verification framework 
P h a s e l : Security P rope r ty Specification 
Input: Security properties. 
Output: Remopla automata of security properties. 
The first step of our verification process requires the definition of security prop-
erties describing what not to do for the purpose of building secure code. We provide 
programmers with a tool in order to graphically characterize the security rules that 
a program should obey. Each property is specified as a finite state automaton where 
the nodes represent program states and the transitions match program actions. Final 
states of automata are risky states that should never be reached. To ease the property 
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specification, our tool supports syntactical pattern matching for program expressions 
and program statements. The graphically defined properties are then serialized into 
the Remopla language of Moped model-checker. Section 6.3 discusses the details of 
the security property specification phase. 
Phase2: Static Analysis for Pre-processing 
• Input: Program GIMPLE representation and security properties. 
• Output: Call-graph and alias information. 
Given a program and set of security properties to verify, this pre-processing phase 
conducts call-graph analysis and alias analysis of the program. By considering the 
required properties, this phase identifies property-relevant behaviours of the analyzed 
program and discard those that are irrelevant. Besides, we resort to alias analysis 
in order to limit the number of tracked variables. We only consider variables that 
are explicitly used in security-relevant operations together with their aliases. All 
other variables are discarded from the verification process. More details on the static 
analysis pre-processing phase are given in Section 6.6. The static pre-processing phase 
helps generating concise models that reduce the size of state spaces to explore. 
Phase3: Program Model Extraction 
• Input: Program source code and specified security properties. 
• Output: Control-flow driven Remopla model or data-driven Remopla model. 
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Both the program and the specified properties are translated into Remopla repre-
sentation and then combined together. The combination of program models and 
security properties serves the purpose of synchronizing the program behaviours with 
the security automaton transitions. In other words, transitions in security automata 
are triggered when they match the current program statement. Our verification ap-
proach carries out program model extraction in two different modes: the control-flow 
driven mode and the data-driven mode. The control-flow mode preserves in Remo-
pla models the flow of control of programs, but discards data dependencies between 
program expressions. The resulting Remopla model is efficiently used to detect tem-
poral security rule violations and scales to large programs. On the other hand, our 
data-driven model captures flow-sensitive data dependencies between program ex-
pressions. Hence, it enhances the precision of our analysis and reduces the number 
of false positives. Our approach for integrating data dependencies within program 
Remopla models is defined in Section 6.5. 
Phase4: Property Model-Checking 
• Input: Remopla model. 
• Output: Detected error traces. 
The model-checking is the ultimate step of our process. The generated Remopla model 
is given as input to the Moped model-checker for security verification. An error is 
reported when a security automaton specified in the model reaches a risky state. The 
original version of Moped has a shortcoming in a sense that it stops processing at 
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Figure 4 Null-checking of memory allocation functions. 




memAllocate = {malloc(), realloc(), calloc(),...} 
use = {strcat(), strncat(), memset(),...} 
the first encountered error. We have done modification to Moped in order to be able 
to detect more than one error in a run. Moreover, we have developed an error trace 
generation functionality that maps error traces derived from the Remopla model to 
actual traces derived from the source code. 
6.3 Modeling Security Properties 
In this section, we describe the modeling of temporal security properties in our frame-
work. We detail the steps from the specification of an automaton-based property to 
its serialization into Remopla representation. 
6.3.1 Temporal Security Properties 
We target temporal security properties that dictate the execution order of security-
relevant operations. We express such properties as finite state automata where nodes 
represent program states, and labeled transitions represent security-relevant program 
operations. A sequence of operations that reaches the final state stands for a program 
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Trans i t ion Label P a t t e r n 
f ( ) 
f (" foo") 
f ( ! " foo" ) 
x - f 0 
x = y 






Invocation of functions matching pattern f ( ) . 
Invocation of functions in pattern f with argument 
constant value equal to foo. 
Invocation of functions in pattern f with argument 
constant value different from foo. 
Assignment where the rhs is a function call. 
Assignment where the rhs is not a function call . 
Invocation of functions in pattern f 0 where 
the ith parameter is security-relevant. 
(* indicates a sequence of irrelevant variables) 
Entry point of programs. 
Exit of programs. 
Return from call to functions in pattern f. 
Comparison between pattern X and pattern Y. 
execution path that violates the security property of the automaton. As such, final 
states are risky states that should never be reached. For instance, the automaton of 
Figure 4 states that newly allocated pointers should be checked against NULL before 
being used. Using a pointer without performing a NULL check leads to the automaton 
error state. 
6.3.2 Pattern-based Security Automata 
To facilitate the specification of a wide range of properties, the transition labels of 
security automata support syntactical pattern matching for program variables and 
program statements. Table 19 summarizes the usage of patterns for automaton tran-
sition labels. There are two kinds of patterns: 
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• User-defined patterns for which the matching is explicitly defined by the user. 
For instance, consider the labelp = memAllocateO in the property automa-
ton of Figure 4, the variable pattern p matches any pointer variable, and the 
operation pattern memAllocateO matches malloc functions such as mallocO, 
rea l locO, and cal locO. In a given automaton, a variable pattern that appears 
in several transition labels must match the same variable at each occurrence. In 
Figure 4, the value of pattern p in label p = memAllocateO is the same in label 
COMPARE(p,"NULL"). Transition labels also support syntactic matching of con-
stants (i.e., strings and numbers) which are specified within double quotation 
marks as defined in Table 19. 
• Built-in patterns that are implicitly defined in our framework. The COMPARE() 
built-in pattern tracks the presence of a specific check in the program such as 
pointer null check or pointer bound check. The pattern takes as arguments the 
two operands of a comparison expression. Notice that we do not consider the 
boolean result of these checks. We only verify their required presence in the 
source code. We also have built-in patterns that match program entry point 
ACTION_PROGRAM_START, program exit ACTION_PROGRAM_END, and function return 
statements ACTION_FUNCTION_RETURN_f. 
6.3.3 From Security Automata to Remopla 
The second step of property specification translates a specified security automaton 
into a Remopla representation which we also refer to as a Remopla automaton. We 
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benefit from the expressiveness of the Remopla language to specify security automata 
as Remopla modules. In fact, these modules implement the concepts of functions and 
procedures in Remopla. The automaton module of Listing 6.2 illustrates the Remopla 
translation of the security automaton in Figure 4. 





states {start, statel, error}; 











state (int action) 
current.state =•= start -> 
if 
:: action == ACTION.FUNCTION.CALL.memAllocate 
-> current.state = statel; 
p - ARG[RETURN.VALUE.INDEX]; 
: else -> break; 
fi; 
current.state " statel -> 
if 
:: action == ACTION.COMPARISON 
&& ARG[0] == p fcft ARG[1] « NULL -> current.state "Start; 
:: action »- ACTION.FUNCTION.CALL.use 
&ft ARG [0] »- p -> current.state » error; 
: else -> break; 
fi; 
current.state « error -> break; 
else -> break; 
The nodes and the transition labels of a security automaton are mapped to Re-
mopla constructs, as defined hereafter: 
• Remopla Automaton Nodes: The automaton nodes are defined as elements 
of a Remopla enumeration variable referred to by s ta tes . The first line of the 
Remopla module of Listing 6.2 defines the states of the null check automaton. 
Each enumerated state corresponds to a unique integer value. We define the 
state values s t a r t and error to represent the automaton initial state and final 
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f ( ) 
f ( V 0 , . . . , V n ) 
ACTI0N_FUNCTION_RETURN_f 
COMPARE(V0,Vl) 












state, respectively. Since the security automaton actually defines the negation 
of a security property, the final state is the risky state. The integer variable 
current_state is used to track the current state of the security automaton. 
The keyword INITIALIZATION sets the variable current_state to the automaton 
initial state which is by default the value s ta r t . 
• Remopla Automaton Transitions: The automaton transition labels are 
defined as elements of a Remopla enumeration variable referred to by actions. 
The second line of the Remopla module of Listing 6.2 defines the transitions 
of the null check automaton. Each enumerated automaton label corresponds 
to a unique Remopla integer constant. Table 20 shows the Remopla constructs 
corresponding to the automaton transition labels defined in Table 19. In fact, 
the mapping to Remopla constructs for program entries, program exit, function 
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calls without arguments, and function returns is straightforward. For program 
actions that involve program variables, we define a global Remopla array ARG [] 
that stores the program variables in question and is inquired during the model-
checking process. The two operands of assignment operations and comparison 
operations are put into the global array ARG []. The left-hand-side operand is 
placed at index 0 of the array, and the right-hand-side operand is placed at 
index 1. The parameters of function calls are placed in the array ARG[] with 
respect to their position in the function argument list. 
6.3.4 Execution of Remopla Automata 
Now that we have defined the Remopla constructs for nodes and transition labels, 
we are able to define a Remopla module for each security automaton. In our frame-
work, the Remopla module move_state() defines a property automaton. It takes as 
argument the current program action, and has a body that consists of a sequence of 
statements implementing the security automaton behaviour. The following paragraph 
illustrates the execution of the move_state() module in Listing 6.2 corresponding to 
the null-check property: 
• Initialization: The variable current_state is set to s t a r t in order to initialize 
the execution of the Remopla move_state() module. 
• Action matching and s ta te transition: The move_state() module takes as 
argument the current program action that is represented by a unique integer 
i 
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value as defined in Section 6.3.3. Then, given the value of current_state, the 
move_state() module checks if the action argument matches a transition label. 
Considering Listing 6.3.3, let the cu r ren t_s t a t e be set to s t a r t , if the current 
action matches the statement q = mal loc(sz) ; then pattern p is set to the 
return pointer q stored in ARG[RETURN_VALUE_INDEX]. Besides, the c u r r e n t -
s t a t e is set to s t a t e l . 
• Error Detection: The move_state() module detects an error when the exe-
cuted transition assigns the value error to current_state. Let c u r r e n t _ s t a t e 
be equal to s t a t e l , when reaching the following statement memset (q, ' \ 0 ' , s z ) ; . 
the action matches ACTION_FUNCTION_CALL_use. In addition, the pointer pa-
rameter q matches the value of pattern p. Hence, the transition to state e r r o r 
is triggered and a property violation is detected. 
6.4 Program Model Extraction 
The model extraction is the process that translates program source code to Remopla 
representation. First, the GCC compiler serializes the source code into its GIM-
PLE intermediate representation. Then, we map the GIMPLE representation to a 
Remopla model of the considered program. The GIMPLE representation preserves 
substantial information of the source code, so a simplistic conversion of all available 
information into program models would lead to the state space explosion problem 
of model-checking [38]. Hence, we utilize an abstraction technique that we define 
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Table 21 Remopla representation of program. 
Program Constructs 
any_type v; 
f ( ) { . . . } 
f O 0 , • • • , v n ) ; 
r e t u r n v; 
vi=v2; 




i n t v; 
module void f ( ) { 
move_state(ACTION_FUNCTION_CALL_f); 
move_state(ACTION_FUNCTION_RETURN_f); > 
ARG[0]=v0;...;ARG [n]=vn; f ( ) ; 
ARG[RETURN_VALUE_INDEX] = v 




: : t r u e -> . . . ; 
: : t r u e -> . . . ; 
f i ; 
— ! : •• 
in this section to reduce the size of Remopla models. The program facts we take 
into account to construct program models are the following: variable declarations, 
function definitions, function calls, function returns, and control-flow structures. The 
handling of the aforementioned program facts is explained hereafter. 
6.4.1 Variable Declarations and Function Definitions 
Due to the limited data types provided by Remopla, we use Remopla integer type to 
represent all declared variables in source code. Each function definition is represented 
as a Remopla module with void return type and without formal parameters. The 
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translation of function statements follows the mapping denned in Table 21. Remo-
pla modules with empty body are created for library functions whose source code 
are unavailable. A function module captures two important program actions: pat-
tern ACTION_FUNCTION_CALL_f indicates the entry point of function f () and pattern 
ACTION_FUNCTION_RETURN_f indicates the return from function f 0 . These two actions 
are expressed explicitly in the function module since they may be involved in a secu-
rity property and trigger a change to its corresponding automaton state. Upon each 
function entry and return, the property automaton module move_state() is invoked 
to check these actions against the automaton transitions and change the program 
state accordingly. 
6.4.2 Function Calls and Returns 
We handle interprocedural parameter passing and return through the definition of a 
global Remopla array called ARG []. A function call and a function return initialize 
the ARG[] array as shown in Table 21. At each function call, the ARG[] array stores 
the function parameters according to their position in the function formal argument 
list. The first parameter is at index 0, the second at index 1, and so forth. A 
function return statement stores the return value in the last entry of the ARG [] array 
indexed by RETURN_VALUE_INDEX. By using this global array for parameter passing, 
we provide the flexibility to preserve in the program model only security relevant 
parameters. For example, if the second parameter of a function call f (x,y) is of our 
interest, instead of translating it as ARG[0] = x; ARG[1] = y; f ( ) ; we consider only 
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the second parameter and translate the call into ARG[1] = y; f ( ) ; . As such, the 
number of function parameters to track is reduced to the minimum. 
6.4.3 Flow Constructs 
Control-flow skeleton should be preserved in program models for temporal property 
verification. At GIMPLE level, complex control structures such as for, do/while, and 
switch) are flattened and represented using i f /e l se and goto statements. Compound 
conditions are also split and represented with multiple if blocks. This simplified 
GIMPLE representation eases our translation to Remopla. As shown in Table 21, an 
i f /e l se GIMPLE construct has a corresponding Remopla if construct that preserves 
its structure. The two operands involved in the condition are stored in the ARG[]. As 
explained earlier in Section 6.3, we do not evaluate boolean values of conditions, 
we are only concerned by their occurrence in source code. Notice that in Remopla 
translation a guard condition set to true is attached to each branch. The model-
checker Moped would explore exhaustively all conditional branches. This implies 
that the control flow skeleton in the model is path-insensitive in the sense that we 
consider all paths in the source code without pruning infeasible paths. The reason 
we sacrifice the analysis precision is to ensure the scalability of our framework. 
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6.4.4 Assignments 
As presented in Section 6.2.3, our framework can perform in two modes: a control-
flow mode that discards all data facts, and a data-driven mode that establishes de-
pendencies between security-relevant variables. In the data-driven mode, assignment 
operations are of great interest to deduce data dependencies. We define the built-in 
Remopla module assignment () to capture assignment operations and to compute de-
pendencies between variables as detailed later in Section 6.5. Assignment statements 
are translated into function calls to the module assignment (). The two operands of 
an assignment are treated as call parameters and passed to the module assignment () 
using the global Remopla array ARG []. 
6.5 Dealing with Data Dependencies 
Relationships between variables are important to detect violations of data-driven 
properties, so we need to preserve variable dependencies in Remopla models. Note 
that we are interested in whether variables are related, but not the actual values 
they are carrying.. To this end, we introduce an additional Remopla integer array 
referred to by s tack [ ] , to represent data dependencies. Given the s tack [] array, 
dependencies between program variables are tracked by simulating the effects caused 
by the following program operations: variable declarations, assignment operations, 
function calls, and function returns. The following paragraphs describe our approach 
of modeling data dependencies using the stack [] array. 
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6.5.1 Variable Declarations 
Each program variable is assigned an entry in the stack [] array. Variable identifiers 
serve as indexes for the array. The new entries are appended at the top of the 
stack array. We define the integer variable stack po in te r that refers to the first 
empty array entry at the top of the stack. We also define the module assign_entry () 
that places a new entry in the stack array and increments the stack pointer by one. 
Initially, each added entry contains the value of its index since no data dependencies 
are captured yet. In fact, we model an aliasing relation between variables by assigning 
the same values to their entries in the s tack [] array. 
We distinguish between global variables and local variables. The former are per-
manently kept in the stack [] array, whereas the latter are stored in array s tack [] 
at function calls and removed from it at function returns. More details are given 
hereafter: 
• Global variables are gathered during the parsing of the GIMPLE representation 
of programs. In the Remopla program model, each global variable is declared 
in the global scope of the model. As shown in Figure 5, the global variable i in 
source code of Figure 5(a) is defined as a global variable in Remopla model of 
Figure 5(b). The module init_global_var() assigns an entry in the s t ack [ ] 
array to each global variable of the model. This module is called during the 
initialization of the verification process marked by the keyword INITIALIZATIONS 
as shown in Line 2 of the Remopla module of Figure 5(b). Figure 5(c) depicts 
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Figure 5 Global and local variable initializations. 
i n t * i ; 
void main( ){ 
i n t *x, 
i n t *y , 
i n t *z , 
i n t *p; 
(a) C code 
Stack _ 
Pointer" 
(c) Line 8 
x x 
(d) Line 14 
1 i n t i ; 
2 INITIALIZATIONS: 
3 init_global_var(); 
4 goto main; 
6 module vo l d i n i t _ g l o b a l _ v a i 
7 i = a s s i g n _ e n t r y O ; 
8 } 
0 
10 module v o i d m a i n ( ) { 
u i n t x , y , z , p ; 
12 i n t l o c a l _ v a r _ n u m b e r ; 
13 x = a s s i g n _ e n t r y ( ) ; 
14 y = a s s i g n _ e n t r y ( ) ; 
15 z = a s s i g n _ e n t r y () ; 
16 p = a s s i g n _ e n t r y ( ) ; 
17 l o c a l _ v a r _ n u m b e r = 4 ; 
18 . . . 
19 } 



















(e) Line 15 (f) Line 16 (g) Line 17 
the stack [] array after the declaration of the global variable i. This entry 
remains permanently in the array during the verification process. 
• Variables of local scope are assigned indexes of the array when entering a func-
tion. For instance, Figures 5(d) to 5(g) illustrate the stack array after the 
declaration of variables x, y, z, and p, respectively. The number of increments 
that are performed to the stack pointer within a function is stored in vari-
able local_var_number. The latter is used to decrement the stack pointer and 
i 
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1 module v o i d m a i n ( ) { 
2 . . . 
ARG[0] = y ; ARG[1] = x ; a s s i g n m e n t ( ) ; 
ARG [0] = z ; ARG[1] = x ; a s s i g n m e n t ( ) ; 







(b) Remopla model 
(e) Line4 (f) Line5 
removes local variable entries at function returns as detailed later in this sec-
tion. Notice that the stack management utilizes a scope-based approach. In 
other words, our analysis does not consider anymore local variables that be-
come out-of-scope. This allows us to define a scalable approach to deal with 
data dependencies. 
6.5.2 Assignment Operations 
We define the built-in module assignment() to derive data dependencies between 
variables from assignment operations. Each assignment modifies the s tack [] array 
tq create new aliasing relations, and eventually to kill previous aliasing relations. As 
such, our analysis uses the array to account for aliasing information. In fact, the 
module assignment 0 considers the operation vl = v2 as what follows: 
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• The array entry indexed by vl is assigned the value indexed by v2 to indicate 
that vl and vl are aliased. For example, in Figures 6(d) and 6(e), the entries 
of y and z are set to the value x. As such, the content of the s tack [] array 
indicates that variables x, y, and z are aliased. 
• The aliasing relations that are killed by the assignment are removed from the 
stack [] array. Among all the variables that previously referred to vl, we select 
the one with the least index value and set the value of its entry to the value 
of its own index. All entries of other aliases of vl are set to the index value of 
the selected variable. For example, in Figure 6(f), the entry of x is changed to 
p to indicate the new aliasing relation with variable p created at line 5 of the 
Remopla model. To kill the previous aliasing relation between x, y, and z, we 
change the entry of y to its index value. Since y and z are still aliased, the entry 
of z is set to y as well. 
!
 Notice that we only consider simple assignment operations with no dereference 
operator. This is due to the absence of pointer type in Moped. In fact, we represent 
all pointers as integer variables. It is possible to extend the stack [] array with an 
additional entry containing points-to information, however this will drastically affect 
the performance and the scalability of Moped. We choose to sacrifice precision for 
the sake of scalability. 
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Figure 7 Function call with parameters. 
void main(M 
y = f ( x ) ; 
} 
i n t * f ( i n t *k){ 
} 














module void ma in ( ){ 
ARC [0] = x; f () ; 
module void f ( ) { 
i n t b , k; 
b = a s s i g n _ e n t r y ( ) ; 
k = a s s i g n _ e n t r y ( ) ; 
g e t _ p a r a m _ v a l u e ( k , 0 ) 
(b) Remopla model 
_E 
y _ y 
z
 JL 





y _ y 
z
 —L 
p _ p 




6.5.3 Function Call with Parameters 
In what follows, we detail our approach for handling parameter passing during func-
tion calls: 
• Remopla actual parameters: as defined in Section 6.4.2, the arguments of func-
tion calls are stored in the global array ARG [] . For instance, in Line 3 of Remopla 
representation of Figure 7(b), argument x of the call to function f () is put at 
index 0 of ARG []. 
• Remopla formal parameters: each formal parameter in a callee function is de-
clared as a local variable which is assigned the actual argument of the call. In 
Figure 7(b), the argument k of function f (int *k) is declared as a local variable 
of f () in its Remopla representation. As for all local variables, k is assigned an 
entry in the s tack [] array as depicted in Figure 7(c). 
• Matching formal parameters and actual parameters: We define the built-in 
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Figure 8 Function return. 
void main (){ 
y = f(x); 












module void main(){ 
ARG[0] = x; f () ; 
get_return_value(y) 
} 
module void f (){ 
local_var = 2; 
i n t * f ( i n t *k){ n ARG [0] = b ; ARC [1] = i ; 
. . . 12 a s s i g n m e n t O ; 
b = i ; 13 ARG[RETURN_VALUE_INDEX]=b; 
. . . 14 r e s t o r e _ i n d e x ( l o c a l _ v a r _ n u m b e r ) 
r e t u r n b ; 15 . . . 
} . 16 > 
(a) Source code (b) Remopla model segment 
x p x _ p 
y y y _J_ 
z y z z 
P P P _ P 
b I — > 
k ~ p ~ _ 
(c) Linell (d) Line4 
module get_param_valueO to perform parameter matching at function calls. 
The first argument of get_param_value() refers to the callee function formal 
parameter. The second argument indicates the parameter position in the func-
tion parameter list. The call get_param_value(k,0) in Figure 7(b) matches the 
formal parameter k to the actual parameter at position 0 in the global array 
ARG []. Since ARG [0] = x, formal parameter k is matched with the actual pa-
rameter x. The stack array of Figure 7(d) illustrates that the formal parameter 
x is aliased with the actual parameter k. 
6.5.4 Function Return 
The return value of a function is also passed using the ARG[] global array. In the 
Remopla model of the callee function, the return value is stored in the entry of array 
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ARG[] indexed by RETURN_VALUE_INDEX. On the caller side, the built-in module get_-
return_value() accesses the entry ARG[RETURN_VALUE_INDEX] to retrieve the callee 
return value. In Figure 8(a), the source code of main sets variable y to the return 
value of f (). In the Remopla translation of Figure 8(b), the module of f () sets 
ARG[RETURN_VALUE_INDEX] to variable b. The Remopla module of mainQ invokes 
get_retum_value(y) to retrieve the value in ARG [RETURN_VALUE_INDEX] and to assign 
it to y. For the sake of performance, when a function returns, we remove all its 
corresponding local variables from the s tack [] array. Given the number local_-
var_number, the module restore_index() decrements the s tack po in te r and reduces 
the number of stored entries. Figures 8(c) and 8(d) illustrate the stack array when 
entering module f 0 and when returning from module f (), respectively. 
6.6 Static Analysis to Improve Abstractions 
The model construction process described in the previous section produces Remopla 
models with large number of program functions and variables. This may lead to the 
state explosion problem of model-checking and render our approach unscalable to 
large software. To improve the performance of the verification process, the program 
model construction needs to be optimized. We achieve this goal by incorporating a 
static analysis component into our framework. By taking into account the specified 
properties, this component preprocesses the GIMPLE representation of source code 
to identify property-relevant program actions and variables that need to be preserved 
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in program models, excluding property-irrelevant information. The static analysis 
in our framework involves a call-graph analysis and an alias analysis. This section 
details how the static analysis pre-processing phase works in our framework. 
6.6.1 Call-Graph Analysis 
A call-graph is a directed graph that captures the interaction between functions. 
Each graph node represents a function, and a directed edge connecting a callee node 
to a caller node represents one or more invocations of the callee. Given a program 
call-graph, we are able to reduce the size of its corresponding Remopla model by 
performing the following steps: 
• We extract from the call-graph the chains of successive calls in which security-
relevant operations are used. All functions that are present in these extracted 
chains are translated into Rempola modules. 
• Functions that are not invoked in security-relevant chains are not considered 
during the extraction of Remopla models. 
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Table 22 illustrates the effect of applying the call-graph analysis to all programs in 
the analyzed packages with respect to the null-check property of Figure 4. We ex-
tract call chains starting form the different entry points of the considered packages, 
and identify the security relevant ones. Table 22 shows that the number of functions 
that are considered is reduced by a significant amount ranging from 42% to almost 
90%. Notice that the size of the generated Remopla model increases with the num-
ber of security relevant program actions listed in the transition labels of property 
automata. A large property automata may result in a large Remopla model provided 
that these actions are actually present in the source code. The complexity of the 
Remopla model, in terms of the number of modules it includes, is linear to the num-
ber of program functions from the considered code that contains the security relevant 
program actions. 
6.6.2 Alias Analysis 
In our verification framework, we resort to pointer analysis in order to reduce the 
number of security relevant variables that need to be tracked by the model-checker. 
The pointer analysis allows us to extract the following information: 
• Variables that are explicitly used in security-relevant operations and that obvi-
ously need to be considered during the construction of program models. 
• Aliases of these aforementioned variables that are indirectly related to security 
operations. These aliases are also considered in program Remopla models. 
i 
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• Variables that do not belong to the aforementioned set of variables are not 
considered in program models. 
The literature contains several pointer analysis algorithms that can be classified 
into flow-sensitive alias analysis and flow-insensitive alias analysis. The former con-
siders the execution order of statements in the program oppositely to the latter one. 
Flow-sensitivity increases the analysis precision at the cost of more complexity and 
less scalability, whereas flow-insensitivity scales to large program but with lost of ac-
curacy and precision. Choosing either of these two types of analysis depends on the 
usage purposes of their output. We advocate the usage the flow-insensitive pointer 
analysis presented in [45] for the following reasons: 
• Our verification approach is flow-sensitive and simulates execution traces of the 
analyzed program. Moreover, it has the capability of extracting flow-sensitive 
variable dependencies as detailed in Section 6.5. Thus, a flow-sensitive prepro-
cessing alias analysis is costly and produces information that can be deduced 
by the model-checker itself. 
• The alias analysis algorithm in [45] has a proven scalability feature [5]. 
From the results given in Table 23, we show that the pre-processing alias anal-
ysis helps reducing the number of tracked variables significantly. The average of 
the reduction is around 96%, hence the data dependencies that are derived during 
m'odel-checking are related to a limited number of variables. Notice that our data 
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dependency algorithm does not deal with some program facts such as pointer deref-
erence and field dereference since these operations require a more sophisticated data 
dependency construct to be integrated within the Remopla model of a given pro-
gram. In other words, we need at least to add a new entry to the s tack [] structure 
to capture the level of indirection of pointers (number of dereference operators). By 
increasing the size of the stack [] structure, we drastically affect the scalability of the 
Moped model-checker. We choose to keep the data dependency to simple but widely 
used constructs to achieve a better trade-off between precision and scalability of the 
verification process. 
6.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we presented our software security verification framework that com-
bines static analysis and model-checking. The combination consists in utilizing static 
analysis to automatically build model-checkable abstractions of programs. It also 
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takes advantage of the model-checking flexibility in verifying a wide range of system-
specific security properties. Our implementation is based on the TREE-SSA frame-
work of the GCC compiler and the Moped model-checker for pushdown systems. Our 
tool performs security verification in two modes: (1) a control-flow mode that discards 
data dependencies, and (2) a data-driven mode that captures and computes data de-
pendencies between program expressions. In the following chapter, we present the 
conducted experiments that demonstrate the scalability and the efficiency of our tool 
in detecting real errors in large C software. 
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Chapter 7 
Design, Implementation, and 
Experimental Results 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter demonstrates the capability of our security verification framework in 
detecting real errors in large scale C software packages. We show that our tool can be 
efficiently used for uncovering undesirable vulnerabilities in source code. The CERT 
secure coding website [2] is a valuable source of information to learn the best practices 
of C, C++, and Java programming. It defines a standard that encompasses a set of 
rules and recommendations for building secure code. Rules must be followed to pre-
vent security flaws that may be exploitable, whereas recommendations are guidelines 
that help improve software security. The CERT standard also makes another differ-
ence between rules and recommendations stating that compliance of a code to rules 
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can be verified, whereas the compliance to recommendations is not always verifiable. 
During our experimentation, we utilize our security verification framework to check 
the compliance of software packages with the CERT secure coding rules. Notice that 
we target CERT rules that can be formally specified as finite-state automata and given 
as input to our framework. These automata-based rules represent a wide majority 
of the CERT standard. The experiments presented in this chapter are conducted in 
the two modes of our security verification tool: the control-flow mode that discards 
data dependencies and the data-driven that establishes data dependencies between 
program variables. The hardware platform used for the experiments is a Dell D810 
with Pentium M 1.86GHz CPU and 1G memory that runs Fedora Core 8. 
This chapter is organized as follows: We give an overview of our Section 7.2 
gives an overview of our tool implementation and the CERT coding rules used in our 
experiments. Our conducted experiments in the control-flow mode are detailed in 
Section 7.3. The results of our experiments in the data-driven mode are presented in 
Section 7.4. We draw conclusion in Section 7.6. 
7.2 Design and Implementation 
In this section, we motivate our choice of using GIMPLE representation of source code 
and the conventional pushdown model-checker Moped. We also give an overview of 
the CERT secure coding rules used to conduct our experiments. 
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7.2.1 Why GIMPLE and Moped ? 
Our ultimate goal is to provide a security verification tool for open source software, 
thus we base our approach on the GCC compiler considered as the defacto open source 
compiler. The GCC mainline recently includes the Tree-SSA framework [97] that fa-
cilitates static analysis with its GIMPLE intermediate representation of source code. 
In fact, GIMPLE linearizes all high-level control flow structures including nested func-
tions, exception handling, and loops. Working with GIMPLE representation allows 
our analysis to be focused more on data modifications and control-flow information 
instead of putting effort into analyzing complex language constructs. Besides, the 
language- and platform-independent features of GIMPLE provide appealing flexibil-
ity features for our approach to be extended to all GCC supported languages. 
For the verification process, we use the Moped model-checker for pushdown sys-
tems that are known to efficiently model programs' execution stack and interproce-
dural behaviours [50]. Moped has a C-like input language called Remopla to define 
programs as pushdown systems. The procedural nature of Remopla facilitates the 
translation of a GIMPLE representation to a Remopla model. As such, we benefit 
from static analysis to automatically build model-checkable abstractions of large scale 
programs. Automata-based security properties and program Remopla model.are in-
put to our security verification tool in order to detect security violations and provide 
witness paths leading to them. 
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7.2.2 Macro Handling 
The GIMPLE representation of programs is closely related to the environment under 
which the program is compiled. This tight coupling between the underneath envi-
ronment and the considered code gives an appealing precision feature to our analysis 
compared to other approaches directly based on source code. Consider the following 
code snippet in Listing 7.1 taken from the b i n u t i l s - 2 . 1 9 . 1 package. For code porta-
bility purposes, the macro HAVE_MKSTEMP is checked in flif def to verify whether the 
system supports function mkstempO for safe temporary file creation. If not, function 
mktempO is used instead. A simplistic traversal of the source code would flag an error 
for the occurrence of mktempO considered as an unsafe function for temporary file 
creation. Being based on GIMPLE representation, our analysis does not suffer this 
false alert. In fact, GIMPLE representation solves the conditional jjif def, and one of 
the two temporary file functions will appear in the GIMPLE code with regard to the 
compilation environment. In our case, the machine used to conduct the experiments 
supports mkstempO which is present in the GIMPLE code of Listing 7.2 
Listing 7.1: Sample C code from b i n u t i l s - 2 . 1 9 . 1 with macros 
#ifdef HAVE.MKSTEMP 
fd » mkstemp (tmpname); 
#else 
tmpname = mktemp (tmpname); 
if (tmpname « NULL) 
return HULL; 
fd • open (tmpname, 0_RDWR 
#endif 
O.CREAT O.EXCL , 0600) ; 







=> mkstemp (tmpname); 
8401; 
-- -1) 






This points out the important fact that the verification of software should be per-
formed on the same environment intended for their real usage. Besides, the verifica-
tion should be performed on hostile environments to predict as much worst execution 
scenarios as possible. 
7.2.3 Temporary Variables 
The GIMPLE representation breaks down program expressions into SSA form in 
which each variable is defined exactly once [97]. This form of representation involves 
the definition of temporary variables that hold intermediate values. Consider the 
call to mallocO function in Listing 7.3, its corresponding GIMPLE code in Listing 
7.4 splits the mallocO call into two sub-expressions involving a temporary variable 
D.1861. 
Listing 7.3: Sample C with memory allocation 










1860 - mall 
= (char *) 












The return value of mallocO is assigned to a temporary variable D. 1861. Then, 
the latter is cast and assigned to pointer p. The usage of temporary variables presents 
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a challenge for pattern matching. In this example, variable D.1861 matches the 
pattern for the return value of mal locO, whereas variable p matches the pattern 
for the call to f r e e O argument. Without considering relations between temporary 
variables, the verification process flags an erroneous warning for the deallocation of 
an uninitialized pointer. The expressiveness of the GIMPLE representation helped us 
to overcome this challenge. In fact, GIMPLE keeps track of the original definition of 
temporary variables. In the given example, we are able to recognize that temporary 
variable D.1861 is an intermediate representation of p and avoid spurious warnings. 
7.2.4 CERT Coding Rules 
To assist programmers in the verification of their code, we integrate in our tool a set 
of secure coding rules defined in the CERT standard [2], The objective is to provide 
programmers with a framework to evaluate the security of their code without the 
need to have high security expertise. The CERT secure coding rules can be mainly 
classified into the following categories: 
• Deprecation rules: These rules are related to the deprecation of legacy functions 
that are inherently vulnerable such as g e t s O for user input, tmpnamO for 
temporary file creation, and randO for random value generation. The presence 
of these functions in the code should be flagged as a vulnerability. For instance, 
CERT rule MSC30-C states the following 'Do not use the randO function for 
generating pseudorandom numbers " 
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• Temporal rules: These rules are related to the bad sequencing of program ac-
tions in source code. For instance, the rule MEM31-C from the CERT entails to 
"Free dynamically allocated memory exactly once". Consecutive free operations 
on a given memory location represent a security violation. Intuitively, these 
kind of rules are modeled as finite state automata where state transitions cor-
respond to program actions. An unsafe sequence of operations should lead to 
an error state in its corresponding automaton. 
• Type-based rules: These rules are related to the typing information of program 
expressions. For instance, the rule EXP39-C from the CERT states the following 
"Do not access a variable through a pointer of an incompatible type'". A type-
based analysis can be used to track violations of these kind of rules. 
• Structural rules: These rules are related to the structure of source code such as 
variable declarations, function inlining, and macro invocations. For instance, 
rule DCL32-C entails to "Guarantee that mutually visible identifiers are unique ". 
As an application of this rule, the first characters in variable identifiers should 
be different to prevent confusion and facilitates the code maintenance. 
Our approach covers the two first categories of coding rules that we can formally 
model as finite state automata. In fact, we cover 31 rules out of 97 rules in the 
CERT standard. We also cover 21 recommendations that can be verified according 
to CERT. Notice, that the security properties we handle are the most relevant for 
building secure software since these 31 rules correspond to all rules of the C language 
179 
given by the BSI (Build Security In: Homeland Security) [1]. The latter is listed as 
a related source of information in the CERT website [2]. 
7.3 Experiments in Control-Flow Mode 
In this section, we detail our conducted experiments that consist in verifying a set 
of well-known and widely used open-source software against a set of CERT secure 
coding rules. We strive to cover different kinds of security coding errors that skilled 
programmers may inadvertently produce in their code. In the sequel of this section, we 
detail the results of the experimentation that we conducted on large scale C software. 
The content of the tables that present the experimentation results is described in the 
following paragraph. The three first columns define the package name, the size of the 
package, and the program that contains coding errors. The number of reported error 
traces is given in the fifth column (Reported Errors). After manual inspection of the 
reported traces, we classify them into the three following columns: column (Err) for 
potential errors, column (FP) for false positive alerts, and column (DN) for traces 
that are undecidable with manual inspection. The checking time of programs is given 
in the last column. 
7.3.1 Unchecked Return Values 
CERT Coding Rules: 
• MEM32-C: Detect and handle memory allocation errors. 
• EXP34-C: Ensure a null pointer is not dereferenced. 
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Figure 9 Null check automaton 
if(x,"0") 
_Malloc = {malloc, realloc, calloc} 
Unfortunately, programmers very often omit to handle erroneous return values 
from function calls. They make wrong assumptions on the successful termination 
of callee functions. According to the Coverity scan report, the use of unchecked 
return values represents 25% of programming errors [43]. Error handling omission 
can lead to system crashes especially for memory allocation functions that return 
null pointer on failure. Therefore, rule MEM32-C entails that the return value of 
memory allocation functions should be checked before being used to prevent the 
nasty dereference of null pointers. Besides, rule EXP34-C emphasizes that null pointers 
should not be dereferenced. Table 24 illustrates the analysis results of the security 
automaton depicted in Figure 9. 
We reviewed the reported error traces and mark them all as real errors. They 
contain a allocation operation that is never followed by a null check of the returned 
pointer. We give in Listing 7.5 a code snippet from the apache-1.3.41 that uses the 
return pointer of malloc() without null check. 
Listing 7.5: Use with null-check in apache-1.3.41 
con • malloc(concurrency * sizeof(struct connection)); 
memset(con , 0, concurrency * sizeof(struct connection)); 
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7.3.2 Memory Leak Errors 
CERT Coding Rules: 
• MEM31-C: Free dynamically allocated memory exactly once. 
Memory locations that are assigned to processes may contain sensitive data that 
should not be disclosed to unauthorized users. A process must ensure that its memory 
locations are released and cleaned up when no longer used. Failure to do so results in 
resource leaks that reduce the performance and the availability of the running system. 
In fact, operating systems limit the size of memory space a process can own to defend 
against resource exhaustion. When the limit is reached, the process is not able to 
execute and suffers a denial of service. 
To prevent memory leaks, the CERT rule MEM31-C states that all dynamically 
allocated memory locations should be freed before termination of a process. The 
automaton given in Figure 10 is used to verify the absence of memory leaks in software 
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Figure 10 Memory leak automaton 
x=_Malloc() 
free(x) 
.Malloc = {malloc, realloc, calloc} 
packages listed in Table 25. Our tools reports an error for all paths that allocate 
memory locations without freeing them prior to exit. We illustrate the different cases 
through examples in the following paragraphs. 
Sample code of Listing 7.6 illustrates a real memory leak error in shadow-4.1.2.2 
where pointer buf is allocated but never freed. 







• buf ; 
= (char *) 





system (buf) ! •» 0) 
fprintf (s 
exit (1); 
exit (0) ; 













strl en (fileedit) 
(fileedit) + 2, 




Listing 7.7: False alert of memory leak in openssh-5.0pl 
ac » ssh_get_authentication_connection () ; 
if (ac »- NULL) { 
fprintf(stderr,"Could not open a connection to your authentication agent.\n"); 
exit (2)j 
} 
AuthenticationConnect ion * ssh_get_authenticat ion.connection (voidH 
auth • xmalloc(sizeof(*auth)); 
return auth; 
} 
The code in Listing 7.7 is extracted from the package openssh-5.0pl for which 
our tool reports a false positive. In this code, function ssh_get_authent ica t ion_-
connectionO returns an allocated pointer ac. On allocation failure, the program 
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exits. Since our tool is path insensitive, it cannot determine that the function exits 
when pointer ac is null and reports a false alarm for the memory leak of pointer ac. 
7.3.3 Use of Deprecated Functions 
CERT Coding Rules: 
• FI033-C: Detect and handle input output errors resulting in undefined be-
haviour. 
• P0S33-C: Do not use vforkQ. 
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• MSC30-C: Do not use the rand() function for generating pseudorandom numbers 
Deprecated functions are quite abundant in the C library of functions. The CERT 
coding rules forbid the usage of these functions as they are readily vulnerable to 
attacks such buffer overflows, code injection, and privilege escalation. The usage of 
safe alternatives is required as a preventive measure. We present hereafter the set of 
CERT rules that our tool is able to verify: 
• Rule MSC30-C for random number generation: The randO function produces 
numbers that can easily be guessed by attackers and should never be used 
especially for cryptographic purposes. The CERT recommends using function 
random () instead. 
• Rule P0S33-C for process management: The vf ork() function suffers race con-
ditions and denial of service vulnerabilities and should never be used. Program-
mers should consider the usage of forkO as a safe alternative. 
• Rule FI033-C for string manipulation: The CERT deprecates the usage of func-
tion g e t s O , sp r in t f (), and vspr in t f () since they are extremely vulnerable 
to buffer overflow attacks. Microsoft developed safe alternatives to C string func-
tions that are documented in the technical report ISO/IEC TR 24731-1 [57]. 
The CERT standard STR07-C recommends the usage of these functions for the 
following reasons: (1) They discard the nasty "%n "format string that attackers 
use to overwrite memory locations with their malicious code. (2) They take as 
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Figure 11 Deprecated functions automaton 
argument a buffer size of type r s i z e _ t that should not be larger than RSIZE_-
MAX. The latter determines the maximum memory size a single object can have. 
(3) They ensure that strings are null-terminated to avoid buffer overflows. 

































































During our conducted experiments, we flag the occurrence of deprecated functions 
in the analyzed packages as an error that should be fixed. The automaton for the 
detection of deprecated functions is given in Figure 11. From the analysis results 
in Table 26, we deduce that deprecated functions are still used in many software. 
As illustrated in Listing 7.8, function randO is used in package apache-1.3.41 for 
password generation. 
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Listing 7.8: Unsafe usage of randO for password generation in apache-1.3.41 
/* 
* Make a password record from the given information. A zero return 
* indicates success; failure means that the output buffer contains an 
* error message instead. 
*/ 
static int mkrecord(char *user, char *record, size.t rlen, char *passwd , int alg){ 
char *pw; 
char cpv [120]; 
char salt [9] ; 
if (passwd != NULL) { 
pw *» passwd; 
} 
switch (alg) i 
case ALG.APHD5: 
(void) srand((int) time((time.t *) NULL)); 
ap_to64(ftsalt [0] , rand(), 8); 
salt [8] - '\0'; 
ap_MD5Encode((const unsigned char *)pw, (const unsigned char *)salt, 
cpw, sizeof(cpw)); 
break; 
I In the case of packages zebra-0.95a and emacs-22.3, rand() is used for time 
synchronization purposes. Listing 7.9 shows the usage of randO in the routing 
package zebra-0.95 to compute a time jitter. We do not know whether the timing 
for these programs are security relevant and cannot claim that the use of randO is 
an exploitable error. 
Listing 7.9: Using randO to compute time jitter in zebra-0.95 
rip_update_jitter (unsigned long 
{ 
return ((rand () 7. (time + 1)) 
} 
void 
rip_event (enum rip event event, 
{ 













7.3.4 Unsafe Environment Variables 
CERT Coding Rules: 
• STR31-C: Guarantee that storage for strings has sufficient space for character 
data and the null terminator. 
• STR32-C: Null-terminate byte strings as required. 
• ENV31-C: Do not rely on an environment pointer following an operation that 
may invalidate it. 
String manipulation in C programming is famous for spawning exploitable errors 
in source code such as inappropriate format string, buffer overflows, string truncation, 
and not null-terminated strings. For our experiments, we focus on the following CERT 
rules: 
• Rule STR31-C disciplines the usage of string copy functions to prevent buffer 
overflows and truncation errors that arise from copying a string to a buffer that 
is not large enough to hold it. 
• Rule STR32-C stresses on the need of a null character to mark the end of a string. 
For flexibility sake, the C language does not limit string sizes and depends on 
the presence of a null character "\0 " to mark the end of a string. The absence 
of this character results in buffer overflows and denial of service attacks. 
• Rule ENV31-C targets the safe usage of environment functions to prevent bad 
assumption resulting from inconsistent environment values. 
The risk of string errors increases even more when using string pointers that refer to 
the values of environment variables. In fact, programs' execution environment should 
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Figure 12 Environment function automaton 
X = ttynameO jr\ s 1 )-^ 
1 _STR(X) 
(s2 rd 
. , . STR(Y) 
\ . lf(Y,"0") " ^ 
Y = getenvQ^'^-^ /"^ \ ^^-<!sfR(Y) 
_STRQ = {slrlen, strcpy, strlcpy, strncpy. system) 
never be trusted and should be considered as hostile to safe execution. From this 
conservative assumption, all values requested from the environment should be checked 
before usage: null pointer checks, bound checks, and null-termination checks. The 
C library contains a set of environment functions that are widely used despite their 
notorious reputation of being unsafe. Among these functions, we have ttynameO 
and getenvC). These functions return a string with unknown size that may be not 
null-terminated. On failure, these functions return a null pointer. Besides, these 
functions are not reentrant. In other words, if multiple instances of the same function 
are concurrently running, it may lead to inconsistent states. Attackers may take 
advantage of this reentrant characteristic to invalidate the values of environment 
variables. The CERT rule ENV31-C targets the safe usage of environment functions 
to prevent bad assumption resulting from inconsistent environment values. 
We define the automaton in Figure 7.18 to detect the unsafe usage of environment 
functions. As explained earlier, we consider all string functions that are not part of 
the TR 24731-1 [57] as unsafe functions! So, using a variable that is returned from 
189 





































































environment functions as an argument of an unsafe string function is considered as a 
vulnerability. 
Table 27 illustrates the results of our experimentation for a given set of software. 
The fifth column indicates the reported error traces. After inspecting the traces, we 
distinguish false positives from what we believe to be a potential error in the sixth 
column. We discuss in the following paragraphs some of the reported errors. 
The code in Listing 7.10 is taken from program sshd of openssh-5. Opl. It triggers 
a warning when analyzed with our tool. In fact, the return value name of ttynameO 
is copied using the function s t r l c p y O . This function ensures the null-termination 
of the destination buffer namebuf provided that namebuf len is properly set. In other 
words, large enough to read all characters in name, though it should not overflow 
namebuf. If the size of name is bigger than namebuf len, then there is a possible 
string truncation error as mentioned in the programmers comments. From their 
comments, we assume that programmers intentionally did not handle the possible 
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string truncation as they do not consider it as an exploitable error. We consider this 
error trace as a false positive. 
Listing 7.10: Unsafe usage of ttynameO in openssh-5• Opl (Rule STR31-C) 
name •> ttyname(*ttyfd); 
if ( ! name) 
fatal("openpty returns device for 
strlcpy(namebuf, name, namebuflen); 
return 1; 
which ttyname 
/* possibl e 
fails."); 
truncot ion */ 
The code fragment of Listing 7.11 is taken from krb5-1.6. It is a good example 
to show what not to do when using environment variables. It calls getenvQ to get 
the value of environment variable KRB5CCNAME. 
Listing 7.11: Unsafe usage of getenvQ in krb5-1.6 (Rules ENV31-C and STR32-C) 
if Cgetenv("KRB5CCNAME")) < 
int i; 





sprintf (buf 2 , ' 
*)malloc (strlenCgetenv("KRB5CCNAME 
+strlen("KRB5CCNAME=") 




In this code, getenv() is called three consecutive times. There is absolutely no 
guarantee that these three calls return the same value. An attacker may take advan-
tage of the time race between each call to modify the value of variable KRB5CCNAME. 
• Between the first and the second call, an attacker can remove variable KRB5CCNAME 
from the environment and the second call to getenv () returns a null pointer. In 
that case, function s t r l e n O would have a null argument and would generate 
a segmentation fault. 
• Besides, getenvO is used a third time as an argument to sp r in t f () which is 
vulnerable to buffer overflow and should be avoided according to CERT rule 
FI033-C. We assume that the allocation of buf2 is successful. Between the 
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second call and the third call to ge tenvO, an attacker may change the value of 
KRB5CCNAME and set it to a larger string than the one considered for the memory 
allocation. The call to s p r i n t f 0 is then prone to overflow the memory space 
of buf 2. 
We definitely consider this piece of code as unsafe since it makes bad assumptions 
on nasty values of environment variables. 
7.3.5 Race Conditions 
CERT Coding Rules: 
• P0S35-C Avoid race conditions while checking for the existence of a symbolic 
link. 
• FI001-C Be careful using functions that use file names for identification. 
Figure 13 Race condition automaton 
CHECK(X) _USE(X) 
_CHECK = access, stat, statfs, statvfs, Istat, readlink, tempnam, tmpnam, 
tmpnam_r 
_USE = acct, au_to_path, basename, catopen, chdir, chmod, chown, chroot, 
copylist, creat, dbjnitialize, dbm_open, dbminit, dirname, dlopen, execl, 
execle, execlp, execv, execve, execvp, fattach. fdetach, fopen, freopen, ftok, 
ftw, getattr, krb_recvauth, krb_set_tkt_string, kvm_open, Ichown, link, mkdir, 
mkdirp, mknod, mount, nftw, nisjgetservlist, nis_mkdir, nis_plng, nis_rmdir, 
nlist, open, opendir, pathconf, pathfind, realpath, remove, rename, rmdir, 
rmdirp, scandir, symlink, system, t_open, truncate, umount, unlink, utime, 
utimes, utmpname 
The Time-Of-Check-To-Time-Of-Use vulnerabilities (TOCTTOU) in file accesses 
[19] are a classical form of race conditions. In fact, there is a time gap between the file 
permission check and the actual access to the file that can be maliciously exploited 
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to redirect the access operation to another file. Figure 13 illustrates the automaton 
for race condition detection. It flags a check function followed by a subsequent use 
function as a TOCTTOU error. The analysis results are given in Table 28. 









































































































































































































Listing 7.12 illustrates a race condition error in package zebra-0.95a. The s t a t () 
function is called on file ful lpath_sav before being accessed by calling function 
open(). Being based on pathname instead of file descriptor renders these functions 
vulnerable to TOCTTOU attacks as detailed in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2. 

















sav , b 
fcbuf) ~ -1) 
, O.RDONLY); 
uf f er 512)) 
{ 
> 0) 
Listing 7.13 contains a sample code that is extracted from package amanda-
2 .5 . Ip2. The mkholdingdir0 function is used inside a loop. Our tool goes through 
the loop and considers that there is a path where s t a t ( d i s k d i r , . . .) is a check 
function and mkdir (d i skd i r , . . . ) is a use function that corresponds to the pattern 
of TOCTTOU errors. We actually consider this reported error as a false positive 
since there are paths where the mkdir() call does not depend on the result of the 
s t a t ( ) check. Besides, the return value of the mkdir 0 is used to check the successful 
creation of the directory. 
Listing 7.13: False positive TOCTTOU in amanda-2.5. Ip2 
vhile (db->split_size > (off_t)0 




mkholdingdir (char * diskdirH 
struct stat stat.hdp; 
int success =• 1; 
else if (mkdir(diskdir, 0770) != 0 && errno ! 




7.3.6 Unsafe Temporary File Creation 
CERT Coding Rule: 
• FI043-C: Do not create temporary files in shared directories. 
Very often software applications create and maintain temporary files for differ-
ent purposes such as information sharing, temporary data storing, and computation 
speeding up. Usually applications store temporary files in shared folders, then ter-
minate execution and leave these files behind. This bad management of temporary 
i 
files exposes private and sensitive data and offers to attackers the possibility to hijack 
temporary files and tamper with their content. The impact of such attacks is very 
high especially when these targeted files are set with high privileges. Therefore, pro-
grammers must properly create, protect, and delete temporary files. The standard C 
library provides a set of functions for temporary file creation. However, most of these 
functions are vulnerable to various forms of attacks and must be used with precau-
tion. We detail in the following paragraphs the temporary file discipline entailed by 
the CERT rule FI043-C and modeled in the automaton of Figure 14. Table 29 gives 
the verification results for a set of packages against the security rule FI043-C. 








_Temp = {tmpnam, tempnam, mktemp.tmpfile, mkstemp} 
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• Temporary file creation: A temporary file must have a unique name to avoid 
collisions with existing files. The C functions tmpnamO, tempnamO, tmpf i l e ( ) , 
and mktempO generate a unique file name when invoked. However, these func-
tions suffer a race condition between the file name generation and the file cre-
ation that can be exploited by attackers. We refer to this error as FI043-C-1 
in Table 29. 
• Setting appropriate permissions: Since temporary files are usually created in 
shared folders, it is highly required to set appropriate permissions to these files 
to protect them against attackers. As such, a call to umask(077) must be done 
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before a call to mkstempO to limit the permissions of the resulting temporary 
file to only the owner. We refer to this error as FI043-C-2 in Table 29. 
• Race conditions: Functions that create temporary files are considered as check 
functions, as defined in Section 7.3.5, that are subject to race condition errors 
when their filename argument is used in a subsequent system call. We refer to 
this error as FI043-C-3 in Table 29. 
The sample code in Listing 7.14 is taken from make-3.81 package. The GIMPLE 
representation of that code is given in Listing 7.15. This code is quite similar to the 
code fragment in Listing 7.1. 








(mkstemp (tempfile) < 
if (mktemp (tempfile) 





Both codes use the tfifdef macro to verify the system support of function mk-
stempO. Otherwise, the system uses mktemp(). Checking for system supports of safe 
functions is a good practice for secure programming. However, this fragment is not 
error free. Suppose that mkstempO is used, its file name argument should never ap-
pear in any subsequent system call according to the CERT rule FI043-C. Hence, the 
call to fopen0 with the same file name presents a file race condition error detailed 
in Section 7.3.5. 





















In Listing 7.1, fopen is called only when mktempO is used for the temporary 
file creation. The 0_EXCL flag provides an exclusive access to the file to prevent 
unauthorized access. The error that we trigger for this code is related to non usage 
of the umask(077) call to set the temporary file permissions. 
7.3.7 Unsafe Creation of chroot Jail 
CERT Recommendations: 
• P0S02-C: Follow the principle of least privilege. 
• FI016-C: Limit access to files by creating a jail. 
CERT recommendations P0S02-C and FI016-C highly advise to follow the prin-
ciple of least privilege to secure processes execution. By the principle, a process 
should have access only to the resources required for its execution. All other accesses 
should be discarded. The main intent of this principle is to prevent privilege esca-
lation threats that may occur during a potential exploit of vulnerable processes. To 
follow the least privilege principle, the C function provides the chroot (new_root) 
function to create a virtual root directory for the owning process. After being re-
rooted, the process cannot access files outside the directory tree defined by the new 
root directory. Unfortunately, the programmers often commit mistakes when using 
the chroot () function as detailed in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2. The security automa-
ton related to the considered CERT recommendations is given in Figure 15. In Table 
30, we give the results of verifying a set of software against the chroot 0 related 
automaton. 
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We briefly recall the common errors when invoking chroot () and discuss the 
reported errors hereafter: 
• Failing to call c h d i r ( " / " ) after calling chroot(new_root) will prevent the 
process from being redirected to the confined directory. The chroot jail is in-
effective and the process can still access files outside of it. In Listing 7.16, we 
show a false positive warning issued by our tool when verifying f r e e r a d i u s -
2 .1 .3 . As mentioned in their comments, programmers intentionally do not call 
chdi rO ' / " ) to allow access to some configuration files. Though it is not, a. safe 
programming style, we consider this error as a false positive. 
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(chroot(chroot.dir) < 0) { 
fprintf(stderr, "7,s: Failed to perform chroot '/,s: Xs", 
progname , chroot.dir, strerror(errno)); 
return 0; 
Note that we leave chdir alone. It may be OUTSIDE of the root. 
This allows us to read the configuration from "-d,/etc/raddb", 
with the chroot as "./chroot/" for example. 
• Failing to drop root privileges required for invoking chroot ( ) . After creating 
the chroot-jail, the elevated privileges should be dropped in order to satisfy the 
principle of least privilege. Listing 7.17 illustrates an error in shadow-4.1.2.2 
where the root privileges are never dropped after the call to chroot () and 
chd i r ( ) . 










. . */ 
(pw->pw_dir[0] 











t change root directory 
pv->pw_dir); 










->pw. .name )); 
7.4 Experiments in Data-Driven Mode 
Ii} the second step of the tool experimentation, we enabled the data dependency 
analysis. Table 31 shows the analysis details of packages f r e e r a d i u s - s e r v e r - 2 . 1 . 3 , 
shadow-4.1.1, and ks t a r t -3 .14 . The verification time and the detected errors 
are given for each executable in both control-flow mode analysis and data-driven 
mode analysis. The Remopla data dependency handling naturally leads to longer 
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verification time. The slowdown factor given in the sixth column of Table 31 indicates 
the performance overhead induced by the data dependency analysis. However, the 
data dependency awareness of our approach renders it more precise and efficient than 
r^OPS. In fact, MOPS does not handle aliasing neither parameter passing during 
program verification as detailed in Chapter 3. 
We show in the following paragraphs the errors that we detect in some software 
packages when enabling the data dependency analysis. 
7.4.1 Parameter Passing 
The sample code in Listing 7.18 is taken from the k s t a r t - 3 . 1 4 package. Variable 
aklog is assigned the unsafe return value from getenvQ. The content of aklog is 
not validated before being passed to the security critical function system(). The 
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only check performed is a null checking of aklog. Note that our pattern matching 
approach involves syntactic matching and scope matching of variables. Thus, the two 
aklog variables involved in this error do not match since they are in two different 
scopes. 
Listing 7.18: Unsafe usage of environment variable in k s t a r t - 3 . 1 4 
void command_run(const char 
int status; 




int main (int argc , char * 
/*...*/ 
aklog = getenv("AKLOG"); 
if (aklog « NULL) 
aklog = getenvO'KINIT.PROG 
ijf (aklog ~ NULL) 
aklog - PATH.AKLOG; 
/*...*/ 










verbose ) { 
*/ 
The analysis performed in control-flow mode, without considering parameter pass-
ing, is not able to capture this error. When enabling data-driven analysis, the de-
pendency between the aklog variables is captured by handling the parameter passing 
of function command_run(). As a result, the untrustworthy source of aklog used in 
system() call is captured. 
7.4.2 Variable Aliasing 
Listing 7.19 illustrates an unsafe usage of environment variables in program su of 
package shadow-4.1.1. This error cannot be detected by our analysis in control-flow 
mode. It cannot neither be captured by MOPS since it does not handle aliasing 
relations of variables. 
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Listing 7.19: Unsafe usage of environment variable in shadow-4.1.1 
int main (int argc 
{ 
char *cp; 
const char *tty = 
if (isatty (0) && 
/*...*/ 






int console (const 
{ 
return is listed 
} 
static int 




char buf [200] , * 
/*...*/ 
, char **ar 
Oj /* Name 




" console (tty) 
char *tty) 
("CONSOLE" 
har *cfgin , 
char *tty, 
cons , *s ; 
while ((s » strtok (cons, " 
if (strcmp (s, 
return 1j 
/ * • . . . * / 
} 









!- HULL) { 
The error trace starts in the mainQ function when variable cp is assigned the 
Unsafe return value of the environment function ttynameO. The analysis in data-
driven mode generates an aliasing relation out of the assignment operation t t y = 
cp;. Besides, the handling of parameter passing allows our approach to track the 
origin of the actual argument t t y passed to function console. Variable t t y is passed 
again to function i s _ l i s t e d where it is used as a parameter to function strcmp() . 
Since t t y is derived from function ttyname, it is not guaranteed to be null-terminated 
and cannot be safely passed to s trcmp() . This error trace is tricky since it involves 
two levels of function parameter passing and an aliasing relation between security-
relevant variables. Uncovering this error demonstrates the efficiency, the precision, 
and the scalability features of our tool. 
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7.4.3 Reducing False Positives 
Tracking data dependencies not only helps to detect data-driven defects, but also 
contributes in eliminating false positives. For example, in Listing 7.20, the variable 
buffer is a newly allocated pointer. Then, pointer buffer is passed to pointer hdr, 
which is checked against NULL, preventing the use of a null pointer. The control-flow 
mode analysis cannot locate the null check of buffer and hence reports a violation of 
the null check property. On the other hand, the data-driven mode analysis captures 
the dependency between pointers buffer and hdr and would not produce a false 
alarm. 







































ldi gest) ; 
Our experimental results demonstrate that considering data dependencies brings 
precision at a significant performance cost. Like all static verification tools, we face 
a trade-off between scalability and precision of the analysis. Our security verifica-
tion tool keeps the choice between control-flow mode and data-driven mode at users 
discretion to better fit their needs. 
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7.5 Comparison with existing tools 
This section compares our security verification framework with existing tools. As 
presented in Chapter 3 MOPS is a pushdown model-checking tool for C programs. It 
has been successful in detecting programming errors in Linux kernel. The control-flow 
mode of our tool is similar to MOPS: we can detect the same error MOPS detects in 
almost the same time frame. Though the data dependency awareness of our approach 
renders it more precise and efficient than MOPS. In fact, MOPS does not handle alias-
ing neither parameter passing during program verification. Beside, MOPS has been 
designed and implemented for exclusively handling C language, our approach benefits 
from the GIMPLE representation in order to be extended to all languages that GCC 
compiles. MetaCompilation (MC) is a static analysis tool that uses a flow-based 
analysis approach for detecting temporal security errors in C code [11]. With the 
MC approach, programmers define their temporal security properties as automata 
written in a high-level language called Metal [65] based on syntactic pattern match-
ing. In our approach, we benefit from the expressiveness of the procedural Remopla 
language to achieve the same level of expressiveness of Metal. A key difference is that 
metal patterns reference the source code directly, whereas our patterns are closer to 
the compiler representation and reference GIMPLE constructs. Soundness is another 
important difference between our approach and MC approach. Our analysis is sound 
with respect to generated program model, whereas MC sacrifices soundness for the 
sake of scalability. BLAST [68], SAT [37] and SLAM [16] are data-flow sensitive 
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model-checkers based on predicate abstraction. They use an iterative refinement pro-
cess to locate security violations in source code. Both are mainly used to verify small 
software of device drivers. Despite the precision of their approach, their iterative 
process introduces the risk of non-termination and does not scale to large software. 
GMC2 [64] is a model-checker for the GCC compiler. As we do, GMC2 takes advan-
tage of the TREE-SSA framework and its GIMPLE intermediate representation to 
tackle open source software. Nevertheless, GMC2 has not been used to verify large 
scale C software as we did. 
7.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have detailed the experiments on large scale C software conducted 
with our security verification framework. First, we run our tool in the control-flow 
mode. Then, we activated the data-driven mode to enhance the precision analysis. 
We detected errors that other tools such MOPS cannot detect since they do not 
take into account data dependencies. There are two main sources of false positives 
generated with our tool: 
• The verification process is path-insensitive and may report an error related to 
an infeasible trace. This limitation applies to the control-flow mode and the 
data-driven mode of our tool. 
• For the control-flow mode, the false positive may be related to relevant data 
information that is not taken into account. We showed in the experimentation 
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results how our data-driven mode can reduce these kinds of false positives. 
• In addition, our tool does not consider runtime flow information that is not 
captured in the compiler generated control-flow graph. As such, we do not 
handle long jumps (setjmpO/longjmpO) indirect calls via function pointer, 
multi-threading with signal handlers. 
The experimentation results demonstrate the efficiency and the usability of our 
tool in detecting real errors in real-software packages. The integration of the CERT 
coding rules in our framework renders it a practical tool for assisting programmers in 




This chapter concludes our thesis. First, we give a summary of our contributions, 
then we describe the research directions that can be performed in the future as an 
extension to our work. 
8.1 Summary 
Growing assurance requirements for applications and systems have raised the stakes 
on software safety and security. Software development process should take into ac-
count safety and security attributes at early stages. A special emphasis should be 
put on the implementation phase, since the root cause of many security vulnerabil-
ities are programming errors that may yield readily exploitable code. As the size 
and the complexity of software increase, manual code review becomes an expensive 
and difficult challenge. Programmers need automated tools to assist them detecting 
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vulnerabilities in their code for the purpose of fixing them. In this thesis, we have 
elaborated approaches and techniques for the automated detection of safety and secu-
rity violations in source code. We tackled safety properties to ensure that programs 
are free from our targeted set of type and memory errors. We also considered the 
violations of system-specific security properties that we refer to as high-level security 
properties. 
8.1.1 Type and Effect Discipline for C Safety 
We described our type and effect discipline for the detection of memory and type 
errors in C programs. We extended the standard C type system with safety annotations 
and static checks to uncover unsafe memory and type operations. We described an 
annotation inference algorithm that propagates annotations to program expressions 
and applies static checks for safety error detection. Our type and effect analysis has 
a number of appealing properties that we describe hereafter: 
• Simplicity: the inference algorithm automatically propagates lightweight an-
notations and releases programmers from the cumbersome burden of manual 
annotations. 
• Effectiveness: the flow-sensitivity and alias-sensitivity of our analysis enhance 
its efficiency for uncovering insidious errors. 
• Flexibility: the type analysis can easily be combined with dynamic verification 
techniques in order to increase the precision of the overall approach. 
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• Usability: the prototype of our safety analysis is designed and implemented as 
an extension of the GCC compiler. The intent was to demonstrate that our 
analysis can be integrated within the compilation process. The safety analysis 
is triggered by simply flagging an option when invoking GCC. 
In addition, we established that our static analysis captures all occurrences of our 
targeted set of memory and type errors. To this end, we described an operational 
semantics of our C-like language that complies with the ANSI C standard. Besides, the 
semantics evaluates undefined behaviors of memory and type operations to runtime 
errors. We proved the consistency of our static semantics and operational semantics. 
Based on the consistency results, we established the soundness of our analysis in 
detecting memory and type errors. 
8.1.2 Automatic Verification of Security Properties 
For the verification of system-specific security properties, we described our security 
verification environment that combines static analysis and model-checking. The com-
bination of these two approaches consists in utilizing static analysis to automatically 
build a model-checkable abstraction of programs. It also takes advantage of the 
model-checking flexibility in verifying a wide range of system-specific security proper-
ties. The latter are modeled as finite state automata where nodes represent program 
states and transitions syntactically match program actions and expressions. Our 
implementation is based on the GIMPLE intermediate representation of the GCC 
compiler and the off-the-shelf model-checker for pushdown systems, namely Moped. 
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Our tool performs security verification in two modes: a control-flow mode that dis-
cards data dependencies and a data-driven mode that computes data dependencies 
between program expressions. The main features of our security verification tool are 
described hereafter: 
• Our conducted experiments showed that our approach can be applied to large 
software projects. We used our tool to model-check a set of real world software. 
We were also able to catch real errors in the analyzed packages. 
• The data-driven mode allows our approach to cope with aliasing and parameter 
passing that cannot be resolved using simplistic pattern matching approaches. 
• The simplicity and the expressiveness of the GIMPLE representation enable us 
to increase the precision of our analysis and to have access to valuable environ-
ment information generated by the compiler. 
8.2 Future Work 
The work presented in this thesis can be extended in different directions. We provide 
hereafter the future extension plan of our work: 
• Enlarge the set of coding errors that our type and effect discipline targets. By 
defining additional safety annotations, our type analysis can be used to detect 
a larger set of coding errors such as buffer overflows, format string errors, and 
input validation errors. 
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• Augment the high-level security verification tool with additional languages that 
GCC supports. For now, our approach focuses essentially on the C programming 
language. Nevertheless, we based our verification framework on the language-
independent and platform-independent GIMPLE representation of the GCC 
compiler. Thus, our approach has the appealing extension feature to support 
all languages that GCC compiles. 
• Interact with security hardening approaches to fix the detected coding errors. 
Our framework can be extended to provide and end-to-end solution for pro-
grammers that takes as input a source code, detects its security and safety 
violations, fix the detected errors, and outputs a security hardened source code. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I: Static Analysis Utility Functions 
We define in the current appendix the auxiliary functions used in the algorithms of 
Chapter 4. 
• Function regionOf takes a pointer type and returns its region annotations. 
regionOf : Inferred Types —* Regions 
Function regionOf (r) = case r of 
if(T,r') => regionOf (r) U regionOf (r') 
else => 0 
end 
• Function rootOf takes as argument an lvalue and returns its related variable. 
rootOf : Lval —> Lval 
Function rootOf (lv) = case lv of 
x => x 
*l'v | l'v.<p => rootOf (/;) 
end 
• Function addressOf returns the memory location of an lvalue argument. 
addressOf : Lval x Env —> Regions 
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Function addressOf (/v, S) = 
let x = rootOf (lv) 
T = £(X) 
in 
case (lv, r ) of 
(X,T) =» r s 
(w . re /^JJ => p 
(X.<P,T) =*• 7'x.offset(<p) 
(*Z„,T) =» addressOf(Z„,£) 
(*£„•¥>, r ) => addressOf (lv.<p, £) 
end 
• Function f ldType(r, tpi) extracts the type of field <pi from a structure type r . 
fldType: Inferred Types x Fields —• Inferred Types 
Function f ldType(r, y?i) = case r of 
if{r',T") =» i/(fldType(r',^),fldType(r",(p i)) 
struci{((/3j,ri,o,)}1„n => T} 
end 
• Function typeOf returns the annotated type of an lvalue argument. 
typeOf : Lval x Env —> Inferred Types 
Function typeOf (/,,,£) = 
case Z„ of 
x => £(x) 
*lv => strTypeOf (typeOf (/„,£)) 
/„.</? => fldType(typeOf(J„, £),<£) 
end 
• Function hostOf takes a pointer type and returns its host annotations. 
hostOf : Inferred Types —* Pointer Host 
Function hostOf (r) = case r of 
refp(K)r, | m ^ => 77 
i/.(r,r') => hostOf (r) U hostOf (r') 
e/se => 0 
end 
• Function updHost takes a type and host annotation and returns a type. 
updHost: Inferred Types x Host Annotations —> Inferred Types 
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Function updHost(r,7j) = case r of 
if{T',T") =» ijf(updHost(r',7?),updHost(r",77)) 
intni => intrj 
rtfp{_)v' => refp{__)v 
end 
• Function updRegHost takes a type, a set of regions, and a host annotation, and 
returns a type. 
updRegHost: Inferred Types x Regions x Host Annotations —> Inferred Types 
Function updRegHost (r, p, r?) =case r of 
«/(r',r") =» t/(updRegHost(r',/7,77),updRegHost(r",/9,r/)) 





• Function regHostOf takes a type and returns a set of region and host annotation 
pairs. 
regHostOf : Inferred Types —> V{Regions x #os£ Annotation) 
Function regHostOf (T) = case r of 
»7(T', T") => regHostOf (r') U regHostOf (r") 
r
^fP'{^)v' => {(/W)} 
else =J> /az'Z 
end 
• Function updFld takes a type, a field label, and another type, and returns a 
type. 
updFld: Inferred Type x Field x Inferred Type —* Inferred Type 
Function updFld(r, y>, r ') =case r of 
if(Ti,T2) => z/(updFld(ri, <,o, r ' ) , updFld(r2, </?, r ')) 
sfructf^.i/Ji^i)}!.^ => sJruc^T/.vjj.o;)}!..,, 
(T/ = r ' if & = ^ 
where < 
IT/ = Tj otherwise. 
end 
• Function RegSeqOf takes a pointer type and returns its sequence of region an-
notations. 
RegSeqOf ; Inferred Types —> Sequence of Regions 
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The symbol + denotes the concatenation operator. 
Function RegSeqOf (r) = case r of 
re/,(*)i? =*• \p\ 
if(T>T') => RegSeqOf (r) + RegSeqOf (T') 
else => 0 
end 
• Function HostSeqOf takes a pointer type and returns its sequence of region 
annotations. 
HostSeqOf : Inferred Types —» Sequence of Host Annotations 
The symbol + denotes the concatenation operator. 
Function HostSeqOf (r) = case r of 
refp(K)n =*• [»?] 
m ^ = > • [77] 
if(T,Tf) => HostSeqOf (r)@HostSeqOf(r') 
e/se =*> 0 
end 
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